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Abstract
The first third of this thesis argues for a B-theoretic conception of time
according to which all times exist equally and the present is in no way
privileged. I distinguish “ontological” A-theories from “non-ontological”
ones, arguing that the latter are experientially unmotivated and barely
coherent. With regard to the former, I focus mainly on presentism. After
some remarks on how to formulate this (and eternalism) non-trivially, I
review the non-relativistic case against presentism. I then consider the
impact of Special Relativity on the debate, and attempt to deepen this
impact by supplying a modal variation on the standard arguments.
The middle third of the thesis investigates persistence, contending that
both endurance and perdurance are consonant with the eternalism already
endorsed. After introducing these theories of persistence, and discussing
in particular how best to formulate an eternalist endurance, I proceed
to defend the coherence of this combination. The Problem of Change is
addressed here. I then respond in some detail to recent allegations of rel-
ativistic threats to endurance.
The final third of the thesis questions the validity of the endurantist-
perdurantist dispute. I criticize two recently proposed translation schemes
that aim to show this dispute to be non-substantive. However, the second
scheme suggests a doctrine of “Ontological Equivalence” which I develop
and consider. I then address the Rotating Discs Argument, using this to
launch a discussion of identity, genidentity, and the relationship between
them.
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Introduction
This thesis has three main components. The first argues for a B-theoretic under-
standing of time according to which the present is in no way privileged. The second
addresses persistence, contending that both endurance and perdurance are compati-
ble with this theory of time. The third component asks whether the debate between
endurantist and perdurantist might be less than substantive.
Now for a little more detail. I start in Chapter One by distinguishing between
“ontological” and “non-ontological” A-theories: the former assert the present to be
existentially privileged; the latter that the present is privileged in some other way.
Non-ontological A-theories are soon rejected; I argue that they are experientially un-
motivated and of doubtful coherence. The focus then shifts to ontological A-theories,
and in particular presentism: the view that only the present exists. This I contrast
with eternalism, which holds that all times exist equally. After discussing how best
to formulate the debate between these theories, I rehearse three weighty objections
to presentism. I then consider and reject various presentist responses, before sug-
gesting that eternalism fares well in comparison. Next I give brief consideration to
two further ontological A-theories: McCall’s “branching future” model and (what I
call) “past-and-presentism”. Although my rejection of these is less firm than with
presentism, I nonetheless regard them as somewhat unappealing.
Their lack of appeal arises in part due to relativistic complications. In Chap-
ter Two I bolster the assault on the various A-theories by considering the lessons
of Special Relativity (SR). Here presentism ‘goes proxy’ for A-theories more gener-
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ally; I discuss the difficulties in formulating presentism in the absence of an absolute
simultaneity. Might SR simply fail to acknowledge a hidden absolute simultaneity
though—and one that would allow presentism to be formulated without difficulty?
In the second half of Chapter Two I contend that the presentist must claim more
than this. I argue that their doctrine is necessarily true if true at all, and thus even
the possibility of SR should unnerve them. I further argue that it is implausible to
regard SR as not just false, but even impossible. I thus conclude my case against
presentism and the A-theory in general.
Chapter Three introduces two theories of persistence: endurance and perdurance.
As I shall understand it, the latter takes objects to be temporally extended, with
“genidentical” temporal parts for each sub-division of their duration. Endurance, by
contrast, is supposed to replicate our natural conception of persistence. In rough
terms it holds that objects are “wholly present” whenever they exist; but smoothing
out this roughness is the major task for the chapter.
Perdurance and eternalism make for easy bedfellows. Eternalist endurance, by
contrast, has attracted accusations of paradox and an inability to cope with change.
These accusations are considered and rejected in Chapter Four, with particular at-
tention being paid to the “Problem of Change”. In fact I fail to locate a difficulty
worthy of this name.
Several recent articles have tried to argue from SR to the falsity of endurance.
In Chapter Five I further the defence of (eternalist) endurance by disarming these
various arguments.
In Chapter Six I change tack once more. By this stage I have endorsed eternalism
but remained neutral between endurance and perdurance. Might these ‘theories’ of
persistence in fact be one and the same though? Or might they be distinct, yet with
no ‘fact of the matter’ to decide between them? After a brief sketch of this last view,
I examine two recent translation schemes that have been suggested with the aim
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of establishing equivalence between endurance and perdurance. I have reservations
about each of these schemes, but go on to develop one of them in a different guise:
Ontological Equivalence (OE) holds that endurantist and perdurantist countenance
the very same entities, but merely label these differently. I consider how best to
motivate and support OE, and also some (serious) objections to it.
According to endurance, something three dimensional existing at one time is iden-
tical to something three dimensional existing at another. This is false of the three-
dimensional entities countenanced by the perdurantist; instantaneous temporal parts
at different times may be “genidentical”, but they are nonetheless distinct. In Chapter
Seven I consider identity and genidentity in more detail, beginning with the Rotating
Discs Argument (RDA). What determines the state of rotation of a symmetric, homo-
geneous disc? Not lines of spatiotemporal continuity or qualitative similarity running
through the disc over time; such continuities would run ‘every which way’. The RDA
is standardly thought to be a perdurantist problem; and one solution is to posit brute
relations that hold between segments of (the temporal parts of) the disc at different
times. If these relations trace out straight lines the disc does not rotate; if helices,
it does. Nonetheless, I argue against these brute relations; and I then repeat these
arguments against a primitivism about identity. As to how we should understand
identity, I contend it reduces to its apparent criteria; there is no “further fact” here
beyond the holding of those criteria. This brings identity closer to genidentity, and at
this point I reconsider the idea that endurance and perdurance might be alternative
yet equally correct ways to describe the world. Finally, I turn to certain ‘puzzle cases’
that involve (what would ordinarily be thought of as) identity over time. I ask to what
extent the endurantist might mimic the perdurantist’s solutions here, and what they
need embrace in order to do so. As with much of the chapter, this enquiry is clearly
relevant to anyone sceptical about the distinctness of endurance and perdurance. But
I intend my conclusions here to be of broader interest as well.
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Chapter 1
Against The A-Theory
1.1 Introduction
Is the present privileged? The A-theorist says that it is. Such privilege may take
different forms though. Perhaps the present is a boundary of all that exists. Or
perhaps the present is all that exists (it is privileged in a rather trivial way). Then
again, perhaps all times exist, rather as all places do, but the present is nonetheless
privileged in some other way.
These possibilities are not exhaustive, but they suggest an exhaustive partition.
Ontological A-theories privilege the present in an existential manner, for example by
asserting that only the present is real or exists. Non-ontological A-theories may yet
make existential claims, for example that all times exist equally, but the point is
that according to these A-theories the present, whilst privileged, is not existentially
privileged.
I am not an A-theorist of either stripe. Instead I am a B-theorist, believing the
present to be in no way privileged. That entails (inter alia) that it possesses no
special, transient, property; that it is not related to any special, transient, entity;
and that it is not all, or even the edge, of what exists. The present is only privileged
insofar as it is where we happen to be—which is to say it is not privileged at all.
My B-theoretic views also commit me to a rejection of tense. We make very many
tensed assertions, for example that “Jim was bearded but is now clean shaven”.
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How should we understand these? It is nowadays agreed that (tokens of) tensed
propositions are not translatable into tenseless ones, but perhaps they may be given
tenseless truth conditions. The detenser thinks they can: an utterance u at time t
of “It is now raining” is (tenselessly) true iff (i) it (tenselessly) rains simultaneously
with u, or (ii) it (tenselessly) rains at t.1 The tenser, on the other hand, thinks that
u’s putative truth derives from the privilege that then accords to (events at) t. For
example, the rain-event in question might then possess the irreducible, transitory
property of being present. Alternatively, for a tenser who holds that only the present
exists, u would be true iff reality then contains a rain-event.2
It is arguable that one could be an A-theorist and detenser.3 But if the present is
not privileged then clearly tensed assertions cannot be true in virtue of this privilege.
Thus the B-theorist is also a detenser, and in arguing against the A-theory I argue
eo ipso against tense.
In what follows I discuss: non-ontological A-theories (§1.2); the formulation of
ontological A-theories (§1.3); and the problems associated with ontological A-theories
(§1.4).
1.2 Non-Ontological A-Theories
My rejection of non-ontological A-theories involves two explicit components and a
third, less explicit, one. The first component (which follows in §1.2.1) contends that
the properties or relations countenanced by the non-ontological A-theorist make no
difference whatsoever to our experience; they are empirically undetectable. I take it
that this is a significant conclusion, since experiential factors are generally reckoned
to support non-ontological A-theories. In §1.2.2 I go on to argue that such theories
1Mellor (1998:xi–xii, 31–34) has switched allegiance from (i) to (ii) here. The shift is in response
to criticisms of (i) by e.g. Smith (1993:67–93).
2Or at least this is a natural analysis. Tooley (1997) is a detenser who believes that only past
and present exist; perhaps one could similarly be a detenser whilst taking only the present to exist.
3See previous footnote.
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are barely even coherent. I think the arguments of these two sections suffice to render
non-ontological A-theories deeply unattractive. In addition, I will discuss in Chapter
Two the relativistic difficulties that beset a particular ontological A-theory. This focus
should not disguise the fact that relativity is no less of a worry for non-ontological
A-theories.
1.2.1 Arguments From Experience
What is a non-ontological A-Theory? It holds the present to be privileged, but not
in an existential way. How much more can be said? Perhaps little, if the privilege
in question is brute. But an analogy (from Broad) may at least help us to get our
bearings:
We are naturally tempted to regard the history of the world as existing
eternally in a certain order of events. Along this, and in a fixed direction,
we imagine the characteristic of presentness as moving, somewhat like
the spot of light from a policeman’s bull’s-eye traversing the fronts of the
houses in a street. What is illuminated is the present, what has been
illuminated is the past, and what has not yet been illuminated is the
future.
(1923:59)4
The question for this section is whether the ‘illumination’ of the present is in any way
detectable. In other words: are there experiential reasons to believe in non-ontological
A-theories?5
The first thing to say is that (a quality of) presentness is not directly experienced.
It is surely not heard, smelt, touched or tasted. Nor, despite Broad’s metaphor of
4Note that Broad is merely explicating the view in question; he does not endorse it.
5In answering this question I write for the most part as if the (non-ontological) A-theorist believes
in just one irreducible A-property, namely that of presentness. Variations are possible though.
The A-theorist might also believe in irreducible properties of pastness and futurity, even though
these could seemingly be reduced to just presentness and the B-relations of ‘earlier/later than’.
Alternatively they might believe that presentness is not a monadic property at all, but rather a
relation to some (presumably extra-temporal) entity. (See McTaggart (1927:19–20).) My comments
in what follows apply mutatis mutandis to these variations.
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a spotlight, is it obviously visible: an artist depicting the scene before me need not
consider how best to exhibit its presentness. Mellor notes that
We cannot [. . . ] refute someone who claims to see the future in a crystal
ball by pointing to the visible pastness of the scene it shows, since there is
no such thing. Whether it is past or future, the scene will look the same.
(1998:5)
Here we might add that the scene would look no different were it present. In addition
I take it that the A-theorist cannot simply hold presentness to be just intuited, plain
and simple, by some extra-sensory mechanism. This is both implausible and obscure.
The unobservability of presentness means that its constant transition from event
to event cannot account in any direct way for our constantly changing experience.
This threatens to deprive the A-theorist of a potential argument for their thesis.
However, presentness might have indirect experiential effects. At least initially, we
might think that although we directly encounter no quality of presentness, we do
experience what is present—and only what is present.
The latter part of this intuition might be vindicated by either a Berkeleian idealism
or an indirect realism according to which we strictly perceive only sense data or mental
‘images’. But the A-theory as standardly formulated is very much a realist position,
attributing presentness to objects and events far beyond the purely mental; and I
take it that A-theorist claims about the ‘presence of experience’, whilst perhaps a
little vague, are not meant to invoke the representative theory of perception. With
these misunderstandings set aside, we may observe that in fact we do not experience
what is (then) present: consider the stars at night, or the faraway thunder. Nor do we
(now) experience distant entities that are (now) present. Perceptual processes take
time.
Indeed, consideration of perceptual processes explains precisely which entities we
perceive, and when we perceive them, without recourse to a property of presentness.
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Consider an event E which we could potentially perceive via a certain causal process
P . P ‘travels’ at a particular speed, SP (e.g. when P involves vision and E is very
distant, SP is roughly the speed of light). A P -based perception that occurs at the
origin of a set of spacetime axes will then be of E only if E lies at a spacetime point
(x, t) such that x/t = SP (give or take a minus sign). To repeat: presentness features
nowhere in this account. The reason for our non-perception, at a particular time, of
very many objects and events is not that these objects and events lack some privileged
property. It is rather that they are at spacetime locations inappropriate to perception
at that time.
There is also the potential here for a B-theoretic account of our changing experi-
ence. At any given time we perceive only those objects and events that are, or were,
at spacetime locations separated from us by a distance appropriate to the perceptual
mechanism in question. What we experience changes from moment to moment, but
the B-theorist should expect this: the happenings at locations such that they are
perceived at (x, t) are distinct from those at locations appropriate to perception at
(x+ δx, t+ δt).6
Permit the A-theorist a final experiential sally. Consider some of our emotions
and attitudes towards the world: relief, fear, regret, etc. Building on Prior’s (1959)
suggestion, we might say “Thank goodness that’s over” at the end of a painful ex-
perience such as a headache. In so saying, we can hardly be thanking goodness that
6Note, however, that this explains the succession of experiences, rather than any apparent ex-
perience of succession. The latter might simply refer to perceptions of the form that a follows b.
But an “experience of succession” might also suggest an experience of transience. Thus it is held by
some that even in a single perception we experience an object as moving ; that we hear the very con-
tinuity of a sustained bell-chime; and that there is more generally a kind of ‘felt progression’ to our
experience. (It is hard to capture the precise phenomenology, but I sympathize with the attempt.)
I think a definitive B-theoretic treatment of these topics is yet to emerge. Mellor (1998:122–123)
tries to explain our perception that a follows b in terms of lingering traces or memories; and Dainton
(2001:102–106) posits a succession of partly overlapping and temporally extended acts of awareness
to ground the apparent perception of flow. (It may also be that each of these accounts could in fact
address the other datum.) However, the crucial point for our purposes is that it is not at all obvious
how an A-theoretic explanation would proceed here—especially given the seeming unobservability
of any property of presentness.
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the headache ended at 10:39 on the 19th February 2007. That in itself is a strange
thing to feel thankful about, but moreover for the B-theorist it is in some sense ‘ever
true’ that the headache ends at that time. Why, then, thank goodness only after the
event?7
At some level the A-theorist doubtless grounds our relief in the fact that the
headache is (by then) past. Yet the B-theorist can parrot this, at least initially, since
they also regard “the headache is past” as true after (and only after) its terminus.
Where the B-theorist cannot follow is into the territory of irreducible properties: the
A-theorist thinks that once it is over the headache possesses just such a property
(namely, pastness).8 But now we can mount a tu quoque against the A-theorist, for
it is hardly plausible that what we thank goodness for is the headache’s possessing
some irreducible, undetectable and rather mysterious property. Mimicking Prior:
“Why should anyone thank goodness for that?” (1959:17).
It is similar with respect to the timing of our gratitude. The initial A-theorist
thought is surely that it is appropriate to thank goodness only after the headache’s
end because only then is the headache past. But if this just means that only then
does the headache possess the irreducible property of pastness, it seems odd that we
should be so thankful. Why not be similarly thankful—rather than apprehensive—
when a headache possesses the irreducible property of futurity? What is there about
these irreducible properties that grounds our differential reactions?
It is no help to say that past headaches are not painful. Future headaches are
presumably no more painful, yet we feel no sense of relief with regard to these. Nor
would it clarify matters to reply that future headaches will be painful; one could
analogously reply that past headaches were painful.9
7For B-theorist responses, see Mellor (1981b) along with MacBeath’s (1983) reply (which Mellor
(1983) then endorsed). In what follows I am influenced by Garrett (1988).
8Or they think that it is earlier than certain events which themselves possess the irreducible
property of presentness. See fn.5.
9An ontological A-theorist—in particular one such as Prior who grants reality only to the
present—might attempt to ground our relief in the fact that past headaches do not exist. This
9
Clearly there is a past-future asymmetry in our attitudes. With regard to un-
pleasant experiences, we are apprehensive before they occur, and relieved afterwards.
Both A-theorist and B-theorist agree that we feel relief when and only when the
headache is past, but on neither account does what grounds this pastness also ground
our relief. Alternative explanatory avenues might involve the direction of causation
(and hence effective action), adrenal/hormonal considerations, or perhaps a mixture
of factors. But the important moral for our purposes is that when it comes to those
emotional reactions that are alleged to support the A-theory, on closer examination
the support proves insubstantial.
1.2.2 A Charge Of Incoherence
It seems, then, that there is little if anything in our experience to recommend a
non-ontological A-theory. I now focus briefly on these theories in themselves, asking
whether they are even coherent. Much of this is familiar territory, well trodden by
Broad (1938:277–279) and many others since.10
Our initial question is not how times or events may be privileged, but rather when
they are supposed to be privileged. The quick answer is: when they are present. But
when is this? Time t is of course present at t; t′ is present at t′; and so on. Does
this allow for any real privilege though? Every time is at that time ‘special’, but this
seems more suggestive of parity than privilege. After all, consider what appears to be
a spatial analogy: in Oxford, Oxford is doubtless ‘special’ in some sense; whereas in
Slough, it is Slough that is ‘distinguished’. These facts suggest no privileged property
or relation that varies over space; instead they signify just spatial equality.
In reply an A-theorist might reject as inappropriate the very question as to when
manoeuvre also fails to establish an asymmetry though: on the view in question, future headaches
are equally non-existent.
10However, I shall not comment on one particularly well-trodden patch: I remain unconvinced by
McTaggart’s (1908; 1927:9–22) arguments against the A-theory, but will not add to this (enormous)
literature.
10
a particular time is privileged. Perhaps we can ask temporal questions of objects in
time, but not of times themselves. What would become of the A-theorist’s central
thesis though? If they abjure the view that a particular time is privileged at some
particular time, what can they say instead? Not that one time is privileged full stop;
that would hardly be a dynamic view. Nor, on pain of embracing parity once more,
can it be said that all times are privileged simpliciter. Then again, perhaps we are
dealing with an A-theorist who thinks rather that it is objects and events that are
privileged. However, they would surely believe that simultaneous objects and events
are privileged at one and only one time, and so we seem perfectly entitled to ask
when this is. Once more we find that t1-located objects and events are privileged
at t1, t2-located objects and events at t2, and so on. Once more we should question
whether there is any real privilege here. Varying the analogy somewhat, it sounds
like a view according to which I am ‘special’ for me, you are ‘special’ for you, etc.
The reality is that this makes none of us particularly special.11
The A-theorist could retort that there is simply a fundamental difference between
time (on the one hand) and space or personhood (on the other). Brute posits will
hardly endear their theory to us though; ideally they could amplify a little. A temp-
tation is to do so using the familiar metaphor of flow.12 The difficulty is that the
metaphor crumbles on but a little examination. Movement is change in spatial po-
sition with respect to time, and indeed we can seemingly ask of any type of change,
whether movement or otherwise, how fast it proceeds. It is at best trivial and at
worst nonsensical to answer, as Prior does, that the present flows at “an hour per
hour, a second per second” (1968:2–3). Should these units not be ‘cancelled top and
11Here we might follow Savitt (2000:S568) in borrowing a line from Gilbert and Sullivan’s The
Gondoliers:
“When every one is somebodee,
Then no one’s anybody!”
12Recall from §1.2.1 both Broad’s ‘spotlight’ analogy and my remarks on the “experience of
succession” (fn.6).
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bottom’, only to reveal that time actually flows at one (whatever that means)? Or
alternatively, if we retain the “second per second” etc., then as Price (1996:13) ob-
serves, “[w]e might as well say that the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its
diameter flows at pi seconds per second!” (since pi is similarly dimensionless).
But in fact there is a respectable precedent for the employment of phrases such as
“an hour per hour, a second per second”. The gradient of a hill might be ‘one in ten’,
indicating that the hill rises one metre for every ten metres ; and indeed the gradient
might even be ‘one in one’. Note, however, that this involves two distinct scales: a
vertical distance and a horizontal one. In a similar vein, the A-theorist might resort to
a meta-time when confronted with embarrassing questions as to how fast time flows.
But in fact this manoeuvre only heightens the embarrassment. No empirical evidence
supports the posit of a meta-time, and it is unclear even what could support it. In
addition, the meta-time fails to solve the initial problem. Denoting standard times
in lower case and meta-times in upper case, suppose that tn is present at Tm, tn+1 at
Tm+1, etc. Perhaps presentness then flows at one second per meta-second; but this
answer seems to depend solely—and rather worryingly—on how one calibrates the
meta-time. One second per meta-minute is just as valid an answer. As to privilege,
perhaps it is more informative to learn that tn is privileged at Tm etc. than that,
for all n, tn is privileged at tn. But it remains the case that each (standard) time is
privileged at one (and presumably only one) moment of meta-time; so parity rules
once more. Unless, that is, we can be convinced that a particular moment of meta-
time is privileged. But if meta-times are privileged then we might ask when they are
privileged, in which case a regress seems likely. And if we had the tools to exhibit
genuine privilege within the meta-time series, why would we not have employed these
with respect to standard time in the first place—thus obviating the need for the
meta-time?
Doubtless a die-hard non-ontological A-theorist will not just roll over. However,
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I think our discussion licences at least the tentative conclusion that non-ontological
A-theories are on shaky ground. In §1.2.1 I argued that no property of presentness is
revealed by experience, whether directly or indirectly. In this section I have argued
that the ‘movement’ of such a property is an embarrassment to the A-theorist, and
that the ‘privilege’ it accords to various times is in fact no privilege at all. To these
objections Chapter Two will add relativistic complications that worsen the prospects
for non-ontological A-theories still further. I therefore think it reasonable to disregard
such theories, and I turn instead to their ontological brethren.
1.3 Ontological A-Theories: Formulation
1.3.1 The Initial Problem
Ontological A-theories hold that the present is existentially privileged. Presentism is
the most popular such theory; it holds, roughly, that only present things exist.13 A
denial of presentism that is nonetheless an ontological A-theory is what I shall call
past-and-presentism. Predictably enough, this holds that only past and present exist;
the future remains unreal.14 A further variation is McCall’s (1976, 1994) ‘branching
future’ model which takes the future to consist of many real but as-yet-unactualized
possibilities.
Opposed to these A-theories is eternalism. This is the view that all objects, or
perhaps all times, exist equally; the present is not ontologically privileged.15 For the
13This phrasing is from Crisp (2004:15) and Keller (2004:84). For alternative formulations see
§2.5.1; but no presentist (that I know of) explicitly accepts one formulation whilst rejecting others.
14Past-and-presentism is also known as “possibilism” or the “growing block theory”. Versions of
this theory have been held by Broad (1923:65–70) and more recently Tooley (1997).
15Lest it be thought otherwise, it is worth pointing out explicitly that on my terminology the
eternalist need not be a B-theorist. One might espouse eternalism (i.e. believe that all times exist
equally) and yet maintain that a particular time is non-ontologically privileged; indeed such theories
were the very subject of §§1.2.1 and 1.2.2 (albeit with the eternalism more muted). For further ex-
plication (though not a defence) of such views see Broad (1923:59–60, 1938:277–280) and McTaggart
(1927:13).
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most part I shall follow recent fashion in regarding the debate as between eternalists
and presentists ; but I will also discuss McCall’s theory along with past-and-presentism
in §1.4.4.
The debate between presentist and eternalist has become a ‘hot topic’ in meta-
physics.16 Nonetheless, various sceptics allege that there is no substantive disagree-
ment here, but rather just equivocation over meanings.17 The precise complaint
begins with the presentist’s claim that
Only present things exist. (Pr)
This “exist” might have either of two meanings, resulting in two disambiguations:18
Only present things exist now. (Pra)
Only present things existed, exist, or will exist. (Prb)
(Pra) appears to be true, and trivially so. This resonates with some comments by
Zimmerman (himself a presentist); he writes that the presentist thinks that “ ‘x exists’
is trivially equivalent to ‘x exists at present’ ” (1996:117). The suspicion that this
renders the presentist thesis trivially true is confirmed by Zimmerman’s analogy with
the actualist who, at least according to him, “wants her thesis to be ‘trivially true’ ”
(1996:17).19
The trivial truth of (Pra) might seem to secure the presentist’s thesis, but a twofold
problem arises. First, the eternalist will also assert that only present things exist now,
16The tip of the recent iceberg includes Bigelow (1996), Callender (2000), Crisp (2003, 2004),
Davidson (2003), Hinchliff (1996, 2000), Keller (2004), Lewis (2004), Markosian (2004a), Merricks
(1999), Meyer (2005), Rea (2003), Saunders (2002), Savitt (2000), Sider (1999, 2006), Smith (2002)
and Zimmerman (1996, 1998a).
17This worry was initially raised by Lombard (1999:254–255); it receives fuller attention in Crisp
(2003, 2004), Meyer (2005) and Sider (2006).
18I continue to borrow (most of) Crisp’s (2004:16) phrasing and labels (but I differ over the italics).
19Rea (2003:253) is close to (and acknowledges) Zimmerman here. But I am not entirely sure of
Zimmerman’s view. In a later article he repudiates the thought that presentism might be “a pointless
tautology”, claiming instead that “it is a substantive thesis” (1998a:209). How can something be
both trivially true and a substantive thesis?
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in which case no disagreement is apparent. Secondly, the nature of their dispute,
at least as usually pursued, is paradigmatically philosophical: the disputants trade
intuitions, implications, denials, counter-assertions, etc. None of this is appropriate if
the view in question is supposed to be analytically true. Adopting (Pra) would mean
that presentists and eternalists are radically confused about their own doctrines.
We turn to (Prb) then. It seems obviously false; as Crisp observes, “the Roman
Empire existed but isn’t a present thing” (2004:16). But what does this really show?
Crisp takes this to be an apparent problem for presentism (albeit one he thinks he
can deflate); and Meyer (2005) believes it insurmountable. Consider also Callender’s
confession:
Above I wrote as if it is clear exactly what the difference is between
eternalism and presentism. But [. . . ] I find it surprisingly difficult to
understand exactly what presentism amounts to. It’s not obvious that
the two views differ over much. Clearly distinguishing presentism from
eternalism is our first challenge for presentism.
(2000:S588; my italics)
What justifies these sentiments? Why is this any more problematic for presentism
than eternalism? After all, the eternalist plausibly asserts that
Past, present and future objects exist.20 (Et)
Here once more we may disambiguate (Et) into a present-tensed and a disjunctively
tensed statement. One of these will be trivially true, and the other trivially false.
The difficulties here are not just difficulties for presentism; they threaten the entire
debate.
1.3.2 The Quantificational Approach
Perhaps there is safety in numbers. Merricks writes that “the best evidence that
presentism is controversial is the fact that some philosophers explicitly reject it”
20Which I take to mean that all such objects exist.
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(1999:425 fn.5). He also draws attention to the “extensive literature” on presentism
and Special Relativity (see Chapter Two), observing that “[t]he very existence of this
literature supports the claim that presentism is neither trivial nor uncontroversial”
(1999:425 fn.5). Sider makes a similar point (1999:327 fn.4).
It would be easy just to side with the majority here. But since Chapters Six and
Seven will question the validity of the (apparent) disagreement between endurantists
and perdurantists, I am under more pressure than most to explain why I think that
the presentist-eternalist debate is valid. One way I could do so is to adopt the
quantificational justification that several recent writers have offered.21 Unfortunately
I have reservations about this line of thought, as I will now discuss. In the following
section I consider what I think is a superior approach.
So, having outlined the problem, Crisp responds as follows. He thinks that (Prb) is
not obviously false after all, and attempts to show this by a series of transformations.
First he observes that “to say that only F s are Gs is to say that, for every x, if x is
a G, then x is an F” (2004:17). It follows, he claims, that (Prb) can be restated:
For every x, if x existed, exists, or will exist, then x is a present (Pr′b)
thing.22
Next Crisp points out that instead of dealing with “our most inclusive domain of
quantification”, as does (Pr′b),
we can state the same thing differently by shifting to a restricted quanti-
fier, one whose domain is restricted to the class of all things in time, the
class of all things that existed, exist now, or will exist.
(2004:18)
21Crisp (2003, 2004) defends this at length, but see also Zimmerman (1996:117–118), Hinchliff
(2000:S576), Lewis (2004:3), Markosian (2004a:47–48) and Sider (2006).
22A worry that I bypass for now: whilst “is a present thing” is an acceptable substitution for “is
an F”, “existed, exists, or will exist” is at least superficially different from “is a G”. It might be
thought that to preserve the structure “is a G”, we should rather substitute “is a thing that existed,
exists, or will exist”. This gives us an extra verb form—the “is”—which would also have to be
disambiguated. A similar worry develops later in this section.
16
This then yields
For every x, x is a present thing (Pr′′b )
in which the “every” is explicitly understood to “quantify restrictedly over the domain
of things in time—henceforth, Dt” (2004:18).
Crisp thinks that (Pr′′b ) is not obviously false, since it is not obviously true “that
Dt includes something identical with the Roman Empire which existed and is no
longer present” (2004:18). Why not? We must distinguish two versions of the claim
that the Roman Empire existed but is not present (one of which uses “tα” to name
the present time):
(RE1) WAS : (for some x, x is the Roman Empire and x will not exist in
tα);
(RE2) For some x, x was the Roman Empire and x is no longer present.
Of these, RE1 is clearly a true de dicto claim. However,
RE2 is a de re claim to the effect that the open sentence “x was the Roman
Empire and x is no longer present” is satisfied by some res in Dt.
(2004:18)
It is RE2 that is held to be of relevance to the truth or falsity of (Pr
′′
b ). Moreover, Crisp
thinks the truth of RE2 is not obvious, since it is not obvious “that the domain of
temporal things is still populated with something non-present and identical with the
Roman Empire” (2004:18–19). If it were the case that “our most inclusive domain of
quantification includes past, present, and future entities [. . . ] it would be a [. . . ] fact
thatDt includes the Roman Empire” (2004:19). But he thinks it controversial whether
our most inclusive domain does include such entities; hence RE2 is controversial, and
so, he concludes, is (Pr′′b ).
17
A query: how is it an open question whether the Roman Empire falsifies (Pr′′b ),
given that earlier it did falsify the allegedly equivalent (Prb)? I suspect Crisp’s reply
is that the Roman Empire did not falsify (Prb) after all. This may have initially been
a tempting thought, but (Prb) is itself ambiguous. “Only present things existed, exist,
or will exist” might mean either of (deep breath!):
(Prb1) [¬WAS : (for some x, x will not exist in tα)] ∧ [¬(for some x, x does
not exist in tα)] ∧ [¬WILL: (for some x, x did not exist in tα)];
(It has never been the case that there was some x such that it was
not going to exist in the present; it is not the case there is some x
such that it does not exist in the present; and it never will be the
case that there is some x such that it has not existed in the present.)
(Prb2) There is no x such that x existed, exists now or will exist, and is not
present.
(Prb1) is a de dicto claim, and a false one at that. (Prb2) is a de re assertion which
Crisp would regard as more disputable.
Still, I do not think that Crisp’s proposal works. RE2 and (Prb2) are no im-
provement on what has gone before. This is particularly obvious with (Prb2), which
contains two ambiguous occurrences of “is”. “There is no x” could potentially mean
either “There is now no x” or alternatively “There neither was, is, nor will be an
x”; and similarly for “is not present”. This gives four potential disambiguations of
(Prb2), of which the first two are trivially true, and the latter two obviously false:
There is now no x such that x existed, exists now or will exist, and is not
now present.
There is now no x such that x existed, exists now or will exist, and neither
was, is, nor will be present.
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There neither was, is, nor will be an x such that x existed, exists now or
will exist, and is not now present.
There neither was, is, nor will be an x such that x existed, exists now or
will exist, and neither was, is, nor will be present.
Similarly with Crisp’s RE2. This is a quasi -formal rendering of a marginally more
grammatical claim: “There is an x such that x was the Roman Empire and x is no
longer present”.23 This time we are faced with obvious truth and trivial falsity :
There was, is, or will be an x such that x was the Roman Empire and x
is no longer present.24
There is now an x such that x was the Roman Empire and x is no longer
present.
Our supposed objects of genuine disagreement between presentist and eternalist there-
fore seem no more contentious than the original (Pr).
Perhaps it is not surprising that we have come full circle. What is meant by “the
domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers”? Surely not some strongly anthropocen-
tric notion according to which x lies in the relevant domain iff we quantify over x.
After all, presentism is not the doctrine that we quantify only over present entities;
it is true or false independently of our practice. Instead then, I take it that we are
discussing the domain of the most unrestricted quantifiers, or perhaps what a ‘true
and complete’ theory would quantify over—notions that are independent of our de
facto quantificational habits. All well and good; but the only way I can understand
these concepts—as opposed to the concept of what we do quantify over—is in terms
of existence itself. That is, x is in the domain of the most unrestricted quantifier iff
23One could strengthen the thesis that no real progress has occurred by instead using “There
exists an x such that. . . ”.
24A dissimilarity with (Prb2): the final claim of RE2—that “x is no longer present”—is to my
mind unambiguous in its assertion that x is not now present. Hence RE2 generates only two
disambiguations.
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x exists (and similarly for “a true theory would quantify over x”). Since I have no
independent understanding of what it is for x to be in this domain, there is nothing
I can do with this concept that I could not do with that of existence. And so to say
that there are only present entities in the most unrestricted domain of quantification
is no more helpful, and no less ambiguous, than to say that only present entities exist.
1.3.3 A Third Sense Of “Exists”
I have claimed that statements such as (Prb2) and RE2 are no advance on (Pr).
(Prb2) contained a “There is” that was as ambiguous as anything we had seen before.
RE2 was implicitly guilty, featuring a “For some x. . . ” which merely disguised the
sentiment that “There is an x such that. . . ”. My feeling is that this is typical:
quantification just hides these problematic verb forms behind either the somewhat
idiomatic “For some x” (as in RE2), or behind the still more technical “∃x”.
As a first step towards a resolution, we might consider whether quantificational
phrases are open to a third interpretation that is neither “there is now an x” nor
“there was, is, or will be an x”. This is a step in the right direction. But really, all it
reveals is that the quantificational route should never have been taken, since it could
presumably have been asserted, of (Pr) itself, that it employs “exist” in the relevant
third sense.
What is the third sense though? Many of us think that numbers, properties,
propositions and other abstract objects exist. Moreover, the assertion that the number
seven exists means not that it exists now, nor that it existed, exists and-or will exist.
Rather, we think that abstract objects exist outside of (space and) time.25
25Frustrated reader: “Asserting that there are numbers etc. amounts to no more than quantifying
over them! That there is a third sense of “exists”, and one that is highlighted by quantificational
practice, is just what the quantificational view was all about!” Perhaps quantification does employ
a third sense of “exists”; this much I concede. But quantificational symbolism can hardly provide
its own interpretation. If we acknowledge a third sense of “exists”, then we might (try to) interpret
quantification in the light of this. But if one is not antecedently convinced that there is a third
sense of “exists”, the existential quantifier as applied to temporal entities will more naturally be
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Now the eternalist does not want to assert that past and future objects exist
outside of (space and) time. But both eternalist and presentist can take heart from
the fact that existence simpliciter does not directly imply existence now. Of course
it does not follow that spatiotemporal entities can exist without existing now, but it
equally does not follow that they cannot. That is what makes room for a debate.
The presentist and eternalist have at least a foothold against the sceptic.
There is more to say. We think that spatial location has no bearing on existence;
Oxford, Cambridge and Slough all exist ‘equally’. The eternalist claims an analogy
here: an object’s temporal location is similarly irrelevant to its existence; thus yester-
day, today and tomorrow all exist ‘equally’. In a sense the analogy is useful only to
the eternalist—since the presentist takes time to be unlike space in this respect—but
it is no disaster for the presentist that the eternalist can make out their thesis. At
least there is then a substantive doctrine for them to deny.
In addition there is a modal analogy.26 Actualists believe that all that exists is
actual.27 Modal realists, by contrast, think that (mere) possibilia exist but are not
actual. The presentist is like the actualist, except that instead of restricting existence
to the actual, they restrict it to the present. Similarly, the eternalist’s ‘temporal
realism’ has strong resonances with modal realism. Crucially though, the consensus
in the literature is that the debate between actualists and modal realists is genuine.
This bodes well for presentism and eternalism.
In addition to analogy, presentist and eternalist might attempt to show what they
earlier struggled to say. Consider a spacetime diagram of the universe with two spatial
dimensions suppressed. The presentist points to a thin sliver parallel to the spatial
understood, once again, in terms of “exists now” or “existed, exists now, or will exist”. In other
words, there is nothing within quantification itself that will induce the uninitiated to acknowledge
a third sense of “exists”.
26See Sider (1999:326–327), Rea (2003:253–254) and Davidson (2003:77) (along with many others).
Sider (2001:17) also mentions a third, partially analogous, case: the debate between Platonist and
nominalist.
27I keep open the possibility the actualist believes in possible worlds, but takes these to be maxi-
mally consistent propositions or some other abstract (and actual) entities.
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axis, and asserts that that is what exists. The eternalist, by contrast, gestures towards
the entire contents of the diagram; they tell us that that is what exists. What they
are saying seems entirely clear. It is true that the sceptic could pipe up once more and
ask whether they mean “exists now” or “existed, exists, or will exist”. But by this
stage I think the sceptic is being deliberately obtuse. We have made out a third sense
of “exists” with tolerable clarity (and henceforth I subscript this sense so as to speak
of existence3).
28 We encountered an analogy with modality, where there appears to
be a genuine dispute. And we made particular headway with the (eternalist) claim
that, at least with respect to ontology, time is no different to space. The debate is
substantive; now it must be resolved.
1.4 Ontological A-Theories: Assessment
The most popular ontological A-theory is presentism, and hence it is this that I am
most concerned to refute. In §1.4.1 I outline certain problems for presentism, and in
§1.4.2 I consider various responses. These topics could form a thesis in themselves,
and so my treatment will of necessity be somewhat brief.
Before considering certain other ontological A-theories in §1.4.4, in §1.4.3 I exhibit
for comparison the eternalist treatment of the difficulties that attend presentism. I
take the opportunity to discuss some alleged advantages of presentism, particularly
those that purport to manifest a superiority over eternalism. But here at the outset
I should mention three more alleged virtues of the doctrine.
First, it is sometimes claimed that presentism is the intuitive view of the ‘man
in the street’.29 In response I concede that said man plausibly does think, or could
easily be brought to think, that “only present things exist”. However, I suggest that
28I would have no objections to talk of tenseless existence instead, except insofar as this could be
confused with the sense of “exists” corresponding to “existed, exists or will exist”. (I would describe
the latter as disjunctively tensed rather than tenseless.)
29See e.g. Putnam (1967:240), Lewis (2004:7), and Markosian (2004a:48) (although the former
two are not in fact presentists).
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this might be no more than the tautology to which eternalists also subscribe. Does
our man really possess a considered concept of existence3, and does he moreover think
that it applies only to present objects?
Secondly, it is notable that Prior was both a presentist and the originator of the
‘thank goodness’ argument considered in §1.2.1. But as I argued in that section
(see fn.9 in particular), on reflection this argument does not obviously support the
presentist.
A third alleged virtue brings us towards the criticisms of the next section. Al-
though we shall have reason to question this in due course, the presentist ontology
does initially appear somewhat sparse. Ontological parsimony is generally thought
desirable, and so this should endear presentism to us. But an ontology should not
be so sparse as to be dysfunctional. The discussion of §§1.4.1–1.4.2 will suggest that
this is precisely the problem with presentism.
1.4.1 Problems For Presentism
There are four main areas to consider here:
1. Relativistic Considerations. These are the subject of the next chapter.
2. Past truth. We think, for example, that Napoleon invaded Russia. It is ex-
tremely plausible that such truths require a truthmaker.30 But if Napoleon
does not even exist3, what makes it (now) true that he invaded Russia? Surely
not the extant evidence that he did. This doubtless grounds our beliefs about
Napoleon, but not the historical fact of his invasion. Indeed we can (just about)
envisage a situation in which the evidence is exactly as it is, but Napoleon in-
vaded Australia instead.
30Truthmakers for negative existential claims are harder to locate. Perhaps the overall position
should be that truth supervenes on being : see e.g. Bigelow (1996:38) and Keller (2004:85–86).
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3. Reference to past objects. In saying that Napoleon invaded Russia, I apparently
refer to Napoleon. Indeed even if I had (falsely) claimed that Napoleon invaded
Australia, I would still have referred to Napoleon. How can I refer to what does
not exist3?
The problem goes deeper. One might think that the proposition that Napoleon
invaded Russia exists3—whether or not anyone asserts it. One might further
believe that such propositions in some sense ‘refer to’ or ‘involve’ their subjects;
or at least that they require the existence3 of their subjects. Call such proposi-
tions “singular”. The presentist must apparently hold that there are no singular
propositions about past entities.31
4. Relations to past objects. I may not only refer to Napoleon, but also stand in
other relations to him. I am taller than him, and perhaps admire him. We would
ordinarily expect relata to have the decency to exist3; but on presentism, past
and future ones do not. A particularly disturbing development arises insofar as
most or all causes precede their effects. According to presentism then, most or
all causal relations ‘involve’ at least one non-existent3 relatum. Again we may
ask: how is this possible?
1.4.2 Presentist Responses
In response the presentist might employ tactics involving any of the following: present
entities, paraphrase, denial, and abstracta. I consider these options in turn.
Present Entities
Perhaps non-existent3 objects can bear properties, be referred to, and function as
relata.32 Such a view would immediately dissolve the difficulties of §1.4.1. Against
31See Sider (1999:327–328) and Markosian (2004a:49).
32See Hinchliff (1996:124–125).
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this view I have no very sophisticated arguments. I simply find it incomprehensible
how something that does not even exist3 could bear properties, etc.
33
The presentist could try to enlighten me by analogy though. Does not Sherlock
Holmes possess the property of being a detective? Did I not just refer to him? And is
he not taller than Dr. Watson? Perhaps the interlocutor genuinely believes that these
non-existent3 entities can bear properties, etc. If so then I merely repeat my former
bewilderment. But in fact the fictional parallel might shift the debate somewhat,
highlighting an alternative option for the presentist. We can and plausibly should
ground fictional ‘truths’ in actuality: in actual writings, thoughts, utterances, etc.
These give a derivative sense in which Sherlock Holmes ‘is a detective’: this is true
according to the writings of Conan Doyle. This is the extent to which fictional non-
existents3 may ‘bear properties’. Is there a similar sense for past entities?
One difficulty is that our belief that Napoleon invaded Russia amounts to more
than that he did so according to historical sources ; we think he really did invade
Russia. This historical fact potentially transcends all that is present in a way that
fictional claims do not transcend all that is actual. Thus we can countenance the
(remote) possibility that, despite all extant evidence, Napoleon in fact invaded Aus-
tralia and not Russia. By contrast we would not countenance the possibility that
Conan Doyle got it wrong and Sherlock Holmes was really a stockbroker.
The reply may come that the presentist will hardly confine themselves to historical
sources or “evidence” in some strong sense. Provided Napoleon’s invasion of Russia
left some extant traces, then whether or not these be salient or detectable, the past
fact of his invasion would be grounded in the present.
It is tempting to counter that there cannot possibly be traces of every past event.
Consider the leaf that fell from a particular tree just over 10,000 years ago. Millisec-
onds later a volcano erupted and obliterated the tree, leaf, and surrounding area.
33Markosian (2004a:51–52) and Keller (2004:89–91) agree.
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Must we nonetheless maintain that even today there is a ‘record’ of the fact that
the leaf fell—and at the particular time and in the very manner that it did? Such
intuitions notwithstanding, the presentist can maintain that given determinism there
is indeed a ‘record’ of even the most trivial past occurrences. The world today would
have been different had they not occurred. Past facts are encoded in the present.
Perhaps there is some mileage for the presentist in this response. It faces a num-
ber of difficulties though.34 First of all it regards the world as deterministic. In
fact there are good grounds to doubt this; certainly Quantum Mechanics is natu-
rally interpreted as an indeterministic theory. The presentist may be thinking of a
more ‘established’ (some would say outdated) theory though: Classical Mechanics.
Unfortunately, Classical Mechanics is not deterministic either (although instances of
indeterminism within the theory are admittedly somewhat recherche´).35 The second
point is that even if the world were deterministic, it could surely have been otherwise.
Would presentism then be false of such a world? Or would it still be true, but with
far fewer past facts? It seems imprudent to rest the truth of past facts on something
as contingent as determinism.
A third difficulty is more technical. Suppose for convenience a particulate ontol-
ogy. Dynamics is (or at least appears to be) second order : the state of the world
at one time depends on the positions and velocities of its constituent particles at
another. And how do we understand velocities? Usually as quotient limits: distance
travelled over time taken (as the latter tends to zero). But that is to say that the
velocity of a particle depends upon facts about where it was (and when). These are
past facts; they are exactly what the presentist is trying to ground. It seems that the
34One difficulty is complex, and I so mention it only briefly: how does the presentist regard the laws
of nature? If they take a Humean stance, is the present sufficiently ‘detailed’ to ground such laws?
Or must the presentist consider past facts also—in which case it seems circular to use such laws to
ground those same past facts? Alternatively, if the presentist takes laws to be necessitation relations
between universals, would it be problematic if such universals are not presently instantiated? Bourne
(2006a:7–8) addresses these issues (and makes these very points).
35See Earman (1986:23–54), Laraudogoitia (1996), and Norton (2003:8–12).
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explanation is circular then: unless some past facts are already grounded, nothing
determines the velocities that the presentist requires in order for the physical laws
to ground past facts. At the very least then, the presentist (who pins their hopes on
determinism) must adopt a heterodox account of velocity.36
Finally, the presentist must say something about the Russellian thought that the
world was created but five minutes ago—replete with apparent traces of past facts.
Continuing with the particulate supposition, such a world might consist of particles
with exactly the same positions and velocities as those of the actual world. Would
that make all sorts of past facts ‘true’ of the Russellian world—even though it did not
then exist?37 Perhaps it will be replied that such a world would have different laws
to ours. But how plausible is this? Intuitively one would think that, at least after its
incipience, the Russellian world could be governed by the very same laws that govern
our own.38
Paraphrase
In response to the idea that Napoleon’s existence3 is implied either by the existence3
of propositions about him, or by our successfully referring to him, the presentist may
turn to paraphrase. Thus “Napoleon invaded Russia” might be parsed in such a way
that this apparently singular proposition does not require the existence3 of Napoleon
after all:
WAS : ∃x (x is named “Napoleon” ∧ x invades Russia).
36See §7.2.2 for (brief) details of Tooley’s (1988) proposal.
37See Bourne (2006a:8–9).
38It is worth mentioning at this point two presentists who would deny that a world could be
identical to how ours is now, even though its past were different. Thus Bigelow proposes that “[i]t
is a present property of the world, that it is a world in which [. . . ] the Trojans were conquered”
(1996:46); and similarly Chisholm suggests that “the property blue [. . . ] once was such that there is
a philosopher who is drinking hemlock (1990:554). Such attempts at grounding past facts doubtless
‘work’, but they seem disturbingly ad hoc. In addition, the relevant historical properties are intu-
itively such that their possession by “the world” or “the property blue” should not just be basic (as
these theories take it to be); and yet on presentism it is hard to find anything on which they may
supervene. See Sider (2001:39–41) for further discussion.
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Whether this is an appropriate analysis of the original claim is of course open to de-
bate. In particular it involves a controversial analysis of “Napoleon” as an abbreviated
description, something of which we should be wary at least.39
It is also unclear how far the paraphrastic strategy will carry. How can the pre-
sentist understand “Stanley was my great-great-grandfather” so as to avoid a com-
mitment to a relation between individuals who never coexisted (and hence, for the
presentist, never coexisted3)? Perhaps by equating it to a succession of relations
between individuals who did coexist (and coexist3):
John is my father;
WAS : William is John’s father;
WAS : Archibald is William’s father;
WAS : Stanley is Archibald’s father.
However, as Sider (2001:25–26) notes, there are no plausible intermediates for claims
such as
Some philosopher admires some French Emperor. (*)
Using “Axy” for “x admires y”, the obvious attempts at paraphrase are:
(a) ∃x ∃y (x is a philosopher ∧ y is a French Emperor ∧ Axy);
(b) ∃x (x is a philosopher ∧ WAS : (∃y y is a French Emperor ∧ Axy));
(c) WAS : (∃x ∃y (x is a philosopher ∧ y is a French Emperor ∧ Axy)).
But (a) and (c) require that the philosopher in question coexists at some time with
a French Emperor that they admire. On the face of it this is quite unnecessary for
39See Sider (1999:327–328) with reference to Kripke (1980). This paraphrase does require the
existence3 of Russia; had we focussed instead on the USSR, this would have necessitated further
paraphrase. Indeed the presentist might offer a paraphrastic analysis even for names of existent
(and thus existent3) entities such as Russia. This would allow for a unitary treatment of names, i.e.
one independent of the named entities’ status.
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the truth of (*). Meanwhile (b) and (c) mistakenly locate the admiration in the past.
Again this is not required by (*).
It is not just singular propositions and cross-time relations that test the presen-
tist’s ingenuity; Lewis (2004) argues that cross-time counting is similarly troublesome.
After one or two epicycles, he suggests that the presentist can parse “There have been
two Kings called Charles” as
WAS : (there is a King called Charles ∧ WAS : (there is a distinct King
called Charles)).40
“There have been over fifty Kings” can be dealt with similarly, but the analysis will
be somewhat lengthy. And as Lewis notes, if we dealt with entities that could be both
instantaneous and simultaneous, rather than Kings, we would require extra disjuncts
to cover this eventuality. Finally, the analysis lengthens further if we unpack “There
have been about fifty Kings” in terms of a disjunction of the analyses for fifty Kings,
fifty-one Kings, forty-nine Kings, etc.
Lewis’ point here is not that the presentist cannot analyse such assertions. It is
rather that the sheer intricacy of the analyses undermines presentism’s claim to be
“the view of the common man, uncorrupted by philosophy” (2004:7). On presentism,
certain everyday utterances possess very complex logical structures. Again this makes
the doctrine seem implausible.
Denial
Another tactic that belies presentism’s status as capturing our intuitions is that of
brute denial. The idea here is that, ordinary beliefs and utterances notwithstanding,
we cannot refer to past entities (since they do not exist3). More surprisingly still,
40Even this may be troublesome though. Can the presentist analyse the “distinct” here? The
difficulty is how to evaluate “¬ x = y” in “∃x (Px ∧ WAS : [∃y (Py ∧ ¬ x = y)])” when x and y
never coexist3.
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there are no past facts, and also no relations between entities at different times—and
hence no (non-simultaneous) causation.
We would need excellent reasons to accept these radical theses, yet it is doubtful
whether presentism can provide such reasons. A presentism that regards so many
everyday intuitions as false purchases ontological economy at far too high a price.
However, the position can be made more moderate. Perhaps certain truths about
Napoleon, whilst literally false, are nonetheless quasi-true. The suggestion is by Sider,
although he is not himself a presentist. He explains the notion as follows:
The working idea of a quasi-true sentence is one that, philosophical niceties
aside, is true. Put a second way, a sentence is quasi true if the world is
similar enough to the way it would have to be for the sentence to be
genuinely true.
(1999:332)
The “philosophical niceties” relevant to our case concern the truth of eternalism. In
more detail: suppose that, for a given sentence S, there is a true proposition P which,
given eternalism, would entail the truth of S. In that case S is quasi -true even if it
is literally false (due to the falsity of eternalism). For example, the presentist holds
it to be strictly false that “Napoleon invaded Russia”, since this singular proposition
mistakenly commits to the existence3 of Napoleon. However, suppose that presentists
can justify the claim that
WAS : (∃x “Napoleon” refers to x ∧ x invades Russia).41 (†)
In that case, Sider suggests that there is a sufficient “supervenience base” to render
“Napoleon invaded Russia” quasi -true.
It might be objected that quasi -truth is not enough. I feel committed to the
truth—that is, the literal truth—of “Napoleon invaded Russia”, in which case it
counts against presentism that it regards such utterances as strictly false (even if
41Perhaps the presentist must also justify the first conjunct in terms of past facts that underlie
the putative reference (whether these be descriptivist or otherwise).
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quasi -true). In addition though, Sider’s proposals are only intended to provide the
near-truth of singular propositions and those asserting cross-time relations.42 His
presentist relies upon the truth of past facts such as (†) to provide the necessary
“supervenience base” for the quasi -true claims. For an explanation of what grounds
these past facts, we must search elsewhere.
Abstracta
Two accounts based upon abstract objects purport to do just this. The first involves
haecceities, and the second abstract times.
According to Adams, a haecceity is
the property of being identical with a certain particular individual [. . . e.g.]
my property of being identical with me, your property of being identical
with you, etc.
(1979:6)
Such properties might be primitive (as Adams believes), but they might alternatively
be reducible to other, qualitative, properties (e.g. having been born at a certain time
to such-and-such parents, having been the first man to climb Everest, etc.).
The presentist hopes to utilize haecceities as proxies for past (and perhaps future)
entities.43 This move is controversial: many will reject haecceities, especially ones that
are non-qualitative a` la Adams (1979). Such haecceities would also deprive presentism
of one of its main attractions: it mutates from an austere, existentially3-streamlined
theory, into a bloated ontology instead. One might also question how, on presentism,
Napoleon’s haecceity manages to pertain to Napoleon (rather than to Rembrandt or
Einstein, for example). Which is to say: what individuates haecceities? Part of the
42Although they could also be applied to Lewis’ subsequent (2004) concerns about cross-time
counting.
43This is not Adams’ intention; he is “inclined to reject presentism” (1986:321-322). Lewis (2004:7–
9), Markosian (2004a:54–56) and Keller (2004:96–99) all explicitly reject haecceitist presentism.
Zimmerman comes closest to backing it: he thinks the presentist might regard claims about a past
or future person as involving “an individual essence not now exemplified that was once exemplified,
and was then the essence of a person” (1998a:211).
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original difficulty was that we cannot refer or relate to what does not exist3. So how
does Napoleon’s haecceity connect with him?
It is also unclear to what extent haecceities help the presentist. I am not taller
than Napoleon’s haecceity, nor is it this that I (might) admire. And does my talk
of Napoleon in fact refer only to an abstract property?44 As to past truth, the mere
existence3 of Napoleon’s uninstantiated haecceity cannot ground the fact that he
invaded Russia. Granted: perhaps his haecceity is such that it was once instantiated
by one who invaded Russia. But then this is also a past fact, and is therefore in just
as much need of a truthmaker as the original claim that Napoleon invaded Russia.
Alternatively, the presentist might ground Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in the fact
that his haecceity stands in a quasi -invading relation to Russia’s own haecceity. But
really Napoleon’s haecceity must quasi -invade Russia’s with respect to the haecceity of
1812, ‘through’ the haecceity of (modern) Poland, and along with some 700,000 further
personal haecceities. These are just empty words. We have no grasp whatsoever on
how one property can quasi -invade another, let alone do so via a third, and in tandem
with so many others.45
I turn instead to abstract times : abstract representations of times other than the
present, rather as one might think of possible worlds. Just as such possible worlds
(allegedly) ground modal truth, so too do abstract times ground past (and perhaps
future) truth.46
A first thought is that the move to abstract times might render presentism onto-
logically otiose (as with the espousal of primitive haecceities). We would presumably
44Perhaps haecceitist presentism might employ paraphrase or quasi -truth in addition here. This
seems to me to only double their difficulties.
45I also note an epistemological curiosity (that pertains in addition to the abstract times view and
the proposals considered in fn.38). Our knowledge of the past fact that p is presumably reliant on
some sort of causal chain running from p to the present. The presentist must find a way to ground
these (past) causal facts, but my current point is rather that our knowledge that p would ideally
have something to do with the truthmaker for p. If truthmakers are abstract, then it is hard to see
how they might figure in the relevant causal story; and hard, indeed, to see how we might connect
with them at all.
46Crisp (2003:240–242) and Bourne (2006a) have recently presented such theories.
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need an abstract time not just for 1066, 2007, etc., but for every picosecond and
beyond—and that is an awful lot of abstract times. Ultimately though, the issue
depends on how abstract times should be conceived, and what one already coun-
tenances. Thus it may be that abstract times are no more than sets of consistent
propositions. Many would countenance such sets irrespective of whether they are
employed as abstract times.
In fact if parsimony is a concern then the abstract times presentist might take
there to be more than just an analogy with the modal case. That is, they might
equate abstract times with (simultaneity slices of) possible worlds, thereby killing
two birds with one ontological stone. But whilst every possible world is a way that
the world could have been, not every ‘possible present’ is a way that the world has
been or will be.47 One would therefore require some (slices of) possible worlds to
have ‘special status’. In avoiding commitment to a new type of entity, the presentist
is driven to commit to (what I assume is) a new primitive instead.
In addition the abstract times need to be ordered. Otherwise the fact that it is
φ according to one representation and ψ according to another leaves it undetermined
whether it was φ before ψ, or vice versa.48 Is the ordering just basic as well? Crisp
thinks so: the presentist requires a “primitive temporal ordering relation” (2003:242).
And Bourne’s abstract times come already bearing dates (2006a:11–12)—apparently
with no more to be said. The alternative, of course, is that abstract times might be
ordered on the basis of their intrinsic features, i.e. such that there is continuity be-
tween successive times. This proposal works better for some worlds than for others.49
47See Meyer (2005:220).
48And if φ were present, this would leave it undetermined whether ψ represents past or future
facts.
49For one thing it clearly assumes that the world in question evolves smoothly. Are there more
chaotic worlds where, roughly speaking, ‘anything follows anything’? Or worlds that are indeter-
ministic and such that they may return to an earlier state? The history of such a world might be
represented as ABACA (where A, B and C are abstract times). How could the intrinsic features of
A, B and C determine this history to have occurred, rather than ACABA? Cyclic worlds would also
be a worry. How might the intrinsics of D, E and F account for both the ‘once-through’ temporal
sequence DEF , and also the cyclic variant DEFDEFDEF . . . ?
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And the ordering does require a sense or direction, which for any world with time-
reversible dynamics would not emerge from consideration of the abstract times. In
such a world the intrinsics (together with a continuity assumption) might tell us that
φ occurs between the present and ψ; but it must be determined in addition whether
φ and ψ occur before or after the present.
Aside from these teething troubles, we might doubt the relevance of abstract
times. I care little whether there exists3 some abstract story (perhaps with some
funny ‘special status’) according to which Napoleon invaded Russia. What I care
about is whether Napoleon invaded Russia. Nor would I be overly concerned if these
abstract representations were ordered very differently to how we generally think that
history unfolded. So much the worse for them, I would say. They would have no
bearing on what actually occurred.50
Nor, we should note, do abstract times obviously solve the problem of reference,
or how we may be related more generally to past objects. There may be ‘stories’
about Napoleon on the abstract times view; but still, he himself does not exist3.
51
Finally, the status of the future is also a cause for concern. Is there ‘already’ an
abstract time for 3000 A.D.? Perhaps the presentist denies this, relishing the freedom
that an ‘open’ future brings with it (see §1.4.3). If so, it seems that abstract times are
progressively generated : as t becomes present, there appears ‘in Platonic heaven’ an
abstract representation of t. Prima facie it might be better to hold that the relevant
abstract time is not generated, but rather was ‘there all along’. This view can also
accommodate an open future by maintaining that only at t does the abstract time
in question come to represent an actual time; prior to that it represents merely a
50Hinchliff, though himself a presentist, rejects abstract times for roughly these reasons (1996:124).
But are we just begging the question here against one who thinks that abstract times do ground
past (or future) truth? I prefer to regard the response as articulating a gut reaction (which should
carry at least some weight): abstract times are simply not the right ‘kind of thing’ to ground past
truth.
51In which case the relevant stories cannot involve singular propositions about him. As with
haecceitist presentism (recall fn.44), abstract times presentism might require some further strategy
to deal with problems of reference and cross-time relations. See e.g. Crisp (2003:225–232).
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possible future.52 Either option requires some kind of change within the abstract
realm though. I do not see how this is possible. At the very least it sits uneasily with
the view that abstract objects lie beyond both space and time.
1.4.3 How Fares Eternalism?
I hope that some or even many of the recent objections militate strongly against the
relevant presentist options. I do not pretend that each of these options is completely
without merit however. As ever, the question is whether the particular price is worth
paying, and what the alternatives are. I reject presentism partly because I think there
is a cheap and effective alternative. That alternative is eternalism.
Consider my referring to or admiring Napoleon. For the eternalist this is no
different from my referring to or admiring Clinton. Both are existent3 yet distant
from me; the only difference is that Clinton is spatially distant, whereas Napoleon
is temporally distant. Past facts also glide smoothly out of eternalism. Napoleon’s
invasion of Russia is as much a part of reality as Clinton’s (now) eating a sandwich.
That is not to say that eternalism is without difficulty. The presentist might
urge that the eternalist can give no satisfactory account of change, or that they
are committed to an implausible doctrine of persistence (namely, perdurance). The
presentist might add that their doctrine avoids such difficulties, and that is (partly)
why they hold it. I try to refute these charges in Chapter Four and thus issue a
promissory note at this stage: the working out of a coherent eternalist metaphysics
will form a retrospective part of the case against presentism.
However, there is one area where I admit that presentism has an advantage over
eternalism. On the latter, future times exist3 just as much as present and past ones,
and hence there appear to be facts about our future choices and actions. We may
not know how we will choose or act, but nonetheless on eternalism we seem to be in
52This seems to be the view of Bourne (2006a:11–16).
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some sense ‘already out there’, making those choices and performing those actions.
This certainly threatens the belief that we are free agents.
In responding to that threat, we should distinguish between the future’s being
determined by the present, and its being determinate as of the present. Only the
latter is guaranteed by eternalism, and to my mind this permits us freedom enough.
If one disagrees though, I would ask whence the conviction arises that we are ‘free’
in some stronger sense. Our deliberations and decisions would surely seem no less
genuine were their outcomes determinate but unknown to us. And perhaps we simply
are not ‘free’ in any sense stronger than that provided by indeterminism. Some
might find this depressing (though personally I do not); but an inference from “p is
depressing” to “p is false” would be highly unpersuasive.
1.4.4 Past-and-Presentism, And The Branching Future
Ideally we could combine this minor presentist victory with the eternalist virtues
that arose in connection with past facts, relations to past entities, etc. Past-and-
presentism promises just this, as does McCall’s ‘branching future’ theory. On these
theories Napoleon is as existent3 as on eternalism, and the future as indeterminate
as on presentism.53 Of course this is a disadvantage if one thinks there are future
truths, singular propositions about future entities, etc.; but we are probably far less
committed to these than to their past analogues.
Past-and-presentism was introduced by Broad (1923:65–70), only to be resurrected
and developed in detail by Tooley (1997). In Broad’s words, the theory
accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future
is nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past
except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history
of the world. [. . . ] The sum total of existence is always increasing, and it
53Or rather on McCall’s theory it is indeterminate which of the (fully determinate) possible futures
will be actual.
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is this which gives the time-series a sense as well as an order.
(1923:66–67)
For obvious reasons, this is often known as the growing block theory.
By contrast, McCall (1976, 1994) holds the future to be very much real. In fact
all currently possible futures are real; it is just that they are not yet actual. Reality
is ‘tree-shaped’, with the trunk of the tree representing the past up to the present
(these categories between them exhausting actuality), and the various possible futures
branching and sub-branching off above the trunk. The present is located at the very
first fork; it advances inexorably up one of the branches, eliminating those other
future possibilities that are not actualized.
To some extent I should be less concerned to demonstrate the falsity of these two
theories than I am with presentism. Their commitment to the existence3 of the past
(and multiple futures, in McCall’s case) means that they face very similar persistence-
related issues to those I consider in later chapters within the context of eternalism.
Most of that discussion assumes the existence3 of times other than the present—an
assumption that does not strictly require the truth of eternalism.
Nonetheless I do think that these two theories are false. For one thing, the doubts
of §1.2.2 surface anew. When something grows, we can usually ask how rapidly it
grows. The past-and-presentist must either deny that we can ask this of the universe
itself, or borrow from Prior with “an hour per hour, a second per second” (1968:2–3).
Either option is at least a little embarrassing.54 And mutatis mutandis for McCall:
how fast does the present climb the tree?
In addition there is a temptation towards a meta-time. For both the past-and-
presentist and McCall, what is actual at one time is different to what is actual at
54Broad himself thought this not just embarrassing but even “fatal” to the non-ontological A-
theorist’s moving present (1938:277). To my knowledge he does not comment on the apparent
parallel for his own theory.
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another.55 This seems straightforward when applied to everyday objects, but less
so when it comes to times themselves. Can we allow that every second, that very
second becomes actual? Times are steadily being actualized, but also appear to be
the external measure with respect to which they are actualized. They seem to be
somehow both ‘within’ and ‘outside of’ actuality.
McCall replies to this (and to some extent the previous) criticism that
the universe tree, though it changes, does not change in time. Rather,
its change constitutes the flow of time. Branch attrition, in the model, is
what time flow is. Therefore branch attrition cannot take place in time,
any more than time flow can take place in time. To suppose that it can
would be to allow that the question, how fast does time flow, makes sense.
(1994:30–31)
Perhaps the very nature of these enquiries mean that our ordinary concepts must
stretch somewhat; but the idea of changes happening outside of time is simply too
much for me (unless one posits a meta-time).
A third worry concerns the dynamism that is heralded as integral to these theories.
At t everything up to t is actual; at t′ everything up to t′ is actual; and so on. Are
these claims not ‘eternally’ true, rather like the claims that the poker is hot at t1 but
cold at t2? Recall McTaggart’s (1927:14–15) complaint: since these claims about the
poker are ‘ever true’, in themselves they permit no real change. Why is the same not
true of actuality?56
Finally, I think that most A-theorists believes themselves to be present. They
do so not in the merely indexical sense with respect to which everyone who believes
themselves present does so truly, but rather in some more absolute, and indeed more
55The theories agree on actuality, but disagree about reality : the past-and-presentist thinks these
co-extensive; McCall thinks the future real but not yet actual.
56Smart (1980) illustrates McCall’s theory by analogy with a pack of cards; each card displays
the ‘reality-tree’ at a different time, so that the card for T depicts reality as having no branches
before T and very many after. My current point is that a mere stack of cards provides no dynamic
element at all. Should there not be some further, moving, entity that picks out one of the cards as
privileged? Of course we would then have to ask: with respect to what does this entity move?
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privileged, sense of “present”. Put in terms of our two current theories, the A-theorist
believes themselves to be at the very edge of actuality. Now it is true that when an A-
theorist utters at t the thought “I am present” (in this privileged sense of “present”)
then, according to the theories in question, their utterance is true. This is simply
because, again according to those theories, at t actuality extends only up to t itself.
But as time ticks by, all that ‘happens’ to events at t is that they acquire successors;
in themselves they change not at all. In some sense then, even when actuality has
grown so as to include everything up to the later time t′, our A-theorist is ‘still’ there
at t believing that they are at the edge of actuality. Is this A-theorist right or wrong?
Their belief is surely not true at t′, since t is not, by then, the border of the actual.
But if the A-theorist’s belief is false at times later than t, a pessimistic conclusion
beckons. There must be very many past individuals (‘still’) believing—and believing
falsely—that they are present, when in fact the edge of reality lies far ahead of them.
How do we know that we are not in precisely the same situation?
The obvious reply is that the beliefs in question occur at particular times; that
they occur only at those times; that they are true at those times; and that they
should not even be evaluated at other times. There is no sense, then, in which an
A-theorist in 2007 will still be believing themselves present even in 3000 A.D. Nor
should we say that their earlier belief is then false; all that we can say is that it was
true when believed. Nonetheless, even if the A-theorist does not continue evermore
to believe himself present, he and his 2007 belief-state continue to exist3. I still think
the A-theorist should worry that, on the current theories, the past is chock full of
individuals believing themselves present.57
However, there is doubtless more that could be said here, and hence I am happy
to make a concession: that whilst I ultimately reject both past-and-presentism and
the branching future model, the arguments given so far do not compel a rejection.
57For further discussion, see Dainton (2001:79), Bourne (2002), Braddon-Mitchell (2004) and
Button (2006).
39
What needs to be added, in my opinion, are certain relativistic considerations. To
these we now turn.
40
Chapter 2
Special Relativity And Presentism
2.1 Introduction
I now seek to further the argument against the various A-theories by considering
certain objections that arise in connection with Special Relativity (SR). In §§2.2 and
2.3 I discuss how the absence of an absolute simultaneity troubles the A-theorist; I
conclude that this is indeed a serious problem. In §§2.4 and 2.5 I ask whether the
A-theorist might therefore deny SR; and also—what might initially seem a strange
question—whether this would really allow the A-theorist to evade relativistic difficul-
ties.
However, it is important to note that I shall argue only vicariously against A-
theories in general; my particular focus is on presentism. This is not because I
believe SR more hostile to presentism than to other A-theories. In fact I do not.
It is rather that (1) as remarked in §1.4.4, the remainder of my project makes me
more concerned to rebut the presentist than the past-and-presentist or ‘branching
futurist’ (and I already regard non-ontological A-theories as seriously troubled); and
(2) presentism’s status as a ‘hot topic’ means that there is far more literature here
with which to engage.
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2.2 The Threat
In the hackneyed example, I am sitting on a platform in the station. A train travels
past, and when I am directly opposite its midpoint, small explosives detonate at the
front and rear of the train—or at least this is how we initially describe things. Apart
from damaging the train, the explosions mark the adjacent track. Light from the
explosions reaches me simultaneously, slightly after they occur.
Atop the train and at its midpoint sits Jim. The two flashes emanate from points
equidistant to Jim’s location at (what I believe is) the common time of detonation.
However, Jim is moving relative to these points and thus does not remain equidistant
from them. The train’s motion takes him closer to the origin of the front explosion,
and hence the light from this reaches him ahead of that from the rear.
Jim knows a bit about relativity. He thinks of himself and the train as stationary
whilst the countryside rushes by. Surveying the damage to the front and rear of
the train, he reasons that the explosions occurred equidistant from where he now
sits (and previously sat). He also realizes that it matters not whether the detonated
packages were stationary relative to him or to the station, since the speed of light is
independent of the speed of the source. From all this together with the (universally
agreed-upon) fact that the light from the front reached him before that from that
rear, Jim deduces that the explosions cannot have occurred simultaneously.
The popular moral of this popular exposition is the relativity of simultaneity :
events simultaneous in one frame of reference are not simultaneous in another. If SR
tells the whole story, then there simply is no relation of absolute simultaneity. That
means we must abandon the classical understanding of the present as (at least) a set
of simultaneous events. And that in turn means we lose our grip on the claim that
the present is in some way privileged.
In response the A-theorist might deny SR, or at least deny that SR is the whole
story; or alternatively they might seek to identify a surrogate ‘simultaneity’ relation
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that is more at home in the relativistic world. I consider the former option in §§2.4
and 2.5, and the latter in §2.3.1
2.3 Beyond Absolute Simultaneity
What is it for a relation to be “at home in the relativistic world”? First we must
introduce some terminology. An inertial frame is a reference frame in which force-free
particles move in straight lines, and with respect to which the laws of physics assume
the same (canonical) form. Spatiotemporal co-ordinates can be associated with such
frames in a number of a (fairly) straightforward ways.2
According to SR, certain quantities that are naturally thought of as absolute turn
out to be frame relative instead. In particular, the difference in spatial co-ordinates
between distinct events varies from one inertial frame to the next, and the temporal
interval between such events behaves similarly (the latter is just the relativity of
simultaneity once more). What does not vary between inertial frames is the interval
or separation between events. For two points with standard, (spatially) Cartesian
co-ordinates in a given inertial frame (x, y, z, t) and (x′, y′, z′, t′), their separation is
given by
√|(x− x′)2 + (y − y′)2 + (z − z′)2 − (t− t′)2| (just as, in Euclidean space,
the distance between two points with co-ordinates (x, y, z) and (x′, y′, z′) is given
by
√
(x− x′)2 + (y − y′)2 + (z − z′)2). To repeat: this quantity is an invariant; it
1Note, however, that I will not dwell on one sense in which SR is not the whole story: it does
not even purport to be a ‘theory of everything’. General Relativity (GR) is at least of wider scope,
and some presentists hope that GR may resurrect the absolute simultaneity that SR apparently kills
off. In fact some models of GR are particularly inhospitable to absolute simultaneity, since they
are not foliable. However, the presentist replies that at suitably large (i.e. enormous) scales our
universe approximates to those models in which we may define a ‘cosmic’ time relative to global
symmetries in the matter distribution. I find it odd to think that, according to such a presentist, the
only objects that exist3 are simultaneous with respect to this rather contingent feature of spacetime.
In addition, the simultaneity in question is disturbingly fragile. What if the matter distribution
ceased to be, or had never been, globally homogeneous? All in all I do not see that GR offers much
hope to the presentist. For further discussion see Craig (2001:195–241) and Balashov and Janssen
(2003:342–343).
2E.g. distant simultaneity can be established by ‘slow clock transport’ or by a ‘light-synchrony
method’. See Janis (2006) for details, including a discussion of whether there is a conventional
element to these procedures.
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has the same numerical value even when the points are re-described (that is, re-
‘coordinatized’) with respect to a different inertial frame.
We can translate this talk into talk of spacetime instead. In a Newtonian space-
time, for every two events there is a fact of the matter as to the magnitudes of both
their spatial separation and the temporal interval between them. In a neo-Newtonian
or Galilean spacetime, there is a determinate temporal interval between any two
events and, if they are simultaneous, a determinate distance also. But there is no
standard of absolute rest in such a spacetime, and hence no fact of the matter as to
whether events at different times are co-located, 10 metres apart, or 10 light-years
apart. When it comes to SR, the appropriate spacetime is Minkowskian. Just as the
temporal interval and spatial distance between distinct events are frame relative in
SR, so too in Minkowski spacetime is there no fact of the matter concerning (the
magnitude of) these quantities. But Minkowski spacetime does respect what emerges
from SR as absolute: there is a fact of the matter regarding the separation of any
two events.
This separation allows us to decompose Minkowski spacetime relative to each and
every spacetime point. If (x−x′)2+(y− y′)2+(z− z′)2− (t− t′)2 > 0 our two points
are spacelike related (i.e. they are some spatial distance apart). If (x − x′)2 + (y −
y′)2 + (z − z′)2 − (t− t′)2 < 0 they are timelike related (i.e. they are some temporal
distance apart). If (x−x′)2+(y− y′)2+(z− z′)2− (t− t′)2 = 0 the points, assuming
they are distinct, are lightlike related (i.e. they are connectable by a light signal).
Because separation is an invariant, all observers agree as to whether two points are
spacelike, timelike, or lightlike related.
Points that are lightlike related to p and with temporal co-ordinates (that in every
frame are) later than p comprise p’s future light-cone. Points within this cone are
future relative to p and timelike related to it. Together these timelike and lightlike
future points comprise p’s absolute future; events at these points may be causally
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Figure 2.1
influenced by those at p.3 Analogous definitions can be given for p’s past light-cone
and absolute past ; the latter corresponds to those points at which events may causally
influence those at p. Finally, points spacelike related to p comprise p’s elsewhere;
events in this region are causally isolated from those at p. These distinctions are
illustrated in Fig.2.1.
Armed with this terminology we may consider whether the presentist can construct
a satisfactory relativistic surrogate for the classical present. The emphasis here is on
“satisfactory”: of course the presentist can pick out a relation intrinsic to Minkowski
spacetime and label it as a “simultaneity” or “co-presence” relation. The question
is whether that relation has features sufficiently close to its classical predecessor to
merit its title; and indeed whether the relation allows for a viable relativistic form of
presentism.
The approaches I shall consider are four. They are based on (i) a relativized
simultaneity; (ii) the idea of a ‘point’ present; (iii) interpreting simultaneity in terms
of the past light-cone; and (iv) interpreting it in terms of the elsewhere. All of these
3Assuming as is customary that causal influence travels no faster than light.
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proposals have already been discussed and criticized in the literature on relativistic
presentism, and thus my treatment will remain somewhat brief.
2.3.1 Relative Simultaneity
One can define a simultaneity relation with respect to an inertial reference frame
(recall fn.2). Could this be used to formulate a relativistic presentism?
First, a point in favour of this proposal. The classical simultaneity relation is
an equivalence relation. Provided we restrict ourselves to just one reference frame,
relative simultaneity is similarly reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
Suppose, then, that Jim clicks his fingers. In his inertial reference frame, that
finger-click might occur simultaneously with the explosion of a distant star. Relative
to a passer-by though, the finger-click precedes the explosion. And to someone walking
the other way, the explosion precedes the finger-click.4 All this sounds odd to pre-
relativistic ears, but it is just the relativity of simultaneity writ large. The difficulty
for the presentist latching onto relative simultaneity is that existence3 itself appears
destined to be relativized. What exists3 for me would be very different to what exists3
for those walking past me. This sounds like a ridiculous conclusion.5
Now it might be replied that, for the presentist, existence3 has always been rela-
tive. After all, what exists3 relative to 2007 differs greatly from that which existed3
relative to 1066. But even if we accept this, the radical dependence of existence3 on
velocity remains problematic. Altering one’s velocity obliterates and generates very
many distant bodies. Indeed, for anyone pacing back and forth, distant stars first
exist3, then do not exist3, then exist3 once more. Existence3 should not be quite so
fickle.
4At least this is the rough story. A (serious) complication is that in special relativity the rest
frame of an extended object is not well defined. See Gibson and Pooley (2006:172).
5Another ridiculous conclusion would be that what exists3 is conventional. This would seem to
follow if one believed that the definition of relative simultaneity is itself conventional; see fn.2.
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2.3.2 Point Presents
In response to arguments by Rietdijk (1966) and Putnam (1967) from SR to eternal-
ism, Stein (1968, 1991) provides two suggestions of interest to the A-theorist.6 The
first is a relativistically defensible analysis of “is determinate for”: x is determinate
for y iff x lies in the absolute past of y.7 This relation is transitive and asymmetric,
which is what we intuitively expect of a determinacy relation.8
More could undoubtedly be said, but our primary interest is in the consequences
this has for the relativistic present. One natural thought is that the present is the
edge of all that is determinate. This could be understood in terms of the past light-
cone itself; we will consider this proposal shortly. Alternatively one might regard the
very tip of the light-cone as the relativistic present, burrowing its way ever further
into the future. This is Stein’s second conclusion: “in Einstein-Minkowski space-
time an event’s present is constituted by itself alone” (1968:15). It follows if one
thinks that (i) for two events to be mutually present, each must be determinate (or
in Stein’s language, must have “already become”) for the other; and (ii) an event x
is determinate for y iff x is in the absolute past of y. Because the latter relation is
asymmetric, the only point which stands in a relation of mutual determinacy with x
is x itself.9
Another interesting way to arrive at this ‘point’ presentism is to focus on the
intuitive characteristics of “is real for”. Putnam (1967:240–243) required that this
relation be transitive.10 But as Saunders (2000:S602) notes, it is very plausibly sym-
6For further discussion, see Maxwell (1985, 1993), Savitt (2000), Hinchliff (2000), Callender
(2000) and Saunders (2000, 2002).
7An important caveat for what follows: Stein’s literal proposal is that x must lie in the “topo-
logical closure of the past” of y, which region he takes to include y itself (1968:14).
8This determinacy relation is I think the best relativistic option for the past-and-presentist; they
could claim that x exists3 for y iff x is in y’s absolute past. However the final criticism of this section
will apply not just to ‘point’ presentism but also to a past-and-presentism remodelled along these
lines; and the remarks of §2.3.5 will also apply.
9Recall the caveat of fn.7.
10He required this under the spurious guise of a “No Privileged Observers” principle. Doubtless
there is a genuine relativistic principle which might bear this name; but its connection to the
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metric also. Reflexivity follows from this and is in any case desirable, meaning that
we would ideally find a relativistic surrogate for “is real for” that is an equivalence
relation. Now we return to Stein though, who writes (correctly) that in
Einstein-Minkowski space-time [. . . ] there are no intrinsic geometrical par-
titions into equivalence classes at all, besides the two trivial ones : that into
just one class (all of space-time), and that into classes each consisting of
a single point.
(1968:19)
The eternalist will gladly agree, going on to deny that reality for each point could
consist of that very point alone. Merely stating this view amounts to a reductio, they
will argue: it is an extreme form of (spatiotemporal) solipsism. You are not real for
me, and indeed no-one else is. Nor am I, or is anyone else, real for you.11 We have
lost the essential, inter-subjective, strand to our concept of reality.
In addition we may note a further, curious consequence: that almost none of an
individual’s past has ever been present (for them).12 Yesterday’s parade is past (and
determinate) for me (say), lying as it does in my absolute past. Yet since I was not at
the very spatiotemporal point where the parade occurred (I am idealizing somewhat
here), for me it was never present. The same is true for almost all of my past.
2.3.3 The Past Light-Cone
Hinchliff (2000) develops and even endorses the other suggestion that tentatively
emerged in discussion of Stein. In fact the idea was first backed by Godfrey-Smith,
who suggested that “the present be identified with the class of events which are ‘seen
now’ by an observer” (1979:240). In other words it is events situated on the past
light-cone that are held to be present.
transitivity of “is real for” is tenuous at best.
11At least these are natural conclusions. On the current proposal it is not completely obvious
what is real for a spatially extended entity. Still, their distinct locations mean that no part of you
is real for any part of me (and vice versa), in which case it seems right to say that we are not real
for one another.
12See Putnam (1967:246), Hinchliff (2000:S579) and Callender (2000:S594).
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Since the light-cone structure is invariant, on this proposal all observers agree as
to what is present for an event E. Less encouragingly, these ‘present’ events are also
past in every inertial reference frame: the temporal co-ordinates assigned to events
on E’s past light-cone are such that these events occur before E.13
This is not the half of it. The proposed relation is non-transitive: x can be
present for y, and y for z, even while x is in the absolute past of z. The relation is
also asymmetric: if x lies on y’s past light-cone, y does not lie on x’s. Hence if x is
present for y then y is not present for x.
All this is repugnant enough in an analysis of “is present for”. It is still less
attractive once we tether existence3 to presence. If Jim at x exists3 for Joe at y then
Joe at y does not exist3 for Jim at x. And Jim’s existing3 for you together with your
existing3 for me does not entail his existing3 for me.
2.3.4 The Elsewhere
Pre-relativistically, E’s present is composed of those events that are neither past nor
future relative to E. Needless to say, these are also the events simultaneous with E. In
Minkowski spacetime, it is the ‘elsewhere’ that separates (absolute) past and future.
It is therefore worth asking whether the elsewhere could play the role of surrogate
present, and whether spacelike separation could ground a relativistic simultaneity.
Weingard believes that it can. He notes first (and we may agree) that temporal
determinations would ideally be relativistically invariant, “so that the past, present
and future for an event at P are the same in every frame of reference” (1972:120). This
obtains on the proposal in question; the light-cone structure is frame independent.
The proposal also has the advantage that past, present and future exhaust the sum of
reality. And finally, the suggested underpinning for “is present for”—i.e “is spacelike
13And in some frames well before. Savitt (2000:S566) observes that we generally talk of the Cosmic
Microwave Background Radiation (CMBR) as having been emitted some fifteen billion years ago.
On the current proposal, the emission of CMBR is present.
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separated from”—is also symmetric.
Once again though, the proposed relation is not transitive. This in itself makes
spacelike separation an unfortunate candidate for the simultaneity relation.14 But
things appear more serious once we realize that timelike-separated events will all be
present for any event spacelike separated from each of them. Thus my birth and
death are simultaneous with distant Derek’s sudden sneeze. And although he lives
for thousands of Earth years, his birth and death are both present for me-now. We
can accept changes to our notion of simultaneity and the present, but there is a point
at which these notions just do not apply.
In addition (although we get rather ahead of ourselves here) one might become a
presentist to avoid the Problem of Change (§4.4). I am sceptical about this problem
as usually formulated, but on ‘elsewhere’ presentism contradictory states of affairs
will be simultaneously present for an observer at a spacetime point. This appears to
be a sharpened, more serious, difficulty.
In conclusion we should reconsider an additional factor sometimes alleged to sup-
port presentism. I think there is little in experience that on reflection supports the
presentist (as with non-ontological A-theories: see §1.2.1), but I take it that many
presentists maintain experience to be somehow tied in with what is present. Quite
the opposite is true on the current theory though: the present is precisely what we
cannot experience. Sklar puts the protest rather well:
Having dismissed as unreal things whose only deficiency is the fact that
causal signals from them have taken time to arrive at us now, or that
causal signals from us will take some time to arrive at them, it seems very
suspicious indeed to promote into the domain of the fully real those things
causally inaccessible to us (now) altogether.
(1981:137)
14Weingard (1972:121) evidently thinks that “is real for” is transitive, and therefore equates this
with the ancestral of “is spacelike separated from”. This would entail eternalism insofar as every
event would be real for every other.
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2.3.5 Fragmentation
To the tailored objections of the last few pages, I add a general complaint. It begins
with a forthright observation by Go¨del that the
concept of existence [. . . ] cannot be relativized without destroying its
meaning completely.
(1949:558)
What are we to make of this? As observed in §2.3.1, existence has always been relative
to times if this just means that different things exist at different times. And for the
presentist, existence3 is equally relative: what exists3 is permanently in flux.
15
Perhaps Go¨del is concerned that what exists3 for me might differ from what exists3
for you. But why is this more worrying than the fact that what exists3 for me differs
from what exists3 (or perhaps existed3) for William the Conqueror? The disparity
might be thought to arise because William and I exist (and, for the presentist, exist3)
at very different times, whereas you and I exist (and exist3) simultaneously. But
this is just a classical intuition rearing its stubborn head: on relativity we are not
simultaneous in any absolute and uncontroversial sense. Alternatively, perhaps we
hesitate to allow a discrepancy in what exists3 for us because we are so proximate.
But in fact our proximity guarantees that on most of the preceding analyses hardly
any discrepancy will arise.16
My suggestion is that we make Go¨del’s point in slightly different terms. Consider
the ontological A-theorist’s ‘tide of absolute becoming’. This refers, albeit metaphor-
ically, to an alleged process whereby successive events come into existence3.
17 It is
a tide of absolute becoming, and moreover it is just one tide. Now we might in fact
wonder whether there is any dynamic element to the proposals of the last few pages,
15In what follows I assume that by “existence” Go¨del does mean existence3.
16Two exceptions to this: if all that exists3 relative to (x, t) is what is located at (x, t), then we
differ completely in what exists3 for us; and on the relative simultaneity proposal, what exists3 for
us differs greatly if we are in (rapid) relative motion.
17See e.g Broad (1923:67–68; 1938:280–281); but I take it there is such a ‘tide’ on presentism as
well as past-and-presentism.
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as opposed to merely a plethora of ‘timeless’ facts regarding what is present, and
thus exists3, relative to what. Setting that aside though, the most that the relevant
proposals have provided is a coming into existence3 that is relative to a ‘worldline’
(i.e. a sequence of contiguous timelike-related points); and there are as many of these
‘tides’ as there are worldlines. The same difficulty would arise with respect to the
non-ontological A-theorist’s privileged properties. Classically these are alleged, again
somewhat metaphorically, to ‘sweep through’ spacetime from past to future. But the
recent relativistic proposals generate no such unified ‘sweep’, instead supplying a frag-
mented picture on which these properties ripple out from each and every spacetime
point, but only relative to those points. In other words, my emendation of Go¨del is
this: the concept of becoming cannot be relativized without destroying its meaning
completely.
2.4 Absolute Simultaneity Regained?
Now consider the following simple argument:
(A) SR is true;
(B) If SR is true then presentism is false;
(C) Hence, presentism is false.
Clearly this argument is valid, and so the presentist must reject either (A) or (B).
The last few sections have considered attempts to reject (B). I argued that each of
the proposed formulations faces serious difficulties, and as such I henceforth take (B)
to be true.
Indeed some presentists explicitly accept (B), focussing instead on a denial of
(A).18 Their denial acknowledges the empirical success of SR, but seeks to accom-
18See Craig (2001:103–104) and Tooley (1997:335–338). Strictly speaking Tooley is a past-and-
presentist, but (as indicated in §2.2) a lack of absolute simultaneity threatens this doctrine also.
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modate this in a watered-down version of SR (call it SR*) that is observationally
equivalent. Whilst SR is a democracy, SR* is an explicit dictatorship: spacetime can
be foliated into very many sets of parallel hyperplanes, but SR* holds one particu-
lar set to be privileged. Events that lie on a single hyperplane within this set are
absolutely simultaneous, and the timelike direction orthogonal to these successive hy-
perplanes defines an absolute rest. Observational equivalence with SR is guaranteed
insofar as motion relative to the absolute rest frame results in a deformation of our
measuring apparatus that compensates for and conceals the relative motion. In this
way nature conspires to hide the absolute rest frame from us.19
The presentist can hold, then, that SR* is true instead of SR. If so, presentism
can be resurrected in its original form; tendentious re-dressings in relativistic garb are
not needed. This manoeuvre is popular: Prior (1968, 1970), Tooley (1997:337–373),
Hinchliff (2000:S584–586), Craig (2001) and Markosian (2004a:75) all endorse versions
of it. Indeed the latter argues that SR* is a priori preferable to SR, presumably
because we have an a priori predilection for absolute simultaneity.
Before going on to consider the potency of this move, I must express some initial
reservations.20 I grant that there may be a privileged frame which is absolutely at
rest. But I similarly grant that there may be a privileged centre to the universe, or a
privileged direction to space. These are all possible, but the latter two in particular
we do not regard as likely. The reason is that such ‘privileges’ are simply redundant;
we can explain both experience and the wider world without recourse to them. The
same seems true of absolute simultaneity.21 Just as it would take an extremely strong
metaphysical argument to persuade us of the reality of an absolute centre to the
19Such a theory may sound outlandish, but in FitzGerald (1889) and particularly Lorentz (1892,
1895) it has roots in papers seminal to the development of SR. For further details on the so-called
“neo-Lorentzian” interpretation, see Craig (2001).
20I borrow these reservations from Stein (1991:154–155 fn.3).
21I say “seems” because certain controversial interpretations of Quantum Mechanics do posit
an absolute simultaneity relation (albeit one hidden from us). This is clearly good news for the
presentist, but the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is neither simple nor settled. If I were a
presentist, I would not be holding my breath.
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universe, or of a privileged direction, so should we require the same for absolute
simultaneity. For my part I doubt that the presentist has arguments that are nearly
strong enough.
2.5 The Modal Relativistic Argument
I shall propose a version of the argument from SR that claims immunity from re-
sponses based on SR*. Its immunity stems from its not requiring SR to be true, but
merely to be possible; hence I dub it the Modal Relativistic Argument (MRA). I think
MRA makes the presentist’s hand seem extremely weak, especially in conjunction
with all that has gone before; but if I am wrong then at least it encourages us to
think more deeply about the presentist thesis.
Subject to certain clarifications in §2.5.1, MRA requires three premises:
(1) Presentism is either necessarily true or necessarily false;
(2) SR is either contingently true or contingently false;
(3) If SR is true of any world, then presentism is false of that world.
If the presentist accepts all three of these, they are undone:
(4) From (2), SR is true of some possible world;
(5) From (3) and (4), presentism is false of some possible world;
(6) From (1) and (5), presentism is necessarily false.
I take it, then, that the presentist disagrees with at least one of (1)–(3). We can
almost immediately eliminate (3) as the source of the disagreement, since it is so
close to the previously accepted (B). The sole difference is that it loosens the scope
of (B) so as to apply to all worlds rather than just actuality; but the reasons for
accepting (B) are likewise reasons for accepting this loosened (3). It is not just in
54
actuality that a lack of absolute simultaneity scuppers the presentist; surely this is
true more widely.
I shall therefore say no more about (3). In §2.5.1 I turn to some book-keeping,
before defending (1) in §2.5.2 and (2) in §2.5.3.
2.5.1 Book-keeping
I wrote in §1.3.1 that in rough terms presentism is the doctrine that “only present
things exist”.22 Others portray it as holding that “nothing exists which is not
present”; that “only the present is real”; and that “only present objects exist”.23
Others strengthen these formulations though. Hudson portrays presentism as “the
thesis that, necessarily, only present objects exist” (2001:46; my italics). Sider claims
that the “presentist thinks [. . . ] that, necessarily, it is always true that everything is
(then) present” (1999:325; my italics). Moreover, some of the previously cited authors
precisify their definitions along similar lines. Zimmerman (1996:115–117) does just
this, as does Markosian in a footnote to his above characterization:
More precisely, it is the view that, necessarily, it is always true that only
present objects exist.
(2004:47 fn.1)
The explicit focus of MRA on the modal status of the claim that only present objects
exist3 requires that one tread carefully here. Adopting Sider’s definition would mean
that any query as to whether presentism is necessarily true would in fact ask whether
it is necessarily true that it is necessary that only present objects exist3. But the
intended question is rather whether it is necessarily true that only present objects
exist3.
22See Crisp (2004:15) and Keller (2004:84). In retrospect I meant that only present things exist3.
23For the first of these formulations see Bigelow (1996:35); for the second see Tooley (1997:234),
Hawley (2001:34), Davidson (2003:77) and Crisp (2003:211); and for the third see Markosian
(2004a:47).
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By “presentism” we shall mean the view that only present objects exist3. It follows
that presentism is potentially true or false of particular worlds at particular times.
Prima face then, the actual world might be “presentist” even though other worlds
are not, and indeed it might be presentist today but not tomorrow. Such a view is
not overly plausible, but it is consistent with our definition.
2.5.2 Could Presentism Be Contingently True?
Now to a defence of (1). The ultimate strategy will be to argue that presentism cannot
be contingently true or contingently false; thus it is necessarily true or necessarily false
as claimed by (1). First though, I consider the received wisdom on this subject.
Received Wisdom
We saw in §2.5.1 that many writers refrain from commenting on the modal status of
presentism. But from the evidence seen so far, it might be thought that whenever the
modal status of presentism is commented upon, presentism is held to be necessary
(or at least it is held that its proponents take it to be necessary).
This is not quite true. Bergmann does assume presentism to be held as necessary
(1999:123), but adds in a footnote that his argument (which is not of relevance here)
would go through “even if” presentism were contingent (1999:130 fn.13). Bigelow
is similarly sceptical, thinking it “improbable” that presentism could be contingent.
However, he concedes the possibility:
If presentism could be proved false by a scientific experiment then, it would
seem, presentism would not be a “metaphysical” matter after all but would
be a merely empirical hypothesis. Initially, that seems improbable, though
we should return to this option.
(1996:36)
Crisp confirms that “most presentists think of their theory as necessarily true if true”.
However, he opts to “reserve judgement”:
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The reasons I know of for being a presentist offer no reason at all for
thinking presentism a necessary truth.
(2003:215)
Finally, Rea is also quite circumspect. He stops short of saying that presentism is
contingently true (if true at all), but sees
no reason to dismiss at the outset the possibility that presentism and its
denial are contingent.
(2003:248 fn.9)
It seems we have a lop-sided spectrum of opinion. Hudson, Sider, Markosian and
Zimmerman take presentism to be (held as) necessarily true. Bigelow and Bergmann
think it unlikely that presentism could be just contingent. Crisp and Rea have no
such reservations, but fall short of fully endorsing it as contingently true (if true at
all). Note also that the disagreement over presentism’s modal status does not align
with that between presentists and eternalists. In fact all four bases are covered:
see Fig.2.2. It follows that (1) does not make the disreputable move of adopting a
view of presentism held only by non-presentists. Still though, why take (1) to be true?
Presentism’s modal status Presentist Eternalist
Necessarily Zimmerman Sider
true if true & &
at all Markosian Hudson
(Arguably)
contingently true Crisp Rea
if true at all
Figure 2.2
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Intuitions and Arguments
There are three surprises in this area. The first we have met: many writers on
presentism seem insensitive to its modal status. The second we have also met: there
are differences of opinion within both camps even when modal considerations are
addressed. The third surprise is that those who do address this topic do so only
superficially. Crisp and Rea are alone in offering any justification for their views, and
even their justification is essentially negative (they can give no reason why presentism
may not be contingent).
In search, then, of a more positive justification, I first report some common in-
tuitions: that the debate over presentism is ‘metaphysical’ in some full and meaty
sense; that these are therefore issues of necessity ; and that this is appropriate to a
doctrine that is philosophical as opposed to physical.
What lies behind these fledgling intuitions? Perhaps the thought that philosophi-
cal investigation proceeds a priori. This doubtless marks an important contrast with
(some) other disciplines. But it does not mean that philosophical doctrines are nec-
essarily true (if true at all). First there is the Kripkean (1980) worry that the a priori
and the necessary misalign, and do so twice over; for there are both a priori contin-
gencies and a posteriori necessities. Secondly, even though philosophical reflection
may itself proceed a priori, if the premises from which it embarks are contingent,
only the contingent truth of the conclusion will follow.
Nor, as Crisp and Rea have observed, do the considerations in favour of presentism
clearly portray it as necessarily true. I deal with these considerations in turn.
The first is simply that presentism is strongly intuitive. In fact I disputed this
claim in §1.4, but that aside it seems excessive to think that gut feeling reveals not
just truth but even necessary truth.
Perhaps this gut feeling is somehow tied to experience. I think that experience sup-
ports presentism no more than it supports non-ontological A-theories (recall §1.2.1).
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Again though, even if our experience were such that it lent credence to presentism,
would this entail the necessity of that doctrine?
Similarly, recalling §1.4.3, it does not appear necessary that we are free agents
(indeed it may not even be true); and I still claim (as my promissory note records)
that considerations involving persistence and-or the Problem of Change do not entail
the truth, let alone the necessity, of presentism.
Fourth consideration: as remarked in §1.3.3, presentism is supposed to be the
temporal analogue of actualism—which is itself a popular theory. Given the analogy,
if there were good reasons to think actualism necessarily true (if true at all) then
perhaps presentism should be regarded similarly. But in fact it makes little sense to
discuss the modal status of actualism. What would it mean for this doctrine to be
necessarily true? It hardly seems right to say that, in every possible world, only the
actual world exists3. Moreover, even if we could comprehend the idea that actualism
is necessarily true (if true at all), it would still not follow that this carries over to
presentism. For one thing the analogy might break down at the modal level. For
another, if actualism—a theory of modal ontology—were necessarily true (if true at
all), then the temporal analogue of this might appear to be that presentism—a theory
of temporal ontology—is always true (if true at all).
Finally, what of presentism’s attractively streamlined ontology? Arguably, pre-
sentism is not especially streamlined if it embraces either haecceities or abstract times
(see §1.4.2). But this aside, perhaps there is a route from ontological parsimony to
necessary truth. Suppose that, necessarily, either presentism or eternalism or past-
and-presentism (etc.) is true. Suppose further that, necessarily, presentism is the
most parsimonious of these. Final supposition: necessarily, parsimony is a criterion
of truth. It would then follow that presentism is necessarily true.
It is the final supposition that seems weakest. Parsimony in itself cannot be
sufficient for truth, since an extreme nihilism would soon follow. What is also required
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of a theory is something like adequacy. Even then though, it is unclear how elegance
and simplicity should be weighted relative to parsimony; perhaps a ceteris paribus
clause must be included before parsimony is allowed to arbitrate between theories.
But irrespective of this small print, the major objection to the final supposition is
that it is simply misguided. Occam’s razor, it will be said, is a heuristic principle to
be employed when formulating or adjudicating between theories. It is a perversion of
this principle to regard parsimony as a necessary criterion of truth.
In fact I have no wish to engage in a lengthy debate over the status of Occam’s
razor. I tend to the view that it is indeed just a heuristic maxim, but since my overall
aim is to establish (1), and the argument from Occam’s razor purports to do just this,
I would be more than happy to be wrong here.
This aside though, Crisp and Rea seem correct in their claim that the arguments
for presentism, such as they are, do not portray that doctrine as necessarily true. So
why not just deny (1) and take presentism to be contingent instead?
Supervenience and Epistemology
Tempting as this is, I think we should pause for thought. (1) is in with a chance. The
gist of my supporting argument is that epistemic considerations make it unattractive
to hold presentism to be contingently true or contingently false. And if one does not
hold presentism to be contingently true or contingently false, then one holds it to be
necessarily true or necessarily false as claimed by (1).
A world is presentist iff presentism is true of that world. The contingent truth
of presentism would then amount to the actual world, but not all worlds, being
presentist. We can distinguish two versions of this claim: supervenient contingent
presentism, which holds, roughly, that two worlds cannot differ merely as to whether
they are presentist; and non-supervenient contingent presentism, which holds, again
roughly, that two worlds can so differ.
60
Now to smooth out this roughness. We wish to discuss whether possible worlds
might differ only as to their presentist status. But given that a difference vis-a`-vis
presentism means a gargantuan difference in terms of what exists3, how could two
worlds differ only with regard to presentism?
We can finesse this issue by construing possible worlds four-dimensionally. They
contain, or perhaps represent, everything that has happened, is happening, and will
happen in a world—irrespective of whether all of this, or only a particular sliver,
exists3. Even the most die-hard presentist should not object here. The suggestion is
merely that we conceive of possible worlds as models of all that happens over time.
The presentist is free to say that only a part of this model represents what exists3, just
as the eternalist chooses to embrace it whole. Moreover, the contingent presentist with
whom we are currently engaged allows that not all worlds are presentist. It seems,
therefore, that they can have no general objection to my talk of four-dimensional
models, since in some cases they assert that all of what is thus represented in fact
exists3.
24
Now to streamline our definitions. Supervenient contingent presentism holds that
by fixing the world-history, we thereby fix the presentist status of that world. Non-
supervenient contingent presentism holds that a world’s presentist status is not fixed
by its world-history; the same world-history could be true of both a presentist and a
non-presentist world.
Supervenient contingent presentism is not very plausible. How could a world-
history determine the ‘rules’ of existence3 for that world? How would changing that
world-history correlatively change a presentist world into a non-presentist one (or
vice versa)? Alter the number of objects in the world-history, alter their type, their
distribution, their properties and the relations between them: such alterations do not
underpin the difference we are pursuing.
24Or at least that more than a single slice of the model corresponds to the existent3. (There is
the logical space for a contingent presentist to hold that eternalism is necessarily false.)
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What about the laws of nature? If one is a Humean then to alter these is to
alter the distribution, properties, etc. of objects as already discussed. On a more
robust view of the laws of nature, it is certainly true that varying these might make
‘past objects become present’. Suppose that the actual world is presentist. Then it
is plausible that different physiological laws might have allowed the recently deceased
to live into the present and thus exist3. But this is not what we are after. We want
past objects not to ‘become present’ and therefore existent3; we want them to remain
past but nonetheless exist3. This is no job for the laws of nature.
Indeed there appears to be a Sorites argument against supervenient contingent
presentism. Consider two very different world-histories that are alleged to differ, inter
alia, as to their presentist status. Imagine passing ever so slowly from one of these
worlds to the other via a succession of possible worlds each differing only minutely
from its predecessor. At every step the successive worlds might differ only over the
colour of an object, whether an event happens fractionally earlier or later, whether
there is one less atom, etc. It is implausible that any such step marks the transition
from a presentist to a non-presentist world. But unlike with baldness or piles of sand,
the distinction between a presentist and a non-presentist world is surely an absolute
one with no grey areas. So not only can the transition not occur at a single step, but
it cannot occur gradually either. In that case it cannot occur at all.
I turn then to non-supervenient contingent presentism. But I begin with the ap-
parently unrelated tale of the pixies that pursue me relentlessly about Oxford. These
pixies are invisible, noiseless, odourless, immaterial, and in fact entirely undetectable.
Nonetheless, I believe they are out there (and in hot pursuit).
How would I persuade a sceptic? Perhaps by convincing them that the pixies
exist necessarily ; that there are a priori reasons as to why they must exist. But
what if I think the pixies exist only contingently? This means, of course, that their
existence is possible, but that their non-existence is also possible. And now it seems
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that I espouse a seriously unattractive set of views, for if it is entirely possible that
the pixies not exist, then why, given that there is no evidence for their existence,
do I persist in saying that they do? A more appropriate response would seem to be
agnosticism or indeed an Occamist repudiation.
Very similar thoughts apply to non-supervenient contingent presentism. Some
things ‘show up’: if there were a cat on the mat I could see it from where I sit and
would trip over it when leaving the room. But the truth or falsity of presentism is
not similarly observable, as Markosian admits:
In particular, we Presentists think that the current state of the world
is qualitatively indiscernible from the way it would be if Non-presentism
[. . . ] were [. . . ] true.
(2004a:69)
Why is this? As discussed in an earlier context (§1.2.1), what we perceive at each and
every spacetime point is determined, not by mysterious A-properties or what exists3,
but rather by what occurs at locations appropriately distanced from the point of
perception. I hear a faraway gunshot, but whether the gunshot still exists3 makes
no difference to my perception. This lack of sensitivity is even more obvious with
respect to the distant past. Whilst we might question the coherence of such an idea,
my moment-to-moment experience would not differ even if the existence3 of Napoleon
and the whole 19th century were constantly in flux.
We can now see the problem with non-supervenient contingent presentism. This
view holds that presentism is true of some worlds yet false of others. But in virtue of
its non-supervenience, the truth or falsity of such presentism ‘floats free’ of all that is
detectable; the price of non-supervenience is ignorance. Why assert presentism to be
true of a world in which there is no evidence for its truth? One might as well believe
in pixies.
Of course if our ignorance extends to any particular world, we are ipso facto
ignorant about the actual world. We might therefore dilute contingent presentism:
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having previously held that the actual world is presentist but not all worlds are,
the contingent presentist could retreat to the claim that some worlds are presentist
but others not—with no assertion being made about actuality. I believe that those
presentists against whom MRA is aimed would baulk at this. Prior, Craig et al.
think that in the actual world, only present things exist3. In addition though, one
must observe quite how empty this contingent presentism would be. Some worlds are
presentist and others not; but we cannot say whether a world is or is not presentist,
even when that world is our own. Here is a distinction with no observable differences,
with respect to which we cannot place the actual world, and for which I know of no
good arguments. It therefore seems to me that, whether one takes it as supervenient
or non-supervenient, contingent presentism is a desperately unattractive doctrine.
2.5.3 The Contingency Of SR
The final premise of MRA to be examined is (2): that SR is either contingently true
or contingently false. If one happens to believe (as I do) that SR is true, and further
that the laws of nature are contingent, then one will doubtless be strongly disposed
to accept (2) already. But given (1) and (3) it seems that the presentist must resist.
Clearly they will not hold SR to be necessarily true; they must claim it to be necessary
false instead.25 How should we understand this claim?
Not in terms of a strict, logical, necessity. It is unlikely, to say the least, that SR
suffers from the kind of internal inconsistency that would generate a logical contradic-
tion or closed tableau. The theory is too well understood for this to be a significant
worry.
But might there be a lurking interpretative difficulty with SR? Although (I have
claimed that) it is a self-consistent formal calculus, there may be deep-lying reasons
25In so doing they align themselves against those presentists who attempt to relativistically re-
formulate their doctrine. I take it that such presentists think SR is true—or at the very least not
necessarily false.
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why it cannot possibly be understood as a theory of time. I suggest that the most
likely way for the presentist to develop this is by observing that worlds satisfying SR
contain no absolute simultaneity, and yet (they will claim) absolute simultaneity is
essential to time.
Much will depend on how this latter claim is supported. It is far from obvious, and
in fact goes rather against the grain. The vast majority of physicists and philosophers
happily regard SR’s non-spatial dimension as temporal, despite an explicit belief that
it admits of no absolute ordering. And there is good reason for this: despite the lack
of an absolute simultaneity, a universe satisfying SR may yet include a dimension
that stands aside from three spatial ones, along which entropy increases, causes give
way to effects, change occurs, experiences succeed one another, and clocks function
as measuring devices. Can we really claim that such a dimension is not temporal?
The presentist has to bite this bullet. They must maintain that even if it contains
all of the above, a spacetime that does not admit of an absolute ordering contains no
time. And worse is to follow. Let us make the supposition—which in fact I reject—
that absolute simultaneity is essential to time. Let us then describe as quasi-temporal
a spacetime which, though not equipped with an absolute simultaneity, nonetheless
contains a dimension with respect to which entropy tends to increase, causes lead
to effects, experiences occur, etc. It seems that the presentist must insist that even
quasi -temporal worlds are impossible; for in such a world presentism would again be
false (due to the lack of an absolute simultaneity). So not only does the presentist
have to establish the controversial thesis that absolute simultaneity is essential to
time; in addition they must argue that there could be no world containing a merely
quasi -temporal dimension.
I do not know how they can accomplish this latter aim. As to the former project,
that of showing absolute simultaneity to be essential to time, it is also unclear how the
presentist should proceed. Perhaps their best bet is to urge that passage is essential to
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time (and to further observe that absolute simultaneity is necessary for passage). This
is not immediately more persuasive than the earlier claim about absolute simultaneity:
why think that passage is so essential to time that a spacetime lacking this would fail
to be temporal, even if it exhibited all the other paradigmatic features of temporality?
But the presentist might extract an answer of sorts from McTaggart (1927:14–15).
Change, they will say, cannot occur without passage; and time is the dimension of
change. To this there is the standard eternalist reply that change is in fact just
variation in what obtains at different times (or perhaps different quasi -times given
the recent discussion); it is not dependent on passage after all.26 Whilst I fully endorse
this reply, I assume the presentist rejects it. They will continue to maintain that a
world with no absolute simultaneity, and hence no passage, contains no change. But
again, could there not be quasi -temporal worlds in which (on the supposition that
the presentist is correct) there may not be change as such, but there may still be
variation in what obtains at different times? In such a world, where there is no
absolute simultaneity, presentism would again be false. And indeed, could the actual
world not be quasi -temporal in just this way?
But perhaps it is unfair to expect an argument from the presentist here. It is
apparently essential to water that it have the molecular structure H2O; but as Kripke
(1980) has taught us, this is an a posteriori discovery. Might it similarly be necessary
a posteriori that time admit of an absolute simultaneity?27 If so, then it is hardly
fair to insist on an a priori argument to this effect.
The first point to make in response is that the Kripkean analogy is far from
perfect. Whilst most of us concede that water could not have been XYZ, or that I
could not have been born to different parents, the concession regarding time is much
less intuitive. To repeat what was said above: many of us very comfortably interpret
26In addition the presentist must consider Shoemaker’s (1969) claim that there could be time
without change.
27Which I take to mean that this would be metaphysically necessary. Dorothy Edgington and
Hugh Rice have suggested that the presentist might adopt this line.
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SR as informative about time, despite the lack of an absolute simultaneity. To the
extent that there is an analogy here, our presentist resembles one who says that water
is essentially XYZ; they claim as necessarily true that which we tend to regard as
actually false. This is an uninspiring start.
A second (and I think decisive) objection is that it is desperately unclear how
the presentist might have discovered the putative a posteriori necessity of absolute
simultaneity to time. What empirical investigation could possibly reveal this? And
even if empirical factors did somehow reveal an absolute simultaneity, how could they
further establish this as necessary to time?
Thirdly, we may revisit old territory. Whilst we accept that anything without the
microphysical structure H2O would not be water, we think there could nonetheless
be another substance that melted at 0 ◦C, boiled around 100 ◦C, filled the rivers and
seas, etc. This provides a model for what was previously introduced as quasi -time: a
dimension that is like time in many ways, but does not admit of an absolute simul-
taneity. On the hypothesis that absolute simultaneity is (metaphysically) necessary
to time, it would be quasi -time, and not time itself, that most physicists believe to
obtain in our universe (although doubtless they express this somewhat differently).
It is no more plausible to contend that quasi -time is impossible than to claim that
there could be no water-like liquid distinct from H2O.
28
28Note added June 2007 : my attention has recently been drawn to the discussion of Bourne
(2006b:204–224), which overlaps in part with the foregoing material. Bourne interprets an especially
cryptic article by Go¨del (1949) as arguing from (a) the compatibility with General Relativity of
certain non-foliable (“Go¨delian”) spacetimes to (b) the unreality (or “ideality”) of time. I am
unconvinced that Bourne ever supplies a valid route from (a) to (b), but he seemingly attempts
this via (c) time is necessarily A-theoretic, (d) Go¨delian spacetimes are temporal, and (e) such
spacetimes are acutely inhospitable to all A-theories. (I regard these three as jointly inconsistent,
thus demonstrating not (b) but rather the falsity of (at least) one of (c)–(e). But I stress that this
is my reconstruction of an argument I find obscure.)
The Go¨delian spacetimes under consideration are a little unusual, and one might be led to doubt
their physical possibility (or, with regard to (d), their temporality). I am far less inclined to doubt
the possibility (and temporality) of SR worlds, and hence prefer to focus any modal argument on
the latter. But I note with satisfaction that, although he himself is a presentist, Bourne and I agree
on several points. In particular, just as I have rejected any attempt to regard SR worlds as non-
temporal due to certain allegedly essential properties of time, so does Bourne reject a similar appeal
that would allow the A-theorist to deny (d) (2006b:216–217). Instead Bourne opts for a denial of
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2.6 Conclusion
Where does this leave us? In Chapter One I argued that there is little if any (experien-
tial) support for non-ontological A-theories, and indeed that such theories are verging
on the incoherent. For the remainder of that chapter I highlighted certain difficul-
ties for the presentist, and (more briefly) for the past-and-presentist and ‘branching
futurist’. By contrast, eternalism seemed relatively trouble free.
The current chapter has focussed on SR, arguing in §§2.2 and 2.3 that it is difficult
if not impossible to provide a satisfactory reformulation of presentism in the absence of
an absolute simultaneity. In §§2.4 and 2.5 I considered a modal argument to counter
the presentist suggestion that SR might be false insofar as it fails to acknowledge
(what they believe to be) a genuine, albeit hidden, absolute simultaneity. I argued
that even if SR is false in this way, the presentist is still very much troubled by its
possibility. The key claims were that we have no good reason to doubt this apparent
possibility, and that it is unattractive to hold presentism as just contingently true.
At this point one should recall (from §2.1) that although presentism is an onto-
logical A-theory, and indeed the most popular such theory, with respect to SR it has
stood in for A-theories more generally. In other words I claim that the difficulties
with SR, whether stemming from its truth or its mere possibility, are difficulties for
(c). In doing so he admits that the actuality of any contingent A-theory would not be revealed
empirically (2006b:218), rather as I have contended that the truth of presentism does not ‘show up’.
Bourne then strongly criticizes what I would describe as a ‘non-supervenient contingent A-theory’
(2006b:219–220) for the very reason that I rejected non-supervenient contingent presentism in §2.5.2:
what grounds could one possibly have for asserting its truth? Astonishingly though, this is extremely
close to Bourne’s final position (2006b:220–224). He thinks that A-theories apart from presentism
are ruled out for a priori reasons, and that some worlds are not A-theoretic since they are not
foliable. However, other worlds (which can be foliated) might yet be presentist. The “might” is
crucial though: Bourne does not claim that such worlds would be presentist, concluding instead
(with regard to the B-theory and presentism) that “in those worlds where particular matters of
fact do not rule either out, we have to say that either could be true and that it is a brute matter
of fact which is” (2006b:223). It follows that “it is hard to see any reason for thinking that the
actual world is [A-theoretic] rather than [B-theoretic]” (2006b:221)! One might be distracted at
this stage by Bourne’s abrupt change in topic—he switches from defending presentism to defending
metaphysics—but I shall retain my focus. When a presentist feels forced to admit that their own
doctrine may well be false of actuality, they should surely start to reconsider.
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all A-theories—be they ontological or otherwise. I would be happy to rest my case
against the various A-theories on relativistic considerations. But the arguments of
Chapter One mean I do not have to. Taken in tandem, the last two chapters amount
to what I think is a convincing case against the A-theorist. Henceforth I will assume
the B-theory.
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Chapter 3
Two Theories Of Persistence
3.1 Introduction
Objects exist at multiple times: they persist.1 How do they do so? This chapter
provides brief introductions to the two most popular accounts: endurance and perdu-
rance. Those introductions are not, and could not be, independent of what has gone
before though. My espousal of the B-theory, and of eternalism in particular, will soon
lead to difficulties in formulating endurance. In Chapters Four and Five it will also
furnish various anti-endurantist objections.
3.2 Perdurance
I begin with perdurance, the kernel of which I take to be that objects are temporally
extended.2 Lewis (1986a:202) and Sider (2001:2) provide a useful analogy: perduring
objects extend through time rather as roads extend through space.
Such roads have salient parts, for example the streetlit section or the dual carriage-
way. I believe that roads also have (most probably) non-salient parts corresponding
1It is standard to say that an object persists iff it exists at more than one time, but the latter is
more plausibly necessary than sufficient. We would hardly regard as persistent that which existed
only at two greatly separated instants.
2I shall also write as if perduring objects are “four dimensional”; but temporal extension is
what really counts. A temporally extended but spatially flat object would be three dimensional but
nonetheless perduring.
70
to every sub-division of their length.3 Thus each and every road has a middle third,
a second fifth, etc., even if these sections stand out not at all. How else could a road
extend through space except by having such parts?
A simple has no parts whatsoever (whether salient or otherwise). No-one believes
roads to be simple, but some think that spatially extended simples are at least pos-
sible.4 I reject this. I am prepared to grant that an object may be (i) extended, (ii)
lacking in salient parts, and (iii) strongly indivisible; but I deny that such an object
could also be a simple. Consider the following putative simple: it is externally just
like a snooker ball, internally homogeneous and continuous, and extremely robust.
Suppose that this object is struck from the baulk line of a snooker table. Is part of
the ball not touching the baize before the shot? Must we regard the cue as impacting
the whole ball rather than a part of it? And how did the ball straddle the baulk line
except by having a part either side of it? True: talk of “simples” usually aims at mi-
croscopic bodies (perhaps because actual macroscopic objects are clearly composite).
But the literature on extended simples does not respect this,5 and rightly not; for
why would sheer size generate extra complications? The objection is entirely general:
irrespective of the scale, if an object extends from −L to L on some spatial axis, then
clearly half the object lies between −L and 0, and half between 0 and L.6
For entirely parallel reasons I believe that any temporally extended object pos-
3At least for macroscopic sub-divisions. Intermolecular gaps are a complication here.
4E.g. Scala (2002) and McDaniel (2007). Markosian (1998, 2004b, 2004c) ostensibly embraces
extended simples, but distinguishes between metaphysical parts, “which are the things that actually
compose composite objects”, and conceptual parts, “which correspond to the sub-regions of the
region of space occupied by an object” (1998:223). He concedes that “anything with some extension
will have conceptual parts” (1998:224).
5See Scala (2002:395), Markosian (1998:214; 2004c:415) and McDaniel (2007:140).
6Scala explicitly denies this, granting the possibility of a simple that “occupies a greater than
point-size region of space and is indivisible because it does not have, for instance, a right or a left
half. To look at one, you would think you can distinguish a right from a left half, but looks aren’t
everything. When you think you point to a part of the atom, I say you are pointing at all of it or
nothing at all” (2002:394). In a reply to Scala, Zimmerman (2002:398) describes these simples as
“seemingly possible”. McDaniel also denies my claim: he grants as analytic that “[i]f it had two
halves, then [a] simple would have proper parts”, but denies that “[i]f there were an extended simple,
then it would have two halves” (2007:138–139).
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sesses a temporal part for every sub-division of its duration.7 This, then, is the
perdurantist account of how an object persists through time: it has temporal parts
whenever it exists.
What is a temporal part though? It is tempting to reply: what is a spatial
part? The perdurantist holds these to be largely analogous; if we understand one, we
should understand the other.8 A fuller reply is available though: a temporal part is
an improper part of its parent object as at a particular time, and exists only at that
time.9
Just as my spatial parts are naturally associated and indeed united, so too are
my temporal parts. Such parts are hardly identical (nor is my foot identical to my
hand), but they are nonetheless parts of the same four-dimensional object. In perdu-
rantist terms they are genidentical : related and united by a mixture of qualitative,
spatiotemporal, and causal continuities.10 The genidentity relation is non-transitive
and need not be one-one between temporal parts at different times.11 Note that many
perdurantists also countenance non-natural associations of temporal parts, so that
there is an ‘object’, albeit an unfamiliar one, composed of my temporal parts, those
of Napoleon, and those of an aubergine. As I shall use the term, such parts are not
genidentical; only parts of natural (perduring) objects are thus related.12
7Sattig (2006:55) and Gilmore (2006:206–208) countenance (the possibility of) temporal exten-
sion without temporal parthood. They make no reference to a salient/non-salient or metaphys-
ical/conceptual distinction, although an earlier draft (private communication) reveals Gilmore to
believe in the possibility of spatially extended simples a` la Scala and McDaniel.
8Although in fact there are certain non-obvious differences in the way we individuate spatial and
temporal parts: see Butterfield (1985:35–37).
9In fact this defines an instantaneous temporal part. (I intend my characterization as equivalent
to Sider’s definition: “x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t =df. (1) x exists at, but
only at, t; and (2) x is a part of y at t; and (3) x overlaps at t everything that is a part of y at t”
(2001:59). Sattig’s (2006:54) definition is similar, but since he focusses on spatially improper parts,
a difference arises with respect to an object that is either non-spatial or spatially coincides with one
of its proper parts.) An extended temporal part would be an improper part of its parent object as it
is throughout a certain period (and would exist only at that period). A perduring object therefore
counts as its own extended temporal part. Perhaps more surprisingly, this also seems true of an
enduring object.
10The precise mixture depends on the type of object. See Chapter Seven for more on genidentity.
11See e.g. Lewis (1976:24–25) and the discussion of fission in §7.5.2.
12In this I seem to follow Sider (2001:224–225). Naturalness may well be vague here.
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3.2.1 Virtues And Vices
Any view that holds objects to be four dimensional and possessed of temporal parts
is somewhat counter-intuitive. So why adopt perdurance?
Firstly, it is attractive to one impressed by apparent analogies between time and
space; it treats temporal parts largely on a par with spatial ones.13 Eternalists in
particular already ‘spatialize’ time to some extent by holding that places are an
ontological model for times: all exist3 equally. They may be inclined to go further
and regard persistence through time rather as they do extension through space.14
However, perdurance’s main advantage is that it (allegedly) reaps metaphysical
rewards far outweighing any counter-intuitive costs. I will focus on three particular
examples much later in §7.5.2, but as a taster: the problems of fission and fusion,
the statue and the clay, and Theseus’ Ship are all alleged to become tractable on
perdurance. These are significant gains in themselves, but it is also thought that
perdurance avoids the so-called ‘Problem of Change’, whereas endurance does not
(see §4.4).
Critics of perdurance emphasize its counter-intuitive claims. Thus (i) Thomson
dismisses it as a “crazy metaphysic” (1983:213); and (ii) Van Inwagen claims not
even to understand it (1981:133). Other important objections centre upon (iii) the
Rotating Discs Argument and (iv) Van Inwagen’s accusations of modal inductility
(1990:252–254). I will comment on (iv) in §6.4.3, and on (iii) in Chapter Seven. Van
Inwagen’s (ii) is rather undermined by his later work, which apparently displays a
very clear understanding of perdurance.15 In any case the only real response to (ii)
is to clearly explain the perdurantist’s claims, and this I have already tried to do.
Regarding (i), the precise charge is that perdurance involves a constant generation
13Though recall fn.8.
14Though Parsons (2000:403–406) discusses a surprising potential outcome of this inclination: that
spatial extension might not involve parts, but rather an endurance-like multiple location.
15Nonetheless, Van Inwagen (2000) has since repeated his claims to incomprehension.
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of matter ex nihilo. I back Sider’s reply: such matter is in fact “caused to exist by
previous temporal parts” in accordance with “the familiar laws of motion” (2001:217).
The only change from the standard picture is that, strictly speaking, such laws no
longer govern the movement of matter, but rather its distribution through spacetime.
No perpetual miracle is required.
3.3 Endurance
3.3.1 Being Wholly Present
In contrast with perdurance, endurance is supposed to be our common-sense, default
option. It is often formulated as holding that objects are “wholly present” at each and
every moment of their existence.16 During that existence, they move in their entirety
through space. They are spatially extended, with spatial parts; but not temporally
extended, or with temporal parts.
Nonetheless, the contention that objects are wholly present is clearly philosophical;
the man in the street would express only bemusement if asked whether he, or his
street, were wholly present. Ideally we would unpack endurance in less rarefied terms.
Sider (1997, 2001:63–68) raises a profound difficulty though. Considering an object
O at time t, we wish to analyse the claim that
O is wholly present at t. (E1)
An intuitive starting point is obvious enough: O is wholly present at t iff
Every part of O exists at t. (E2)
But in fact (E2) is inadequate. This is not due to familiar qualms about the sense of
“exists”; these are avoided by a shift to
16See e.g. Lewis (1986a:202), Markosian (1994) and Mellor (1998:86).
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Every part of O is located at t. (E3)
Instead, the difficulty concerns the meaning of “every part of O”. If this means “every
part that O has at t” then we are left with the claim that
Every part that O has at t is located at t. (E4)
(E4) seems trivially true though; even the perdurantist accepts it. But if, on the
other hand, “every part of O” refers to every part that O ever has, then our putative
analysis is that
Every part that O ever has is located at t. (E5)
On (E5), the only objects wholly present at t would be those that have by that time
gained all the parts they will ever gain, and lost none of the parts they will ever lose.
Worse follows though: enduring objects are supposedly wholly present throughout
their careers. This together with (E5) would entail something obviously false: that
objects never gain or lose parts.17
Nor can the endurantist mount a tu quoque. An instantaneous temporal part is
wholly present at a time in a very clear sense: all of its (spatial) parts exist at and
only at that time. In a similarly clear manner, perduring objects are not wholly
present at a time, since they have parts at other times. But they are wholly present
at one particular extended region: that containing all of their (temporal) parts.
What is the endurantist to do? Sider (1997; 2001:64–68) considers further (un-
successful) formulations that centre on being wholly present. In §§3.3.2 and 3.3.3 I
consider some alternative proposals instead.
17The mereological essentialist holds that objects not only do not but cannot gain or lose parts;
perhaps (E5) is welcome in such quarters. I think mereological essentialism no less “obviously false”
than mereological constancy; and also that, even if it were true, its truth should not follow ex
definitione from the truth of endurance.
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3.3.2 Being Temporally Unextended
One option for the endurantist is to borrow from their foe. However the perdurantist
understands the notion of a temporal part, the endurantist can deny that there are
such parts (or at least that objects ever possess them).18 Sider (2001:64–65) points
out that an instantaneous existent might trouble such an endurantist, since the exis-
tent would count as its own temporal part. A tempting reply is that instantaneous
existents do not persist (let alone endure), but alternatively the endurantist might
shift to denying that objects have temporally proper parts. This has the advantage
of overcoming another potential difficulty: the fact that a genuinely enduring object
arguably counts as its own extended temporal part (see fn.9).
I do not think it disastrous to formulate endurance in terms of a denial of tempo-
rally proper parts. But note that this formulation would be inadequate if an object
could be temporally extended without possessing temporal parts; such an object
would then count as enduring (which I suspect the endurantist would very much
resist). I have argued against the possibility of extension without parthood (recall
§3.2), but it is instructive to observe how such extension would trouble the proposed
formulation: the fact is that temporally extended objects are not supposed to count
as enduring. Perhaps our formulation of endurance should reflect this then: enduring
objects (persist and) are temporally unextended.
What initially seems like a distinct suggestion is for the endurantist to focus on
identity. Might an object O endure iff it exists at a time t and is identical to an object
at a distinct time t′? Merricks (1999:427) and Sider (2001:54–55) contend that this
is true even of a perduring object though. Such an object could have temporal parts,
and thus exist, at both t and t′; and every object is self-identical. It therefore seems
that even a perduring object may exist at one time and be identical to an object that
exists at a distinct time.
18See Lewis (1988:67 fn.4), Markosian (1994:247–248) and Zimmerman (1996:121–124).
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To this the endurantist might respond that on perdurance there is no temporally
unextended entity at t identical with a temporally unextended entity at t′.19 Hence
they might reformulate: O endures iff it is temporally unextended, exists at t, and
is identical to a temporally unextended object at t′ (for some t and t′). But now
this is just an unnecessarily complicated way of saying that objects are temporally
unextended and persistent. I do not see that an explicit focus on identity helps a
great deal.
Indeed, I do not see that the shift to being temporally unextended has helped a
great deal. Anyone familiar with the difficulties of §3.3.1 will surely pose a pointed
question: what is it for an object to be temporally unextended? If the idea is that
all of its parts lie in a temporally unextended region, that merely welcomes back the
previous ambiguities. Are we discussing all the parts it ever has? Or all the parts it
has at that region? An endurance based on being temporally unextended seems no
less problematic than an endurance based on being wholly present.
3.3.3 Spatiotemporal Occupation
Instead one might try to formulate endurance in terms of spatiotemporal occupa-
tion. Sattig attempts just this, defining theses of “three-dimensionalism” and “four-
dimensionalism” as follows:20
(3D) (i) an ordinary object occupies multiple spacetime regions, and (ii)
these spacetime regions are temporally unextended, or instantaneous,
and non-simultaneous.
(4D) (i) an ordinary object occupies a unique spacetime region, and (ii)
this spacetime region is temporally extended.
(2006:48–49)
19Here and henceforth I use “entity” in a particularly broad sense that covers (i) enduring objects,
(ii) their ‘lives’ or ‘careers’ (see §6.4.2), (iii) perduring (i.e. temporally extended) objects, and (iv)
their temporal parts. (Such a ‘catch-all’ term will be useful when we proceed in Chapter Six to a
meta-discussion of endurance and perdurance.)
20See also Parsons (2000:400–401) and Gilmore (2006:199–206).
77
Might we borrow Sattig’s (3D) as a formulation of endurance?21 It is worth remark-
ing first of all that (3D) and (4D) are exclusive given the uniqueness constraint in
(4D)(i) and Sattig’s resolve not to “lump together clauses (i) and (ii) of each thesis”
(2006:49).22 But the uniqueness requirement appears incoherent: how could an object
occupy an extended region without occupying its various subregions? How could the
coffee fill my cup, yet not fill both its lower and upper halves?
A resolution lies in the precise meaning of “occupation”. Sattig does not define
this, but characterizes it by saying (inter alia) that
if [an object] a occupies a region R, and R′ is a proper part of R, then it
does not follow that a occupies R′. For example, a table does not occupy
the region occupied by its legs.
(2006:48)
I think Sattig intends “occupation” to mean (what I will term) exact occupation.23
As I would describe matters, I occupy the regions in which I have parts (whether these
parts be spatial or otherwise); but I do not exactly occupy these regions, since I extend
beyond them. In retrospect then, (3D) and (4D) would be more-or-less incompatible
even without the uniqueness condition and the separation of their respective clauses.24
21Sattig uses “endurance” for a doctrine distinct from but related to (3D). The different doctrines
arise because he believes there to be a gulf between “ordinary time” and “spacetime”, the details of
which would take us too far afield.
22This is necessary because it would be prima facie possible to occupy both a unique extended
region and also many unextended ones. (One could arguably do the former in virtue of the latter.)
Note also that although they are exclusive, (3D) and (4D) are not exhaustive: e.g. Hudson (2001:45–
71) argues that objects exactly occupy multiple extended spatiotemporal regions, and Lewis mentions
(only to set aside) the possibility of objects “that persist by having an enduring and a perduring
part” (1986a:202). In what follows I ignore these and other recherche´ options. I also ignore a recently
canvassed alternative to perdurance, namely the stage theory as recommended by Sider (1996, 2000,
2001) and Hawley (2001). Sider (2001:191), Hawley (2001:41–43) and Haslanger (2003:319) all
observe that stage theory and perdurance are ontologically equivalent (in which case perhaps I will
be discussing stage theory after all, but only implicitly). The sole disagreement concerns whether
persisting objects, or the referents of ordinary talk, are four-dimensional worms (perdurance) or
their instantaneous temporal parts (stage theory).
23If so, he should have written that “. . . if R′ is a proper part of R, then it follows that a does
not occupy R′”. However, his example strongly suggests the notion of exact occupation, as does an
earlier “hand in glove” analogy (2006:48).
24Not totally incompatible though: an object might exactly occupy both extended regions and
unextended ones. Again I ignore this recherche´ possibility.
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I fear that the newly discovered centrality of exact occupation means that we have
once more failed to progress. What is it for O to exactly occupy R? We want to say,
roughly, that (a) every part of O is contained with R, and (b) every part of R contains
some part of O. I think (b) will cause problems for the endurantist, but I set these
aside.25 With regard to (a) we must once again question the meaning of “every part
of O”. Does it mean (i): “every part that O has within R”? Or rather (ii): “every
part that O has in any region”? If O is an enduring object and R is an instantaneous
spacetime region, (i) and (ii) are (most likely) distinct. Moreover, (a) is trivial on (i),
and (generally) false on (ii).26 This is the very difficulty that emerged with respect
to being wholly present (§3.3.1) and being temporally unextended (§3.3.2). The shift
to exact occupation has not helped.
In response the endurantist might attempt a non-mereological definition of “exact
occupation”. Suppose that the notion of (non-exact) occupation can plausibly be
taken as primitive. It seems not ridiculous to think that O exactly occupies a region
R iff R is the largest region that O occupies. Such a proposal has two drawbacks
though. First, the endurantist believes that objects exactly occupy many regions,
yet some of these may well be smaller than others. An attempted salvage would hold
that O exactly occupies R iff R is the largest region that O occupies at that particular
time. But on such a proposal even perduring objects would exactly occupy multiple
instantaneous regions. The second objection starts by observing that it seems a
reasonable and intuitive part of the ‘calculus of occupation’ to say that if I occupy R1
and a simultaneous R2 then I occupy a region wholly composed of R1 and R2. Thus
25Or rather I relegate them to a footnote. Suppose that O exactly occupies each of two successive
instantaneous regions R1 and R2. Now consider the temporally extended region R3 that is the fusion
of R1 and R2. If R1 and R2 each contain “every part of O” then surely R3 does also. Similarly,
since every part of both R1 and R2 contains “some part of O”, then surely this too is true of R3.
Hence it seems to follow from (a) and (b) that if an object exactly occupies successive instantaneous
regions then it also exactly occupies a temporally extended region. This is not what the endurantist
wishes to say!
26The parenthesized disclaimers are necessary because R could in theory be an instantaneous
region containing all of the parts that O ever has. See my remarks on (E5) in §3.3.1.
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from the fact that I occupy a hand-shaped region, and also the adjacent arm-shaped
region, we infer that I occupy an entire hand-and-arm-shaped region. But what of
the temporal parallel? Suppose that I occupy successive regions R1 and R2 (which
I surely do, whether I endure or perdure). Do I not thereby occupy the temporally
extended region wholly composed of R1 and R2? Indeed, do I not also occupy a much
larger region containing all the regions that I ever occupy? This would be the largest
region that I occupy, and hence (on the current proposal) the one I exactly occupy.
Perdurance once more!
I think it is time to bring this process to an end. Ideally the endurantist would
have been able to provide a reductive definition of the notions they require. But it
hardly seems disastrous if they must adopt these notions as primitive. Analysis ends
at some point, they may say; and a respectable place to rest is with concepts such
as being three dimensional, exactly occupying a region, etc. Such concepts are well
understood. We surely know what it is to be three dimensional (with all three of these
dimensions being spatial). We can similarly grasp what it means to be temporally
unextended. And, despite a certain context-sensitivity, we would all more-or-less
agree as to whether a quantity of liquid exactly occupies a given volume.
To summarize then, the endurantist may hold that notions of temporal non-
extension, exact occupation, etc. can be understood without recourse to mereological
analysis. My preferred formulation of endurance will be that one and the same per-
sisting object exactly occupies multiple, instantaneous spacetime regions; such objects
are multi-located. I further take it that (i) if x exactly occupies R then x does not
exactly occupy any distinct region containing or contained within R; and that (ii)
x may have different parts at different regions that it exactly occupies. The first
of these is very much part of how we naturally understand exact occupation. The
second is also natural insofar as exact occupation is supposed to capture something
of our pre-theoretical intuitions about persistence. I certainly seem to possess parts
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at one time (or spatiotemporal region) that I do not possess at others.27
27See Gilmore (2006:200–202) for a similar discussion of exact occupation. (ii) in particular gives
the endurantist an answer to certain difficulties raised by Merricks (1999:428–430).
81
Chapter 4
Endurance And Eternalism I:
Non-Relativistic Arguments
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter Three we saw the endurantist struggle to analyse the notions of being
wholly present, being temporally unextended, etc. By contrast, the perdurantist is
well placed to offer mereological analyses. Thus whether x is a temporal part or
perduring whole, the perdurantist may observe that x is wholly present within R iff
R contains all the parts that x ever has.
Eternalism is squarely to blame for this disparity. Were presentism true, we could
easily locate a sense in which enduring objects are wholly present at a time: all of their
existent3 parts would be at that time.
1 Eternalism also grounds several objections to
endurance. Some of these stem from eternalism about Minkowski spacetime, and I
consider them in Chapter Five. In this chapter I discuss non-relativistic arguments
from eternalism to the falsity of endurance: §4.2 considers a mereological objection
due to Merricks, and §4.3 discusses Barker and Dowe’s accusation that endurance is
paradoxical. But by far the most common objection to eternalist endurance is the
1Indeed, all of a perduring object’s existent3 parts would be at ‘that time’—i.e. the present.
Hence the perdurantist would struggle to explain how objects are not wholly present at a time.
Presentism might even entail that perduring objects never exist3: can an object exist3 even when
only a fraction of its parts do? For more on presentist perdurance, see Merricks (1995:524–525),
Lombard (1999), Brogaard (2000), and Sider (2001:71–73).
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(so-called) ‘Problem of Change’. This is examined in §4.4.
First of all though, note that eternalism is not perdurance! Both are ‘four-
dimensionalisms’, but one concerns spacetime, and the other physical objects. Nor is
there an immediate entailment from one to the other; prima facie there might exist3
a four-dimensional manifold with all times and places ontologically equal, and yet
objects within that manifold might be multi-located. Historically these two doctrines
have been conflated.2 More recently, a spectrum of opinion has arisen. Stalnaker
(1986:134) and Lockwood (1989:9) at least imply that eternalism automatically entails
perdurance. Carter and Hestevold (1994) and Merricks (1995, 1999) argue that eter-
nalism implies perdurance. Lewis (1986a:202–204), Sider (2001) and Hawley (2001)
are eternalists who reject endurance, but do so for reasons (at least partly) indepen-
dent of eternalism. Mellor (1981a, 1998), Johnson (1987), Van Inwagen (1990, 2000),
Parsons (2000) and Sattig (2006) are all eternalist endurantists.
4.2 Multiple Location And Eternalism
The first challenge to eternalist endurance focusses on the exact occupation of multiple
regions. Merricks observes that
an enduring object can have all of its parts in one place, P , and also have
all of its parts in a distinct non-overlapping place, P*. This absurdity
follows from the possibility of motion combined with [eternalism] and the
view that an object is wholly present at each time at which it exists.
(1995:528; my italics)3
Here we have an explicit claim that eternalist endurance (plus movement) entails an
“absurdity”. What is the nature of this absurdity? Eternalism is claimed to be central
to it, yet even on presentism an enduring object has “all of its parts in one place”,
2See e.g. Williams (1951:463), Quine (1953:442–443) and Smart (1963:132–135).
3Merricks uses “indexicalism” instead of “eternalism”. See Merricks (1995:523).
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and will have them elsewhere. It might be thought problematic were an object to
have all its parts in one place and simultaneously in another (more on this anon), but
eternalist endurance need make no such claim. Objects are held to exactly occupy
equally existent3 regions, but not (usually) simultaneously existing ones.
Of course Merricks is free to protest that such multi-location is incoherent; perhaps
he is best read as attempting just this. But in that case his argument will hardly
trouble the endurantist. Its centrepiece is effectively the observation that on eternalist
endurance the parts of an object are multi-located. No-one will find this incoherent
who is not antecedently convinced of the more general incoherence of multi-location.
The endurantist will merely reply that, yes, the object does indeed have all of its
parts at P , and similarly at P*. That is precisely what they hold.
Van Inwagen also considers the view that “what exactly fills one region of space-
time cannot be what exactly fills another”. He rejects such a view:
Any plausibility that this assertion may have arises from an illegitimate
analogy with the clearly true principle:
What exactly fills one region of space at a given time cannot be
what exactly fills a distinct region of space at that time.
(1990:248)
Soon I will question this “clearly true principle”. Nonetheless I do think that the pure
spatiality of diagrammatic representation might be partly responsible for an unease
about multi-location. We represent enduring objects in distinct spatial regions of
a diagram. Such regions coexist, i.e. exist simultaneously. Were we to forget or
simply not focus sufficiently on the representative role of whichever spatial dimension
goes proxy for time, we might erroneously think that endurance does fall foul of Van
Inwagen’s principle. And what goes for formal diagrams goes equally for mental
pictures and imaginings.
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As a pictorial antidote, consider a cartoon strip. Asterix is supposed to be wholly
present in each frame (in which he appears). Eternalists assert that no particular
frame, and no set of depicted events, is ontologically privileged; all exist3 ‘equally’.
When spacetime is given this kind of purely spatial representation, there is far less
tension to the claim that objects are multi-located. Perhaps this is because the very
layout of a cartoon strip lessens the temptation to ‘spatialize’ the spacetime thus
represented.4
However, one might even reject Van Inwagen’s “clearly true principle”. If any the-
ory of time is compatible with time travel, eternalism surely is.5 Were I to travel back
in time and talk to my younger self, the most natural endurantist account would hold
that, at the time of the conversation, I exactly occupy two distinct and simultaneous
spacetime regions.6 This is directly at odds with Van Inwagen’s principle.
4.3 Is Endurance Paradoxical?
Barker and Dowe (2003, 2005) present a second challenge to eternalist endurance.
They contend that endurance is paradoxical, insofar as (they think) it requires objects
to be both three dimensional and, more surprisingly, four dimensional.
Their argument focusses on a putatively enduring object O that
is multi-located throughout a 4D space-time region R. Thus there is a
division of R into sub-regions r, such that O is wholly located at each r.
If O is an enduring entity, the rs will be temporal slices of R.
(2003:107)
For each r, Barker and Dowe label the entity there located as Or. The paradox is
then as follows:
4See Mellor (1981a:130) for a related use of cartoon-style depictions.
5For a discussion of time travel and various ontological A-theories, see Miller (2005b).
6Note moreover that, intuitively, I exactly occupy these regions rather than just occupying each
by dint of exactly occupying their fusion. Sattig (2006:50) uses this time-travel intuition to motivate
the more general claim that an object can exactly occupy two regions (whether simultaneous or
otherwise) without exactly occupying their fusion.
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Take the fusion, or mereological sum, of all such Ors. Call the fusion
F (Or):
(i) Each such Or is a 3D entity, since it is located at a 3D sub-
region r. Or is an entity with non-zero spatial extent and zero
temporal extent. Each Or is identical to every other. So each
Or is identical with F (Or). So, F (Or) is a 3D entity.
(ii) F (Or) has parts at every sub-region of R. So it has non-zero
spatial and temporal extent. F (Or) is a 4D entity.
Conclusion: F (Or) is both 3D and 4D, but that is a contra-
diction since being 3D means having no temporal extent, and
being 4D means having temporal extent.
(2003:107)
Eternalism is clearly vital to this argument. One can hardly fuse what does not
exist3, and so on presentism F (Or) would never amount to more than a single, three-
dimensional, Or. It would be difficult to maintain that such a ‘fusion’ is somehow
four -dimensional.
Even on eternalism though, the endurantist might baulk at the instruction to
consider the “fusion, or mereological sum” of the Ors. “What fusion?”, they might
reply. Endurantists do not spurn composition—they are hardly nihilists—but they
usually regard it as restricted.7 The endurantist might therefore say that there is
no entity composed of all the Ors (and perhaps that Barker and Dowe highlight the
absurdity of supposing that there is). Since there is no such entity, a fortiori there is
no such paradoxical entity.
Barker and Dowe anticipate this response but claim that their argument “doesn’t
require commitment to a totally permissive mereology” (2003:108). That is, they say
they can allow that entities have fusions only if certain relations hold between them.
However, they “think space-time contiguity is sufficient” for fusion; and since the Ors
7I return to the interplay between persistence and composition in §6.4.4.
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are contiguous, they contend that F (Or) exists (and is both three and four dimen-
sional). But Barker and Dowe are surely mistaken to believe contiguity sufficient for
fusion. Perhaps they shook hands on completion of their paper. They did not thereby
fuse.
The endurantist who believes in restricted composition thus has an easy escape.
I want to allow endurantists to believe in unrestricted composition though.8 How,
then, can the ‘paradox’ be resolved?
The endurantist can certainly object to (ii), which infers from the fusion’s having
parts across a four-dimensional region to the conclusion that the fusion is itself four
dimensional. Why should the endurantist accept this inference? They hold that three-
dimensional objects can occupy four -dimensional regions in virtue of being multi-
located. And according to (i), O’s fusion is just such an object; it is none other than
enduring O.
Barker and Dowe consider the reply that a multi-located object could have parts
across a four-dimensional region without itself being four dimensional. They reject
this reply after considering a fusion of distinct entities that exactly occupy the regions
adjacent to those that an enduring object does; the fusion of these distinct entities
is plausibly four dimensional (2003:109). But the endurantist can simply accept
this, continuing to maintain that the identity of their fused ‘entities’ makes all the
difference. In both cases the relevant four-dimensional region is ‘filled up’. But in
one case it is filled by a single four-dimensional fusion, and in the other by a multiply
located three-dimensional object. I do not see what Barker and Dowe have to offer
against this.
I think the endurantist can therefore avoid the ‘paradox’. But an alternative reply
is worth investigating, partly in itself and partly in the light of later developments.9
8§6.4.4 will be highly relevant here. In addition to suggesting that an unrestricted endurance is
at least tenable, I will float the idea that endurantists might believe in something like F (Or) after
all.
9See §6.4.4.
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What should we say about the fusion of an object with itself? If we simply fuse plain
old Jim with plain old Jim, then we doubtless obtain just plain old Jim. But Barker
and Dowe are not (just) considering the fusion of O with O; they are considering the
fusion of O1 with O2, etc. How are we to understand this? What is the fusion of Jim
as at t1 with Jim as at t2?
Perhaps we should think that “Jim as at t1” and “Jim as at t2” simply refer to
Jim—rather as “Cicero” and “Tully” are different names for the very same person.
But note that Cicero and Tully are (of course) qualitatively identical, the very same
size, composed of the same matter, etc. This is less clearly true if we think of Jim as
at one time and Jim as at another.
In fact we might pose some awkward questions here. Suppose that at 12.23 on
6th March 2007 Jim is bearded, living in Seattle, and weighing around 80kg. Exactly
one year later, he is clean shaven, lives in London, and weighs 85kg. Now consider
the fusion of Jim as at these two locations.
First, how hairy is the fusion? Perhaps it is somehow of indeterminate hairiness.
Or perhaps it is both bearded and clean shaven. But how? Does it have a bearded
temporal part and a non-bearded temporal part?
Second, what is its mass? 165kg seems not an unreasonable answer. Granted:
some of Jim’s 2007 matter would still be present a year later, in which case we only
arrive at 165kg by counting this matter twice. But much of his matter will not be
common to ‘both Jims’, and so even if we were to give ground here, we might still
expect the fusion to weigh well over 100kg.10
Third, where is the fusion? It appears to be bifurcated between Settle (in 2007)
and London (in 2008). Does it exactly occupy the sum of these spatiotemporal
regions?11 Here we revisit our previous discussion; if the endurantist is antecedently
10In addition we could have fused the 2007 Jim with Jim some forty years later. Then there would
be almost no matter in common and we could essentially just add ‘his weights’ together.
11I intend no difference between a sum and a fusion here; I merely prefer the former since we are
already discussing Jim’s fusion.
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convinced that the fusion is Jim, they will answer negatively. But if one is not already
convinced of this then Barker and Dowe have a point. The fusion certainly occupies
the sum of the relevant regions; and from spatial analogues we might believe that if
x occupies R then x exactly occupies either R or a region containing R.
Fourth, what is the fusion? Much will depend here on the answers already given.
But if the fusion is a bifurcated, indeterminately hairy entity, or one with temporal
parts, then the endurantist will hardly admit it to be a person.
Finally then, is the fusion identical with Jim? If the fusion is not a person then
a fortiori it is not Jim. In addition, whilst there certainly are people weighing over
100kg, we may suppose that Jim never has. How, then, can he and the fusion be
identical?
Now I do not pretend that all of these difficulties are unresolvable. One attracted
to the view that the fusion is Jim might say, for example, that Jim has the properties
of being bearded-in-2007 and clean-shaven-in-2008—and that he has these (and other)
properties at all of his locations.
Against this idea, one might grant that, conceived of in some atemporal sense,
Jim does possess such properties; but one might hold it to be nonetheless implausible
that at each particular location Jim somehow ‘bears his past and future’ in this way.
Indeed it is seems particularly odd that even in 2007 Jim might possess the property
of being clean-shaven-in-2008. Presumably if things had stood otherwise in 2008
then in 2007 Jim might have possessed the property of being bearded -in-2008. Are we
comfortable with the idea that Jim’s future vicissitudes influence the way he is now?
How exactly do they do this?
It is also unclear that the suggested strategy can deal with spatial properties. Jim
as at one particular region is clearly located in that very region. Jim as at another
location is clearly located elsewhere. What do we say of the fusion of these ‘Jims’?
That it is R1-located at R1, and R2-located at R2? That it is bent-shaped in a bent
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region, and straight-shaped in a straight one? Such answers seem close to triviality.
Nor do I think that the difficulties I have canvassed will disappear if we fuse Jim
as at all of his various locations. Then we might have an extremely massive entity,
arguably with very many temporal parts, and with all sorts of degrees of hairiness.
All in all then, whilst I do feel a temptation to say that the fusion of Jim with Jim is
simply just Jim, when I contemplate Jim as at R1 and Jim as at R2 I am less certain
that these fuse to yield Jim simpliciter. If the endurantist is at all moved by these
considerations, then they might be inclined even to reject Barker and Dowe’s (i).
4.4 The Problem Of Change
I turn, then, to the objection that is most stridently put against the combination of
eternalism and endurance. My contention is that there is no ‘Problem of Change’
worthy of that name.
I begin in §4.4.1 with the canonical (though informal) statement of the perceived
problem. This is closely followed by my reasons for initial scepticism. In §§4.4.2
and 4.4.3 I then attempt, on behalf of my opponent, to shore up their argument in
two distinct ways. These attempts will fail. Since I know of no other strategies my
opponent could employ, I will ultimately reject the Problem of Change. In §4.4.4, I
then make certain observations concerning not so much the Problem of Change, but
rather the project of analysing temporal predication.
4.4.1 The Problem Introduced
Lewis provides the classic statement of the Problem of Change:
The principle and decisive objection against endurance, as an account of
the persistence of ordinary things such as people or puddles, is the problem
of temporary intrinsics. Persisting things change their intrinsic properties.
For instance shape: when I sit, I have a bent shape; when I stand, I have
90
a straightened shape. Both shapes are temporary intrinsic properties; I
have them only some of the time. How is such change possible? I know
of only three solutions [. . . ]
(1986a:203–204)
The three solutions he goes on to discuss are (i) an endurance that regards intrinsic
properties as disguised relations to times, (ii) presentism, and (iii) perdurance. I
postpone discussion of (i) and (iii) until much later, since my initial interest is rather
in the (alleged) problem itself. But having portrayed this problem as directed at
the eternalist endurantist, I should comment briefly on (ii). The thought is that on
presentism there is no sense in which I am both sitting and standing. Only one time
‘ever exists3’—the present—and hence I simply sit, stand, or do neither. For the
presentist, no difficulty ever arises.12
Lewis thinks there is an eternalist difficulty though. Note first that he asks how
the described change is “possible”. This question is appropriate when confronted with
the seemingly impossible or the apparently problematic. But Lewis presents no such
data. Change is all around us, all of the time. No sense of paradox or intellectual
discomfort attends it.
Contrast this with the claim that Lewis is sitting and standing at the same time; or
that he is—quite literally—a married bachelor. Our reaction to these claims is one of
intellectual revulsion. The lack of any such reaction to statements of ordinary change
I take to reinforce the impression that, prima facie, there simply is no ‘Problem of
Change’.
The onus probandi therefore lies squarely with Lewis (and sympathizers). They
might proceed by observing that some contradictions, and even some mere difficulties,
are not immediately apparent. A reductio ad absurdum might be complicated; we may
struggle to follow the proof. But the case in hand appears different. For one thing,
12Lewis (1986a:204), Merricks (1995:526; 1999:422), Hinchliff (1996:126) and Zimmerman (1998a)
give essentially this response. Lewis rejects the requisite presentism, Merricks and Zimmerman are
non-committal (here), and Hinchliff endorses it.
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many writers spot the alleged difficulty, not after diligent scrutiny, but rather at fifty
paces. And for another, there seems to be relatively little scope for detailed analysis
of our claims compared to a set of mathematical assertions, the consequences of which
may not be immediately obvious.
A more promising strategy would be to find a third principle with which facts
about change are in tension (at the very least). §4.4.2 considers a shift to atemporal
predication with a subsequent application of the Law of Non-Contradiction. The
attempt of §4.4.3 likewise wields some serious logical machinery: it is founded upon
Leibniz’ Law. That the literature contains such proposals I take to support the view
that there is no obvious Problem of Change in their absence. And since each proposal
ultimately fails, I take this to suggest that there is no Problem of Change after all.
4.4.2 Atemporal Predication
Let us attempt to demonstrate an inconsistency arising from the following two claims:
Jim is bearded at t1; (1)
Jim is clean shaven at t2. (2)
How might this be done? Rea suggests that one sympathetic to the Problem of
Change operates on (1) and (2) using the following “tacit assumption”:
(A) For any x and φ, if x is, was, or will be φ, then x is φ.
(2003:256)
(A) would then licence the claim that Jim is bearded and also the claim that he is clean
shaven (i.e. not bearded). This appears to violate the Law of Non-Contradiction.13
Of course we do need a little more detail. Reading the second “is” as tensed, (A)
is straightforwardly false: my having been φ does not entail that I am now φ. Hence
this second “is” must be tenseless.
13Merricks reasons in just this manner (1995:526–527).
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This paves the way for a rejection of (A) though. Rea thinks it might be denied
“that tense is appropriately disregarded in the formulation of the puzzle”; this denial
he calls “a tenser solution” (2003:257). This way of putting the response—that is,
as asserting the indispensability of tense—makes it available only to those who ‘take
tense seriously’. Recall §1.1: I cannot adopt this line.
Nonetheless, any rejection of (A) based on tense is at odds with the fact that (1)
and (2) are standard ingredients for the Problem of Change—and yet (1) and (2) are
not tensed!14 Hence the tensed verbs in the antecedent of (A) seem ill suited to our
examples; for a perfectly coherent formulation of the puzzle may abjure the language
of “is, was, or will be”. In that case the function of (A) or any (A)-like principle
should not be to subtract tense from (1) and (2), but rather temporality. That is, of
more relevance to our purposes is:
(B) For any x and φ, if x is at some time φ, then x is (atemporally) φ.
From this we conclude that:
Jim is (atemporally) bearded; (1–B)
Jim is (atemporally) clean shaven. (2–B)
At this point one could attempt a B-theoretic analogue of Rea’s denial of tense. This
would deny that time “is appropriately disregarded in the formulation of the puzzle”.
Objects are essentially temporal, it would be urged, and so predication is correlatively
an essentially temporal phenomenon. We should not be surprised if, when we overlook
this, we tie ourselves in metaphysical knots.
I think it may well be misguided to try to ‘de-temporalize’ (1) and (2). Nonethe-
less, this reply is potentially embarrassing given my concession regarding a simpliciter,
atemporal sense of “existence” back in §1.3.3. It seems inconsistent to allow such
14Nor are Rea’s own examples. (1) and (2) do feature an “is”, but this cannot mean “is now” if
t1 and t2 are distinct. And if they are not distinct then (1) and (2) are plainly contradictory.
93
atemporal talk when it comes to existence, but to become temporally fastidious over
predication.
Fortunately there is an alternative reply to any argument based on (B). Atemporal
predication seems appropriate for the Platonic triangle, or the number seven; these
doubtless do have properties in some atemporal way. But what properties does Jim—
very much a temporal object—have atemporally? Three answers immediately spring
to mind:
(a) Those (and only those) properties he has essentially;
(b) Those (and only those) properties he has at all times;
(c) Those (and only those) properties he has at any time.
Of these, I think that (a) is more attractive than (b), which is perhaps more attractive
than (c). But if one adopts either (a) or (b), one should reject (B); for it grants to
Jim atemporal possession of far too many properties. It is not the case that he is
always or essentially bearded, for example, and hence on (a) or (b) he would not be
atemporally so. Yet according to (B) he is atemporally bearded, merely in virtue of
being bearded at t1. Moreover, it is not just that an espousal of (a) or (b) entails a
rejection of (B). In addition, no other difficulties with the Law of Non-Contradiction
lie in wait on (a) or (b). If Fa predicates an essential or permanent property of a, it
is never the case that ¬Fa. This route to contradiction would be foreclosed.
If, however, one accepts (c), one will also accept (B) (since they are in fact equiv-
alent). I will not rail against this idea that any property possessed by Jim at any
time, he possesses atemporally; the logic and language of atemporal predication are
to some extent ‘up for grabs’. If someone wishes to employ the terminology as (c)
suggests, then so be it.
However, I will protest if it is then claimed that Jim’s being both atemporally
bearded and atemporally clean shaven is somehow problematic. In semi-formal terms,
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the background thought is presumably that we would have something like Fa and
¬Fa, which would contravene the Law of Non-Contradiction. But strictly speaking
this requires a dubious Atemporal Law of Non-Contradiction:
Nothing can be (atemporally) both φ and ¬φ. (ALNC)
Of course ALNC would not be dubious if the only properties that an object possessed
atemporally were those had either essentially or permanently.15 But having supposed
with (c) that an object is atemporally φ just if it is φ at some time, it seems that
ALNC is tantamount to the conjunction of two temporal disambiguations of the Law
of Non-Contradiction (one ‘synchronic’, the other ‘diachronic’ as follows):
Nothing can at any time be both φ and ¬φ. (SLNC)
Nothing can be φ at one time and ¬φ at another. (DLNC)
SLNC is extremely plausible.16 But DLNC just asserts the impossibility of change,
implying that Jim cannot be bearded at one time and clean shaven at another. Two
observations are then necessary. First, if DLNC is a plausible principle then the ex-
cursion through atemporal predication is a pointless detour; we could have simply and
more directly derived a contradiction between (1), (2) and DLNC. Second observa-
tion: DLNC needs, at the very least, a welter of supporting argument. Prima facie it
is simply false. The starting point is surely that of course Jim can be bearded at one
time and clean shaven at another. What has been said to make us think otherwise?
4.4.3 Leibniz’ Law
Rea’s suggestion on behalf of one trying to establish the Problem of Change has not
borne fruit. In conversation but also in print one repeatedly encounters a different
15Recall the earlier claim that there is no obvious route to contradiction if one adopts (a) or (b).
16Although some doubt might be cast on it if an object can be multiply located even at a single
time (something that would most obviously arise in connection with time travel: see the discussion
of Van Inwagen in §4.2). Perhaps the endurantist might therefore feel moved to rephrase SLNC in
terms of a region rather than a time.
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idea: that Leibniz’ Law (LL) functions as an enthymeme in (Lewis’ exposition of)
the Problem of Change. Thus Merricks writes that the Problem of Change “rests
on the fact that identity entails indiscernibility” (1994:165), and also that “change,
endurance and the indiscernibility of identicals lead to absurdity” (1995:527). In
Johnston’s explanation of the difficulty, “we conclude from Leibniz’s Law” that change
actually involves two (or more) “distinct things” (1987:115). Deutsch tells us that we
hold statements of change to be true “in, it appears, direct violation of Leibniz Law”
(2002:§2.1). And McCall is similarly concerned that “the indiscernibility of identicals
is preserved” (1994:207).17
What is meant here by LL? I will take LL to be synonymous with the Indiscerni-
bility of Identicals: the apparently indisputable claim that if ‘two’ objects are in fact
one then ‘they’ share all their properties and relations. The contrapositive formula-
tion of LL seems equally uncontentious, stating that if ‘two’ objects differ in their
properties and relations then they are indeed two objects; and in logical notation LL
takes the following familiar form:
∀x ∀y ∀Φ [(x = y)→ (Φx↔ Φy)] (LL)
The difficulty lies in applying LL to typical reports of change. Recall our paradigm
case:
Jim is bearded at t1; (1)
Jim is clean shaven at t2. (2)
If a contradiction with LL is to be derived then clearly it is to Jim that x and y must
refer. But what is meant here by “Jim”? Perhaps x and y refer to Jim simpliciter. But
then is Jim simpliciter bearded, clean shaven, neither, or both? I am not entirely sure;
perhaps this just revisits the question of what properties Jim possesses atemporally.
17These authors are merely laying out the problem; their reactions to it vary immensely.
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But whatever the precise answer, provided that x and y in LL both refer to Jim
simpliciter, it would seem perverse and inconsistent not to predicate of y whatever
we end up predicating of x. If we have reason to assert Φx, we should similarly assert
Φy. In that case I fail to see how one could arrive at something inconsistent with the
consequent of LL.
The more intriguing alternative is to allow x and y to refer to Jim as at particular
times. The following interpretation would then give rise to a contradiction with (1)
and (2):
“Φ” stands for “is bearded”;
“x” stands for Jim as at t1;
“y” stands for Jim as at t2.
Now it might be objected that it is odd to regard LL as applying to the same object
yet at different times. I am not sure this is so very odd; we apparently do refer to
objects as at particular times, e.g. Jim as he was aged seven, or the Tory Cabinet in
1990. I briefly revisit this topic in §4.4.4, and in later chapters I will indeed talk of an
enduring object as at a particular time (or equivalently as at just one of its multiple
locations). On this occasion though, it is my opponent who needs the referential
apparatus in question. If one cannot substitute for x and y in such a way as to refer
to a single object at different times, I fail to see how LL can help them establish the
contradiction they crave.
Grant them this referential apparatus then. What I would then object to is the
continued application of LL in these diachronic contexts. So interpreted, it effectively
states that if an entity at one time is numerically identical with an entity at another,
then these ‘entities’ must be qualitatively identical as at those different times.18 But
18This assumes that the “=” in LL signifies numerical identity. I suspect that no-one would deny
this, but if it were instead to signify qualitative identity, then whilst LL would be (trivially) true,
it could not be used to generate a contradiction with (1) and (2). Jim as at t1 is not qualitatively
identical with Jim as at t2, and so the antecedent would be false.
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why should we accept this? LL articulates a fundamental principle behind our reason-
ing in logico-mathematical cases, and it appears similarly indisputable when focussed
upon ‘two’ entities at a single time.19 In such contexts, one sees its truth straight-
away. But once the identity in the antecedent is interpreted ‘diachronically’—i.e.
with x and y referring to an object as at different times—we are confronted with a
claim whose truth is far less obvious. In fact the claim seems obviously false. The
pen in my pocket, though less full than earlier today, is nonetheless the same pen.
My pocket is the same pocket, despite now being sodden with ink. This is what we
ordinarily say and think, and these intuitions should not be abandoned in the face
of a law that has been wrenched without justification from its domain of origin and
application.20
Of course the intuitions I have recently aired are merely examples of the belief that
numerical identity over time does not necessitate qualitative identity. One cannot and
should not prohibit arguments to the effect that this belief is false, or that there is
an entailment from numerical to qualitative identity after all; but one at least needs
to hear such arguments. What could they be?
No attempt to define identity in terms of LL need worry us. We would have to
ask: LL under what interpretation? If it is illegitimate to regard x and y as referring
to a single entity but at different times, the definitional move carries no threat. But
if, on the other hand, x and y can refer to a single entity as at different times, there
is a type of identity, utterly entrenched within our thought and talk, that does not
satisfy LL. One who takes the idea of diachronic identity with any seriousness will
therefore spurn the mooted definition.
Nor will the following complaint impress us greatly:
“Being identical just means being the same; and being the same surely
19Modulo the comments of fn.16.
20In fact, not only does identity over time seemingly not require qualitative identity; it sometimes
requires qualitative diversity. If I see, today, someone qualitatively identical to Jim fifteen years ago,
I may immediately conclude that such a person is not Jim.
98
means not changing!”
Recall that the complainant seeks to (counter-intuitively) link numerical identity and
qualitative invariance. The “identical” in the first clause must therefore be inter-
preted numerically, and the “not changing” in the second clause qualitatively. There
are now three possibilities for the two occurrences of “the same”. (I) The first occur-
rence could be intended qualitatively. But then the first clause simply states what
the complainant is trying to prove. (II) The second occurrence of “the same” could
be meant numerically. But then the second clause states what is to be proven. (III)
The first occurrence of “the same” could be meant numerically, and the second qual-
itatively. In this case I agree with both clauses. But since the meaning of “the same”
shifts between the clauses, this argument merely trades on an ambiguity.
Does my opponent have more to offer than definition or equivocation? I am not
sure what else they may say. Granted: I have few arguments in favour of the indepen-
dence of numerical and qualitative identity. But I can offer a plethora of intuitions and
everyday utterances, in which case the emphasis remains on my opponent to explain
why numerical identity might be thought, even for a moment, to entail qualitative
constancy.
To summarize then, we might ask two questions. Is there a prima facie difficulty
with (1) and (2)? In §4.4.1 I suggested that there is not. Might there nonetheless be
some lurking tension with a third claim? This and the preceding section considered
two plausible candidates, but neither passed muster. I can supply no further candi-
dates, and so conclude that there is no problem with (1) and (2). If it still be asked
how they are (jointly) possible then, not knowing where the questioner is ‘coming
from’, it is hard to know what to say. Perhaps we should simply reply that the di-
achronic criteria of identity for persons allow for varying amounts of facial hair. But
however we respond to this strange-seeming question, Lewis’s claim to have provided
a “decisive objection against endurance” (1986a:204) seems somewhat exaggerated.
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4.4.4 Analysing Temporal Predication
Can anything be salvaged from the Problem of Change? We have failed to locate
any serious complications with (1) and (2). But (1) and (2) clearly would be more
problematic were it not for their qualifying “at t1” and “at t2”. Just what difference
do these qualifiers make?
Perhaps this is the Problem of Change. But I see no reason, especially given the
last few sections, to anticipate a problem in the sense of “apparent contradiction”
here. There is still less reason to see our ‘problem’ as concerning change. It would be
no less appropriate to request an account of property instantiation for an unchanging
object.
Still, we have at least been asked a sensible question. A useful way to regiment
the various answers will be in terms of the logical structure they impute to sentences
such as (1) and (2). I shall utilize a more abstract variant though, asking after the
true logical form of (*):
O is p at t. (*)
Four apparently distinct answers will be considered.
Properties As Relations To Times
The first suggestion is that (*) has a relational structure: P (O, t). This we read as
“O is p-related to t”.
It might initially seem outlandish to regard apparently monadic properties as
disguised relations to times. But at the level of surface grammar, the proposal has
much to recommend it. A relational expression is obtained by eliminating two or more
designators from a sentence.21 Are “t”, “1986” and “ten past two last Wednesday”
not designators? They apparently designate something. And place-names such as
21See e.g. Lemmon (1965:179); and see Kripke (1980:24) for the notion of a designator.
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“London” function as designators, so it is tempting, especially for the eternalist, to
say the same of these temporal phrases. If this is correct then “is p at” would indeed
be a relational expression.
What follows in terms of persistence if we adopt a relations-to-times view? Perhaps
little. The endurantist ontology seems consistent with the proposal; the endurantist
will simply take “O” to refer to an enduring object (that stands in various relations
to times). But the proposal allows for a perdurantist interpretation also. “O” might
then refer to a four -dimensional entity (still standing in various relations to times).
Now Lewis’ objection to the relations-to-times proposal initially appears quite
simple. He claims that the proposal
is simply incredible, if we are talking of the persistence of ordinary things.
[. . . ] If we know what shape is, we know that it is a property, not a relation.
(1986a:204)
However, if the proposal can be given both an endurantist and a perdurantist seman-
tics, it is hard to see this claim as anti-endurantist—which is very much how Lewis
intended it. The key to resolving this curiosity is that so long as the perdurantist
espouses temporal parts then it is natural to interpret a perduring object’s relations
to times as derivative. Perduring O is p-related to t (say), but only in virtue of O’s
temporal part at t being p simpliciter. Thus in later work, Lewis makes clearer his
opposition, not to relations to times per se, but rather to the idea that, according to
the endurantist, nothing is bent simpliciter (1988:66; 2002:4).22
How should we evaluate this objection? The endurantist is likely to observe that
although bentness may not be an intrinsic property, it may yet be regarded as a
‘quasi -intrinsic property’ insofar as it relates objects only to times. Hawley (2001:17)
observes that whilst shapes are intuitively not relations to other objects, it is less clear
22This prompts a question from Lowe (1988a:74): if, as Lewis believes, it is only temporal parts
that are bent simpliciter, then given the “widespread ignorance” of such entities, whence does a
preference for simpliciter properties arise?
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that they are not relations to times. A similar reply would also be given to one who
thought that the relations-to-times view does not allow for genuine change. Granted:
being differently related to different objects need not amount to change. But being
differently related to different times is another matter entirely.
Subject Modifiers
We have already flirted with Lewis’ preferred solution (1986a:204). In terms of logical
structure, the suggestion is that (*) should be understood as involving a temporal
modification of the subject. Expressed notationally: O-at-t is p.
On this proposal sentences such as (1) and (2) would concern distinct subjects:
Jim-at-t1 and Jim-at-t2. The inevitable objection is that the proposal does not allow
for change. Change, it will be said, amounts to one and the same subject possessing
incompatible properties; and we have already admitted that, on the current proposal,
(1) and (2) have different subjects.
At this point the defender of subject modifiers may concede that Jim’s being
bearded and Tim’s being bearded does not count as change, and nor does the fact
that Jim’s upper lip is hirsute whereas his forehead is not. But they will insist that
change is still distinct from mere variation. It involves intimately related subjects
possessing incompatible properties (where the intimate relations are understood in
terms of identity or genidentity as appropriate).
An alternative response would be to deny any violation of the change intuition.
A natural semantic analysis of “O-at-t is p” takes “O-at-t” to refer to the t-located
temporal part of O.23 As noted above, this provides a derivative or vicarious sense in
which O itself is p-related to t. So if the relation-to-times view can escape the charge
that it does not allow for genuine change, then the perdurantist can simply piggyback
23A dialectic curiosity: Lewis rejects the relations-to-times view because it fails to respect certain
basic intuitions about properties. Does his own proposal in terms of temporal parts not fail to
respect certain basic intuitions about persistence?
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on this.
At this point I make a controversial suggestion. Might we offer an endurantist
semantics for “O-at-t is p”? Recall that we understand endurance in terms of a single
object (O) exactly occupying multiple spacetime regions. Doubtless we can refer to O
simpliciter, but can we also refer to O as at a particular region?24 We talk of Jim aged
seven, the Tory Cabinet in 1990, and Dresden before the bombing. And whilst such
talk might sometimes be interpreted in terms of the way that the relevant object then
is or was, this does not always seem possible. Jim’s mother points to a photograph
and remarks “This is Jim aged seven”. Is she really saying that this is the way Jim
was (aged seven)? I would have thought that she is drawing attention to Jim—but
perhaps to a temporally qualified, seven year-old Jim. In more abstract terms we
might speak of O as at R1, of O as it occupies R2, or perhaps of the R3 ‘instance’ of
O. The endurantist may grant that this sounds a little strange; but then only very
rarely is multi-location explicitly formulated and discussed at all. The unfamiliarity
of the language results from the unfamiliarity of the subject matter.
Apart from providing the endurantist with an additional option when it comes to
temporal predication, the suggested referential apparatus also facilitates a semantics
for sentences such as “Jim in 1984 was taller than Tim in 1990”. Let us make matters
simpler by exchanging the “was” for a tenseless “is”. Even so, it seems wrong to
attempt to hack our sentences into the logical form “In 1984: [Jim is. . . ]”; neither
“in 1984” nor “in 1990” governs the sentence as a whole. Are we committed, then, to
Jim being related to one ‘degree of height’ in 1984, Tim being related to another in
1990, and to the idea that the relevant degrees somehow persist through time?25 Are
there similarly persistent degrees of girth, or styles of beard? Subject modifiers would
permit a more intuitive logical analysis (and associated semantics): Taller(Jim-in-
1984, Tim-in-1990); where the perdurantist takes the relata to be temporal parts,
24This suggestion was mooted in §4.4.3.
25See Prior (1967:169–170).
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and the endurantist objects as at particular times.
Sentential Operators
Perhaps it is mistaken to try to reduce “at t” to a qualifying term. Indeed, perhaps
it is not reducible at all, operating at a sentential level instead. The true logical form
of (*) might then mirror a perfectly grammatical reformulation of that claim: “At t:
O is p”.
Because this structure is so close to a grammatical structure that all parties
accept, it is important to emphasize that the current proposal regards this as the
ultimate logical structure of (*). At this level of ultimate structure the proponents
of the relations-to-times and subject-modifier accounts prefer the proposals already
discussed.
Their proposals readily suggest an appropriate semantics though. What of the
current one? Were no temporal modifier present, we would understand the truth of
“O is p” as arising from the fact that O lies in the extension of the predicate “is
p”. How do we introduce time into this picture? I think the most natural suggestion
is that considered by Sattig (2005:77–91). The idea is to introduce temporality by
saying that what lies within the relevant extension is time relative. As Sattig observes,
this
idea [. . . ] is standard in intensional semantics, where the idea is cashed out
by saying that [“is p”] has as its intension a function from times to classes
of ordinary objects. Given this apparatus, the move from the semantics
of atemporal predications to the semantics of temporal predications can
be informally described as building a time not into the extension of a
predicate, but rather into the intension of the predicate.
(2005:80)
Sattig goes on to reject the account on offer (2005:81–86). His main objection is
that if “is p” has a time-relative extension then this prevents an object from being
atemporally p—or, in his terms, p simpliciter. Now Sattig admits that there are
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understandings of “is p simpliciter” that differ from that which he employs here. For
example, if being p simpliciter amounted to no more than (i) being p at some time,
or (ii) being p at all times, then there is no obvious reason why the possession by
“is p” of a temporally relativized extension would prevent an object from being p
simpliciter. One could at this stage question whether there is any sense beyond (i)
and (ii) in which we want to allow that “O is p simpliciter”. But I have argued
that the eternalist does at least acknowledge a sense of “exists”—i.e. exists3—that
plausibly corresponds to Sattig’s “exists simpliciter”; and so this is not a line that I
can easily endorse. Moreover, an abstract triangle (say) is neither triangular at a time
nor triangular simpliciter in the sense of (i) or (ii); it is triangular in an atemporal
way. How is this possible if the extension of “is triangular” is determinate only once
a time has been supplied?26
With respect to this last point (and as Sattig admits) one could question the sense
in which an abstract object possesses a shape. It is because abstract objects are not
in time that temporally relativized predicate extensions present a problem. But if
such an object is not in time then presumably it is also not in space. Hence it is
doubtful whether it could be triangular (or indeed any other shape).
I would suggest that this issue can in any case be finessed by taking (some) predi-
cates to have both a temporally varying extension and also an atemporal extension.27
The idea is that O is asserted to be p either at a time or simpliciter (i.e. atempo-
rally). In the latter case the assertion is true just if O lies within the (unchanging,
atemporal) extension of p. In the former case the assertion is true just if O lies within
the extension of p at the relevant time.28
26Note that a similar difficulty arises for the relations-to-times view. Perhaps my set square is
triangularly related to many times, but do we not want to say that it is triangular in the sense that
the Platonic triangle is triangular? Presumably, the latter is not triangularly related to any times.
27I think this would be necessary for only very few predicates. The endurantist requires something
along these lines when it comes to “exists”, and arguably also for properties possessed by both
abstracta and spatiotemporal objects. But I am not convinced that anything is, say, red simpliciter
in a sense distinct from both (i) and (ii).
28Here I part company with Sattig (2005:85–86), though with some uncertainty. He seems to
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Adverbialism
The adverbial analysis of temporal predication is perhaps the hardest to evaluate.
Grammatically, “at t” just is an adverbial expression, as is “yesterday”, “in 1984”,
etc. It is not clear what to make of this though. Should we analyse (*) by analogy
with the modal adverbs “possibly” and “actually”? That might suggest a logical
form: “At t: O is p”. But this is just the form considered above, with “At t” treated
as a sentential operator.
An alternative is to regard the temporal qualification as applying to the “is” of
(*): O is-at-t p. But I find it hard to understand what this could mean. In fact I
tend to regard the “is” of predication as entirely dispensable; some languages (e.g.
Russian) do dispense with it, and certainly the standard logical rendering of “O is p”
as “P (O)” contains no element corresponding to the “is” of surface grammar. And if
we can dispense with the “is” of predication, how are we to understand qualification
of this “is”?
Perhaps the “is” in “O is p” does correspond to something though: an instantiation
relation. Furthermore, perhaps the “at t” in (*) then qualifies this relation.29 In fact
I am loath to accept that there is a relation between O and its properties. Is O
not directly p? And if not—if there must be a binding relation between O and p—
then why does O not need binding to this binding relation, and so on?30 I note
in addition that the current proposal countenances more than a plain instantiation
relation. Temporal qualification entails either a vast number of such relations, or a
relation that can be qualified in a vast number of ways. This is not an attractive
think that the ambiguity of “exists” arises insofar as different qualifications can be applied to it (i.e.
either “simpliciter” or “at t”); hence such ambiguity does not emerge from an ambiguity in “exists”
itself. I do not understand why this is a criticism rather than a mere observation. What is wrong
with the idea that the extension of “exists” is only determinate once either a “simpliciter” or an “at
t” has been appended?
29See Johnston (1987:127–129), Lowe (1988a) and (more ambiguously) Haslanger (1989).
30This difficulty is known as “Bradley’s Regress”. It is mentioned in the present context by Lewis
(2002:6–7) and Haslanger (2003:341).
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picture.
There is also the danger that the introduction of an instantiation relation will
resurrect those objections put against the relations-to-times view. If O’s being p
requires an instantiation relation between the two, it seems that a perspicuous logical
representation of this would be as I(O, p). How do we accommodate a time within
this representation? Lewis (1988:65–66 fn.1) thinks the adverbialist is committed to
a three-place relation here: I(O, p, t). On the earlier relations-to-times view, O was
(p-)related to t; now it is suggested that O is (instantiation-)related to both t and
p. So whilst Lewis can no longer complain that this mistakenly construes properties
as relations, he can (and does) protest at what relationality there remains within
the account. His objection appears to be that having a shape should not involve a
relation to anything.31
At this point Lowe and Haslanger reply that Lewis has misunderstood. “O is p
at t” involves, not a three-place relation, but rather a two-place relation between O’s
being p and the time t. This we might represent as R([O is p], t).32 By now I am
starting to lose my grip on the proposal though, and certainly I do not see how the
semantics of this is suppose to proceed. Clearly something is allegedly related to t.
But what kind of entity is O’s being p?
Doubtless there is more that the adverbialist can say here. But the theory seems
ripe to burst into a number of sub-theories, each of which could be examined at
length. Such an examination is not essential to our purposes. What is important is
that even if the adverbial approach does not ultimately succeed, neither endurantist
nor perdurantist seems likely to be left with no viable account of temporal predication.
Earlier in §4.4 we failed to locate any kind of problem associated with change. Now
31Lewis also finds it obscure what “standing in some relation to straightness [has] to do with just
plain being straight” (1988:65–66 fn.1).
32Perhaps this “R” should be an “I” if O’s being p is instantiated at t. Lowe and Haslanger differ
as to how to analyse the “O is p” relatum. Lowe claims that on his proposal a “two-place relation is
related to a time” (1988a:74), i.e. O is related to p. Haslanger, by contrast, writes that “the primary
instantiation of the property [p] by the object [O], need not be construed relationally” (1989:122).
107
we may add to this that, whilst there are interesting issues that remain unresolved, it
seems improbable that temporal predication will furnish a major criticism of either
endurance or perdurance.
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Chapter 5
Endurance And Eternalism II:
Relativistic Arguments
5.1 Introduction
Having considered the non-relativistic threats to endurance, I now turn to relativistic
worries. In Chapters One and Two I suggested that relativity strongly favoured
eternalism over presentism. The question for this chapter is whether it similarly
supports perdurance over endurance.
Several recent authors contend that it does.1 Anti-endurantist arguments based on
the notion of coexistence have been proposed by Balashov and by Hales and Johnson;
I consider these in §§5.2 and 5.3 (respectively). Gilmore’s critique of relativistic
endurance is the subject of §5.4, and Balashov’s charge of explanatory deficiency is
examined in §5.5. Finally, in §5.6, I address relativistic perdurance.
First of all though, we must consider what relativistic endurance might involve.
Pre-relativistically, the endurantist holds that one and the same persisting object
exactly occupies multiple, instantaneous spacetime regions (see §3.3.3). But how can
we understand “instantaneous” in the absence of an absolute simultaneity? Balashov
suggests that, given relativity,
the central concepts of the endurantist and perdurantist ontologies, such
1See Smart (1972) for an early discussion. See Quine (1960:172) for a still earlier assertion.
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as “temporal part” and “being wholly present at a time,” lose their objec-
tive meaning and become relativized to a reference frame, or perspective.
(2000c:331; my italics)2
Of course the frame relativist will have to specify whether they mean a particular
reference frame here (and if so which?), or whether enduring objects are wholly present
at the times of all such frames. Even so, frame-relative proposals suffer from a
common problem: they accord to reference frames, and to times as designated by
such frames, a quite unwarranted metaphysical status. Such frames are no more
than (often) convenient ways to describe the contents of spacetime; they capture
no structure intrinsic to spacetime itself. It might alternatively be convenient to
describe the contents of spacetime using (four-dimensional extensions of) cylindrical
or spherical co-ordinates. We would not dream of singling out as ‘objects’ only those
entities that lie, for example, on surfaces of constant radius or co-latitude.
We therefore face a difficult question: where do we locate enduring objects?
Gilmore (2006:208) asks this very question, and we shall consider his suggested
answers in §5.4. However, the issue is not immediately pressing, since Balashov’s
coexistence-based argument makes the simplifying assumption that objects are spa-
tially unextended. To this argument we now turn.
5.2 Balashov On Coexistence
Balashov’s central contention is that only perdurance is compatible with a relativis-
tic interpretation of coexistence. His early papers (2000a, 2000b) on this topic are
convoluted, and so my explication borrows heavily from Gilmore’s (2002:242–244)
streamlining of the argument (together with much of his excellent rebuttal). Thus
2For similar frame-relativist thoughts, see Rea (1998:232–234), Sider (2001:59), Hawley (2001:53)
and Sattig (2006:179).
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streamlined, the argument has three central premises:3
(1) Relativistic coexistence is best analysed in terms of spacelike sepa-
ration (Coexistence As Spacelike Separation: CASS);
(2) The endurantist but not perdurantist must understand such coexis-
tence in ‘temporally loaded’ terms (“The Asymmetry Thesis”);
(3) The ‘temporally loaded’ coexistence relations that arise from CASS
are absurd (“The Absurdity Thesis”).
The idea, then, is that on a combination of CASS and endurance, certain “absurd”
coexistence relations arise (details of which follow in §5.2.2). These relations are
claimed not to arise on the combination of CASS and perdurance.
The endurantist could take this as a reductio of CASS. For now though, I as-
sume the truth of (1) so as to consider in §§5.2.1 and 5.2.2 the strength of (2) and
(3) (respectively). In §5.2.3 I examine Balashov’s (2005) radical moves in response
to (Gilmore’s) criticism of (1)–(3). Finally, I conclude in §5.2.4 with a meta-level
discussion of relativistic coexistence relations such as (1).
5.2.1 The Asymmetry Thesis
How does Balashov support his second premise, namely that there is a endurantist-
perdurantist asymmetry when it comes to coexistence? The gist is that
[t]he endurantist concept of coexistence is tensed or “temporally-loaded”
in a way in which the perdurantist one is not. It is tensed because it
holds between entities that change their position in space with time and,
consequently, coexistence itself becomes a function of time.
(2000b:S552)4
3In fact Gilmore identifies four premises, the extra one being eternalism (about Minkowski space-
time). Balashov repeatedly endorses this (2000a:162–163 fn.16; 2002:224–225; 2005:2).
4See also Balashov (2000b:S553–S559; 2000a:142; 2005:5).
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For the perdurantist though, the
facts about the coexistence of perduring objects, or of their parts, are
tenseless facts, which do not change with time.
(2000a:153–154)5
Two clarifications are important. First, Balashov does not mean to commit the
endurantist to tense in the sense of §1.1. His meaning is better captured by the alter-
native locutions that endurantist coexistence is “temporally-loaded” or “a function
of time”.
Secondly, one might wonder how, in the context of relativity, Balashov’s talk of
space and time should be understood. Were we to replace “space” and “time” with
“spacetime”, we would be left with the claim that enduring entities change their
position in spacetime with spacetime. This is hardly very clear.6
In fact Balashov’s “time” refers to an object’s proper time.7 Here one might
object that this notion is only coherent given his unrealistic idealization of objects
as (spatially) pointlike (2000a:133; 2000b:S553; 2005:2); extended objects simply do
not have an unambiguous proper time.8 However, as I have understood it, endurance
holds that objects exactly occupy multiple spacetime regions; and what an object
coexists with surely differs from region to region. This provides at least a minimal
sense in which the coexistence relations of enduring objects ‘change’: they exhibit a
variety of such relations.
What of perduring objects? Apparently these “do not change their locations
with time” (2000b:S552). Here one might add that such objects are singly located in
spacetime, and thus do not exhibit the variety of coexistence relations that pertain
to enduring objects. But is this the whole story? Perhaps perduring objects “do
not change their locations”, and are singly located, in themselves. But they have
5See also Balashov (2000a:142, 144; 2000b:S556, S560–S561).
6Cf. Gilmore’s observation on this topic: “Change of position in a manifoldM is always change of
position in M with respect to some temporal dimension T , where T is separate from M” (2002:249).
7See Balashov (2000a:150, 154; 2000b:S556; 2005:2, 9, 14).
8See Gibson and Pooley (2006:172).
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temporal parts at different spatiotemporal regions, each of which stands in different
coexistence relations to the wider universe. Do these not provide a sense in which the
perduring object does both move and stand in different coexistence relations?
Balashov objects to this line of thought, claiming that it focusses only on “the
vicarious sense in which the properties of temporal parts of perduring objects can
be attributed to the four-dimensional wholes” (2005:16). According to Balashov,
the perdurantist “denies that objects have temporary properties in anything stronger
than this sense” (2005:16–17). Maybe so; but still this seems to grant a sense in
which perduring objects stand in varying coexistence relations. Only by focussing on
the fact that perduring objects do not directly (i.e. non-vicariously) participate in
such relations can Balashov establish the asymmetry he craves.
A summary so far then: endurantist coexistence is indeed a temporally (or spa-
tiotemporally) sensitive phenomenon, insofar as enduring objects stand in different
coexistence relations at different regions; and perdurantist coexistence arguably dif-
fers from this. What of the claim that endurantist coexistence is “temporally loaded”
though? Is this just another way to express its temporal sensitivity? Perhaps, but
Balashov also understands the ‘temporal loadedness’ of endurantist coexistence to
licence the use of temporal terms such as “already”, “yet”, “still”, etc. (2000a:152–
153; 2000b:S556–S560). To this terminology I have no real objection. Many pairs
of regions that an enduring object exactly occupies can be temporally ordered. If y
exists for x as at an earlier region, but not as at a later region, it seems right to say
that y no longer exists for x as at that later region. The multiple locations of an
enduring object similarly licence claims involving “still”, “already” and “not yet”. In
conclusion then, if we can quietly forget about the vicarious sense in which perduring
objects stand in different coexistence relations at different regions, then we may grant
the Asymmetry Thesis. However, this thesis is not enough to underpin Balashov’s
subsequent argument, as I am about to explain.
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Figure 5.1
5.2.2 The Absurdity Thesis
Now for a concrete example of the kind of absurdity that is alleged to plague the
endurantist but not the perdurantist. Premise (1) (or CASS) holds that spacelike
separation grounds coexistence: x as at p and y as at q coexist iff p and q are
spacelike separated. Consider the situation depicted in Fig.5.1. It is clear from their
spacelike separation that, on CASS, O2 as at P2 coexists with O1 as at P1, and O3 as
at P3 coexists with O1 as at P1.
9
Balashov observes that O2 and O3 “are still or already in existence” for O1
(2000b:S560). However, he claims that
there is no tensed sense in which [O2 and O3] can be in existence together:
[O2’s] end lies in the absolute past of [O3’s] beginning.
(2000b:S560)10
This is the kernel of endurantist’s (perceived) problem. Because of his adherence to
the Asymmetry Thesis, Balashov believes it does not arise for the perdurantist. Our
task for this section is to enquire: are the envisaged coexistence relations really so
absurd?
9I will not always repeat the qualifying “as at P1” etc.
10See Balashov (2000a:155) for a similar example (with very similar phrasing).
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They are nomore absurd for being temporally loaded. O1 coexists with O2 and O3,
but O2 and O3 do not themselves coexist. How much worse is it that O1 still coexists
with O2 and already coexists with O3? When I perversely assert that Jim is (now)
both bearded and clean shaven, this contradiction is not worsened by adding that he is
still bearded and already clean shaven. The temporal determinations merely involve
comparisons with earlier and later perspectives, comparisons that simply distract
from the initial contradiction—which is quite troubling enough.
This has far-reaching consequences. In §5.2.1 I conceded that the coexistence
relations of an enduring object do ‘change’ (in some sense). Reading Balashov, one
gets the impression that this is relevant to the argument only insofar as it licenses the
application of temporal determinations such as “still”, “already”, etc. However, we
have just evaluated as worthless, from the point of view of worsening the situation,
this very terminology. Hence any endurantist-perdurantist asymmetry with respect
to temporally-loaded determinations makes no difference to the alleged absurdity.
Gilmore (2002:246–252) makes essentially this point, arguing that the following is
equally problematic for the perdurantist : (i) O1’s temporal part at P1 coexists with
O2’s temporal part at P2; (ii) O1’s temporal part at P1 coexists with O3’s temporal
part at P3; and yet (iii) all temporal parts of O2 are timelike separated from all
temporal parts of O3.
11 To repeat: our (somewhat qualified) concessions regarding
the Asymmetry Thesis mean that we cannot apply the vocabulary of “still” and
“already” to this perdurantist scenario. But this makes no difference to the severity
of the (temporally non-laden, unchanging) situation involving temporal parts. The
Asymmetry Thesis is just not relevant.
In addition one might doubt that there is anything paradoxical about the situation
of Fig.5.1 (on either endurance or perdurance). What tension there apparently is in
the various coexistence relations stems from the following antinomy: their relative
11In fact Gilmore thinks this not problematic at all (for reasons we will soon encounter).
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locations indicate that O2 and O3 do not coexist; but it is nonetheless tempting to
think that (i) they do coexist, since (ii) each coexists with O1. This temptation must
be resisted. Spacelike separation is the alleged underpinning for coexistence. Since
the former is non-transitive, so too is the latter. Only a failure to detach oneself from
the intuitive, pre-relativistic coexistence relation (which is transitive) will permit the
inference from (ii) to (i). If CASS is properly adopted and internalized, the antinomy
never arises.
5.2.3 Objections From CASH
That there is at root no absurdity in Balashov’s envisaged scenario (let alone an
absurdity that pertains to endurance but not perdurance) is one of Gilmore’s central
accusations (2002:244–246). Balashov has since accepted this criticism (2005:17–18),
and we therefore turn away from his original tripartite argument.
Balashov’s second attempt starts from the observation that CASS can only ground
the coexistence of two objects. He therefore generalizes CASS to CASH : Coexistence
As Sharing a Hyperplane (2005:19–22). Suppose that objects O1. . .On exist at loca-
tions R1. . .Rn. According to CASH, these objects coexist at those locations just if
R1. . .Rn lie on a common (spacelike) hyperplane.
Balashov thinks that two anti-endurantist arguments follow from CASH. But since
both could be avoided by adopting a more liberal form of CASH, Balashov also
presents an argument against such liberalization. I consider the three arguments in
turn.
Contextuality
The first is that according to CASH three objects as at three particular locations can
coexist “pairwise”, yet not coexist “all together” (2005:28). Thus in Fig.5.2 Bob as at
P3 coexists with Stan as at P1 and also Fred as at P2, and Stan as at P1 coexists with
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Figure 5.2
Fred as at P2; yet the three of them (as at these locations) do not coexist together.
This strange phenomenon apparently involves contextuality. Again, the enduran-
tist could regard this as a modus tollens consideration against CASH: CASH entails
contextuality; contextuality is absurd; hence CASH is false. Instead though, Balashov
wants us to accept CASH and interpret the resultant contextuality as an argument
against endurance.
To do so, we would also require a second “Asymmetry Thesis” to the effect that
no analogous oddity arises for perdurance. I think such a thesis would be false.
Balashov allows that temporal parts stand in coexistence relations.12 What, then, of
the following situation?
(i) Stan’s P1 temporal part coexists with Fred’s P2 temporal part;
(ii) Stan’s P1 temporal part coexists with Bob’s P3 temporal part;
(iii) Fred’s P2 temporal part coexists with Bob’s P3 temporal part;
and yet
(iv) Stan’s P1 temporal part, Fred’s P2 temporal part, and Bob’s P3 tem-
poral part do not all coexist together.
12See Balashov (2005:13–15). What he denies is that such relations pertain to the perduring whole
in anything but a vicarious manner.
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Irrespective of just how strange or troubling this really is, it is surely no less strange
or troubling than the corresponding endurantist scenario.13
Again though, the ultimate conclusion is predictable. Even apart from the failed
asymmetry, there is nothing problematic here. The situations described would be
strange (and indeed impossible) on a pre-relativistic understanding of “coexists”.
But if CASH has already been adopted, contextuality is merely an interesting aspect
of relativistic coexistence. And if it has not, then contextuality is merely a strike
against CASH.
Chronological Incoherence
Balashov’s second CASH-based objection fares no better. It begins with the claim
that certain sequences of spacelike hyperplanes containing more than one object are
“chronologically incoherent”: as the sequence progresses one moves in a future direc-
tion along one worldtube, but in a past direction along another. (Thus consider the
sequence SH1 and SH2 in Fig.5.3a, where A, B and C are the worldtubes of three
objects.) Balashov admits this to be no serious problem provided that, for a given
situation, there is a sequence that is not chronologically incoherent. He adduces the
sequence of hyperplanes parallel to SH1 and SH3 as just such a sequence.
However, Balashov next contends that in certain cases
a chronologically coherent series of temporal-like worlds is not available
(unless one makes such a series improperly short) [. . . ]
(2005:33)
As is by now customary, such cases are alleged to trouble endurantists but not per-
durantists. Balashov’s example of such a case is Fig.5.3b.
13Balashov anticipates this objection but thinks that temporal parts are of only “secondary im-
portance to the perdurantist ontology. Their failure to obey a ‘reasonable calculus’ is, therefore,
metaphysically inconsequential” (2005:31). But contradictions involving temporal parts are contra-
dictions nonetheless, and should not be shrugged away. Suppose a theory entails that spatial parts
A and B are co-located, and likewise B and C; and yet that A and C are differently located. We
should reject this theory rather than turning a blind eye on the grounds that spatial parts are only
of “secondary importance”. The same is true of temporal parts: if there is a difficulty here, it is a
difficulty plain and simple.
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Figure 5.3
By this point there may be a certain amount of inductive scepticism regarding
the claimed disanalogy between endurance and perdurance. But irrespective of this,
Balashov’s central contention—that no chronologically coherent sequence of hyper-
planes is available—is simply false. Every foliation of space-time by parallel spacelike
hyperplanes constitutes a chronologically coherent sequence. As such a sequence pro-
gresses, one moves in a future direction along the worldtube of every object (with a
worldtube intersecting the hyperplanes in question).
How could Balashov have overlooked this? In supporting his claim that in some
cases no chronologically coherent series is possible, he first focusses only on D, E
and F in Fig.5.3b. The two depicted hyperplanes are chronologically coherent with
regard to these. He then observes that “[a]dding [G] to the picture, however, turns
the series into a bad one” (2005:33). This is entirely true (the essential feature being
that G is on the ‘far side’ of the intersection of the hyperplanes), and similar problems
will arise for any sequence containing intersecting hyperplanes. The response of the
previous paragraph merely points out what should have been obvious all along though:
there are sequences of hyperplanes that do not intersect, viz. parallel sequences of
hyperplanes (or hypersurfaces more generally).
119
Perhaps I have misinterpreted Balashov’s argument. I have tacitly taken his par-
enthetical disclaimer concerning the shortness of certain sequences as ruling out ‘se-
quences’ of just one hyperplane: such ‘sequences’ would be chronologically coherent
in a trivial sense. But perhaps the disclaimer alludes instead to the fact that any
sequence of parallel hyperplanes each of which contained all four of D–G would
be “improperly short”, covering only the region where E and F (roughly speaking)
‘overlap’. The suggestion would then be that such sequences, and hence any parent
sequences containing them, are in some way defective.
To this alternative interpretation there are two replies. The first is merely to
emphasize that whilst any sequence of parallel hyperplanes containing all four objects
might arguably be ‘short’, each such sequence is part of a (chronologically coherent)
foliation of spacetime running from the most distant past to the farthest future. This
parent sequence is certainly not “improperly short”.
Secondly, consider the narrative of the parent sequence in our example: all three
objects exist for a while; a fourth is then ‘born’; for a brief period all four exist
together; and then one of the original three ‘dies out’. It is the brevity of the middle
period that Balashov objects to (on this, my secondary reading of his parenthesized
disclaimer). But why should such brevity render the parent foliation illegitimate?
Surely it should be not just permissible but even expected given the relative positions
of E’s start point and F ’s end point?
The Triangle
Balashov’s third objection is important insofar as it threatens to militate against a
liberalization of CASH that focusses not so much on (flat) hyperplanes, but rather on
(curved) hypersurfaces. That is, we might otherwise adopt CASH*: n objects coexist
as at their various locations iff those locations lie on a common spacelike hypersurface.
Balashov notes that a shift to CASH* would help to deal with the ‘problems’
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of Contextuality and Chronological Incoherence (2005:34). He overlooks a far better
motivation for the shift though: in a curved spacetime (such as our own!), hyperplanes
are simply not available. It follows that if there is any hope for CASH, it must be
formulated in terms of hypersurfaces instead.
Nonetheless, Balashov thinks this would be mistaken. His main objection is that
if we allow co-presence on hypersurfaces to underpin coexistence, then
small shifts in the mutual arrangement of objects and adding new objects
to existing collections could induce drastic disturbances in the profile of
the resulting ‘coexistence surface’ and its spatial geometry.
(2005:35)
His example involves supposing that
three objects coexisting in a certain spatially flat temporal-like world form
an Euclidean triangle there (i.e., a triangle whose angles sum up to two
right angles). Adding other objects to the coexistence pool could make
things go ‘wild’, even among the members of the original group: the
triangle they define might suddenly stop being Euclidean, and this for no
physical reason.
(2005:35)
Talk of “adding other objects to the coexistence pool” is somewhat opaque, but I think
Balashov envisages roughly the following: (i) O1, O2 and O3 as at R1, R2 and R3
respectively, lie on a hyperplane and (therefore) form a Euclidian triangle; and (ii) O4
as at R4 does not lie on the same hyperplane, but is located on a (curved) hypersurface
also containing R1, R2 and R3.
14 His contention is then that once we include O4 in
our consideration of O1, O2 and O3 as at the locations in question, something could
go ‘wild’. In particular O1, O2 and O3 might cease to define a Euclidean triangle.
Presumably this would occur if O4 is located such that the hypersurface through all
four is curved in the vicinity of O1, O2 and O3.
The following analogy should show how benign all this is. On a suitably large
scale, Oxford, Cambridge and London are but geographical dots. These three dots
14Balashov may also intend: (iii) there is no other location of O4 such that it lies on the given
hyperplane; and (iv) there is in fact no hyperplane containing O4 as well as O1, O2 and O3.
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lie on a unique flat spatial plane. Although one easily forget such things, this plane
does not quite lie on the Earth’s surface, since the latter is of course curved. Instead,
the plane in question is a shallow slice though the Earth which, if cut along, would
result in the loss of much of Southern England. Relative to their flat spatial plane,
the three cities form a Euclidean triangle (as would any three dots on any plane).
But suppose we now consider a fourth conurbation (such as Slough). No flat plane
contains all four locations, but there are infinitely many curved surfaces—e.g. the
Earth’s surface—that do. Relative to the Earth’s surface, the locations of Oxford,
Cambridge and London form a non-Euclidean triangle.
We should be familiar, then, with the idea that what is true of three points relative
to one surface may be false relative to another. In the geographical example the
inclusion of Slough shifted the focus from the original, flat plane to a different, non-
flat surface; and the relations between the original three cities varied correspondingly.
No change is wrought in Oxford, Cambridge or London as we shift our focus though,
and nor does there appear to be anything particularly ‘wild’ here. The same is true
of Balashov’s four-dimensional analogue. There is nothing here to worry us.
5.2.4 Coexistence: Who Needs It?
Having rejected Balashov’s arguments based on CASS and CASH, I now turn to
these alleged underpinnings themselves. Why is Balashov concerned to identify a
relativistic coexistence relation at all?
The background is straightforward: in addition to the universal, eternalist sense
of coexistence3, we have a firm attachment to a more selective or ‘locative’ sense in
which I coexist with Blair but not Gladstone or Pitt. An absolute simultaneity would
ground this relation: were x and y contemporaneous, they would coexist. But what
can ground (this non-trivial) coexistence in the absence of an absolute simultaneity?
Balashov (2000a:133) wisely attempts to delimit the answers by suggesting certain
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Figure 5.4
desiderata for a candidate relation. It should be: (i) objective, (ii) symmetric and (iii)
relevant. We revisit (i) in due course. (ii) seems sensible enough though: if x coexists
with y, one naturally assumes that y coexists with x. Finally, (iii) encapsulates the
thought that if x and y are to coexist in virtue of standing in a spatiotemporal relation,
there must be some plausible story as to how that relation connects with coexistence.
For example, the fact that z lies in the backwards lightcone of an entity y that is
spacelike separated from x would be no good reason to think x and z coexistent. The
relation in question is just not relevant.
These desiderata enable Balashov to disregard certain non-starter candidates
(2000a:133–138) of which I mention only one as an example. It might be proposed
(deep breath!) that x (as at p) and y (as at q) coexist iff p is simultaneous (in the rest
frame of x as at p) with some point on y’s worldline; and q is simultaneous (in the
rest frame of y as at q) with some point on x’s worldline. Call this proposal CARFS
(Coexistence As Rest-Frame Simultaneity); a situation in which it would rule that
x and y coexist is shown in Fig.5.4 (where “HPSx@p” stands for “the hyperplane of
simultaneity for x as at p”).
As Balashov notes, CARFS fails to respect relevance (2000a:137). The coexistence
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of x as at p and y as at q should depend solely on the spatiotemporal relations
between p and q. It should not depend on whether x and y also exist at other points
simultaneous with p and q in the relevant frames.
What of objectivity? It is unclear what Balashov means by this. He certainly
intends to rule out Gilmore’s proposed candidate (REL), which portrays coexistence
as inherently frame relative. That is, according to REL, x as at p and y as at q coexist
relative to frame F iff p and q are simultaneous in F . Gilmore (2002:255–257) points
out that REL meshes with one relativistic treatment of simultaneity, and also that
REL is transitive (and, we might add, symmetric). However, Balashov protests that
there is still no “fact of the matter” as to whether he coexists with Gilmore (2005:8);
the implication is that an absolute and not a (frame-)relative fact is required.
The maximally liberal frame relativization of REL might seem extravagant, but
frame relativization need be neither promiscuous nor at odds with an objectivity
requirement. Recall CARFS and Fig.5.4. The alleged coexistence of x and y involved
frame-relative facts, but only two frames were involved, and moreover these frames
were singled out by x and y themselves. CARFS may have its problems (e.g. with
relevance as discussed above), but it is not obvious that the involvement of frames
associated with x and y renders CARFS in any way non-objective.
Moving beyond CARFS and REL, we might suppose that x as at p coexists with
y just if, for every inertial reference frame, y is located at some point simultaneous in
that frame with p. Effectively this requires that y’s worldline traverse the ‘elsewhere’
of p. Alternatively, one could suggest that x as at p coexists with y just if there is
some inertial reference frame in which y is located at a point simultaneous with p.
In fact this latter candidate is just Balashov’s CASS, which in one form holds that x
as at p coexists with y just if some location of y is spacelike separated from p.15 The
more standard formulation of CASS is that x as at p coexists with y as at q iff p and
15See Balashov (2000b:S559).
124
q are spacelike separated. This relation is non-transitive. It also means, surprisingly,
that x as at p can coexist with y as at very many spacetime regions. And finally,
CASS might even violate Balashov’s own (iii). Two entities on opposite sides of the
universe cannot interact, can never come to know of one another’s existence, and have
light-cones that only overlap in the extraordinarily distant past and future. Are such
objects not so utterly disconnected that there is no (non-trivial) sense in which they
coexist? The fact that they are spacelike separated just seems irrelevant.
I will not trouble the reader by further remarking on Balashov’s CASH or on
an intriguing proposal in terms of Stein Presents : regions of spacetime points that
can both affect and be affected by an object during a short, contextually deter-
mined, temporal interval.16 The fact is that all of these relations have advantages
and disadvantages. Some, as we have seen, are non-transitive. Others fail relevance.
Some frame-relativize too liberally. And, carefully understood, some are even non-
symmetric.17
It follows that none of these relations reproduce the intuitive properties of coexis-
tence. This should be no surprise given the earlier discussion of relativistic presentism
(§§2.3–2.3.5). Recall in particular that the only symmetric and transitive spatiotem-
poral relations are “exists in the same universe as” and “is at the same point as”; the
choice is between universality and a strangely pluralistic solipsism (as Stein (1968:18)
puts it). Neither relation can underpin coexistence as we naturally think of it, and I
suggest that there is not even a front-running candidate with roughly the right ‘shape’.
As with relativistic presentism, relativistic coexistence is simply a non-starter. There
16See Gibson and Pooley (2006:166–167, 170–171) and Arthur (2006:146–151).
17One can guarantee symmetry by stipulating that x and y coexist iff x exists for y and y exists for
x (see Gibson and Pooley (2006:169)). The quest is then to find an appropriate candidate relation
for “exists for”, and we may re-interpret our ‘coexistence’ candidates in this light. Some of these
candidates are not symmetric. For example, there is no reason why x must traverse the elsewhere
of y as at any point along y’s worldline even if y traverses the elsewhere of x as at every point along
x’s worldline. (Let x have a very short worldline and y a very long one.) Consider also a proposal
that x as at p exists for y as at q iff p is simultaneous with q in the rest frame of y as at q. It need
not (and generally will not) follow that y as at q exists for x as at p.
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is no such relation.
This need not disappoint us. Suppose we know which objects are spacelike sep-
arated from us, which are simultaneous in various reference frames, which lie within
our Stein Presents, etc. Would it really matter what coexists with us (even supposing
there is a fact of the matter here)? Tony Blair is spacelike separated from me, he lies
in my Stein Present, he is simultaneous with me in my rest frame, and so on. Know-
ing all this is enough. I would rather know such facts than simply that he (somehow)
coexists with me. By contrast, consider an alien that lies beyond my Stein Present,
is located at points spacelike separated from me, but also ceases to exist at a point
spacelike separated from me. It would really be of no greater interest to (somehow!)
learn that this alien coexists with me in a non-trivial sense.
Finally though, a man who is interested in such facts: Balashov takes it to be
“uncontroversial that any viable ontology of objects must embrace the concept of
coexistence” (2000b:S552; my italics). Similarly, no-one
would be willing to deny, on pain of solipsism, that she coexists with
various objects—tables and chairs, as well as other persons—and no one
would be inclined to admit that, in any interesting sense of coexistence,
she coexists with all of them indiscriminately.
(2000a:131; 2000b:S552)
I am prepared to deny non-trivial coexistence. If no spacetime relation approximates
to the intuitive relation, then in this regard intuition plays us false. But it hardly
follows that, in some non-trivial sense of “coexist”, I do not coexist with anything, or
that I coexist with nothing ; it is rather that this sense of “coexist” is entirely rejected.
Life is no more lonely as a result. I coexist in the universal, eternalist sense with really
very many entities; and indeed, the eternalist world is rather densely populated in
my immediate neighbourhood.
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5.3 Hales and Johnson
If the reader shares the sentiments of §5.2.4 they will be tempted to view with sus-
picion any further argument based on relativistic ‘coexistence’. Hales and Johnson
produce just such an argument. It is suspicious indeed.
They start, and start to go wrong, with their definition of endurance:
Objects are wholly present at each moment of their existence. We can
formulate this as a necessary condition for endurance: something is an
enduring object only if it is wholly present at each time in which it exists.
An object is wholly present at a time if all of its parts co-exist at that time.
Put contrapositively, the principle states that if an object is not wholly
present at each time at which it exists (if all its parts do not co-exist at
each time at which it exists) then it is not an enduring object.
(2003:532)
In an article discussing the impact of relativity on persistence, the unqualified use
of “time” is unfortunate. Let it pass nonetheless. Instead, recall from §3.3.1 how
difficult it is to analyse the notion of being wholly present. Hales and Johnson are
floundering. It is trivial that “an object is wholly present at a time if all of its parts
co-exist at that time”, provided we assume that “all of its parts” refers to all of the
parts it then has. But the alternative assumption is that “all of its parts” refers to
all of the parts it ever has, in which case Hales and Johnson’s ‘endurance’ is but a
disguised mereological essentialism. Moreover, and as we shall see, this definition is so
central to their argument that its inadequacies can hardly be isolated and contained.
The next problem comes soon after, when Hales and Johnson introduce the notion
of coexistence. The following is said to be “clear”:
First, simultaneity is sufficient for co-existence: if two things exist at the
same time, they co-exist. Secondly, co-existence is transitive: if p and q
co-exist, and q and r co-exist, then p and r co-exist.
(2003:533)
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What is meant by “simultaneity”? The main argument can help us here. Hales and
Johnson consider A and B, two non-coincident proper parts of an object which are
denoted by A1 and B1 as they are at t1 (in the object’s rest frame), and by A2 and
B2 as they are at t2 (in the same frame). We learn that we
can construct another inertial reference frame, moving with respect to the
rest frame of the object, such that the proper parts of the object that
are simultaneous are A1 and B2. In our example, A1 and B1 co-exist as
measured in one frame, and A1 and B2 co-exist as measured in the other;
thus B1 and B2 must also co-exist.
(2003:533)
Clearly then, “simultaneity” should be understood as simultaneity in an inertial ref-
erence frame. Hales and Johnson’s usage suggests that the link between simultaneity
and coexistence is fairly respectable: entities that are simultaneous in a frame coexist
in that frame. What could be more reasonable than this? But their (interpretation
of their) transitivity claim is extravagant by comparison. In general terms, they start
from the coexistence of x and y in one frame, add to this the coexistence of y and z
in another frame, and infer the coexistence simpliciter of x and z!
The excessive liberality of this reasoning is highlighted by the realization that
x and z could therefore coexist without being simultaneous in any reference frame.
Indeed this is true of B1 and B2 in Hales and Johnson’s own example. But one might
well think that in fact simultaneity is necessary for coexistence, or at least that this is
just as “clear” as its being sufficient. It may of course be difficult if not impossible to
hold on to all of our pre-relativistic intuitions about coexistence (recall §5.2.4). But
why sacrifice necessity simply to retain sufficiency?
An alternative line of enquiry considers the precise sense of “coexistence” being
employed. Is it the universal, eternalist sense? Or is it the locative sense in which
I (intuitively) coexist with Blair but not Gladstone or Pitt? Modulo the definitional
difficulties of §3.3.1, it is in the latter sense that we want certain parts of “wholly
present” objects to coexist. But by taking simultaneity in some reference frame to
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be sufficient for coexistence simpliciter, and by explicitly requiring transitivity of
the latter, Hales and Johnson unwittingly single out the universal sense in which
everything coexists with everything else.18 But there is no reason, then, to argue
that B1 and B2 coexist. Eternalism itself secures this.
Thus deprived of an adequate (or indeed any) analysis of non-trivial coexistence,
it is hard to fairly assess the remainder of the argument. I shall make a maximally
charitable (and somewhat unrealistic) assumption: that Hales and Johnson could,
somehow, provide a locative sense in which B1 and B2 uncontroversially coexist. If
so, then their claim at the end of the last quoted passage would be vindicated.
That very claim soon reappears as the antecedent of their conditional de´nouement :
If B1 and B2 co-exist, then the object composed of parts A and B is not
wholly present at t1: it has a part B2 present at t2, just as real as B1 at
t1.
(2003:533)
The first thing to say here is that this only further endarkens the interpretation of
“wholly present”. Recall that “an object is wholly present at a time if [(1)] all of its
parts co-exist at that time” (2003:532). If the coexistence of B1 and B2 means that
the object is therefore not wholly present at t1, it seems that in practice an object
is wholly present at a time if (2): all of its parts which coexist with a part located
at that time are themselves located at that time!19 As a disambiguation of (1), (2)
is certainly novel. I can see no obvious reason to accept it, although this is hard to
judge given the absence of any concrete analysis of (locative) coexistence.
Now for the final nail in the coffin. B2 is Hales and Johnson’s example of a part
that is not present at t1; this is somehow supposed to mean that the object is not
(then) wholly present. But B2 is present at t1: it is present there, not because B2 is
18Cf. Putnam (1967) on relativistic existence. Miller (2004:356–357) also observes that Hales and
Johnson have inadvertently honed in on the universal notion of coexistence.
19I use “if” for ease of comparison with Hales and Johnson’s (1). In fact if B2 is to have any bite
they require an “only if” or “iff” instead.
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“as real as B1 at t1” (whatever this means), but rather because B2 just is B1. As the
object endures, so do its parts. These parts exactly occupy multiple regions. B does
this in the guise of B1 and B2.
Perhaps the reply will come that we should therefore consider a changing object.
Suppose that at t1 (in the object’s rest frame), A1 and B1 fully compose the object
in question. At t2 though (still in the object’s rest frame), it instantaneously grows
another part, C. As such, the object is fully composed of A2, B2 and C2 at t2. But
now C2 is plausibly (i) a part of the object, and (ii) not present at t1 (not even as
C1: ex hypothesi C does not exist then).
Have we a problem for the endurantist here? Perhaps; but not a new one, and
certainly not a relativistic one.20 Any endurantist worth their salt can already deal
with mereological change.21
5.4 Gilmore And The Every Slice Principle
Gilmore’s (2006) critique of relativistic endurance is much more sophisticated. He
starts from the worldtube of an object (or its “path”), and asks where within that
worldtube we should locate the enduring object. He identifies four initially plausible
answers, only to argue that each faces grave difficulties.
In §5.4.1 I will agree with Gilmore that three of these endurantist responses are
untenable. I will also introduce his fourth option. §§5.4.2–5.4.4 then reject, for the
most part, his criticisms of this fourth option. This will point towards certain morals
in §5.4.5.
20Merricks (1999:428–430) concentrates on this (non-relativistic) difficulty.
21The endurantist could build this into the notion of exact occupation, observing, a` la Gilmore
(2006:201), that there is no obvious contradiction in an object having different parts at the different
regions it exactly occupies (see also the end of §3.3.3). In other words, by refusing to offer the
mereological definition of endurance that Merricks easily controverts, the endurantist can simply
side-step the issue.
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5.4.1 Setting Things Up
As remarked above, Gilmore begins with the “path” of an object:
R is the path of O =df. R is a region and is the union of the (region or)
regions that O exactly occupies.
(2006:204)
This notion of a path is valid for both enduring and perduring objects; I will use
“worldtube” synonymously. Gilmore next asks a “Location Question”:
What is the general principle that determines, for any given material
object, which subregions of that object’s path are exactly occupied by the
object?
(2006:208)
The perdurantist answer is simple: an object exactly occupies its entire path.22 The
endurantist instead regards an object as exactly occupying multiple regions within
its path. Very well; but which regions?
Gilmore suggests and then criticizes four different answers:
1. The Every Slice Principle. We return to this shortly.
2. The Rest Frame Principle. This holds that an object exactly occupies regions
of its worldtube all the parts of which are simultaneous in the rest frame of
that object (2006:219–200). Gilmore argues that any relatively moving, spa-
tially extended parts of such an object present a problem. Such a part exactly
occupies a region composed of points that are simultaneous in its rest-frame,
and so does not exactly occupy subregions of the regions exactly occupied by
the object. Objectionable consequence: moving parts do not lie within their
wholes (2006:220–222).23
22In §5.6 I consider a more troubling question though: where are the temporal parts of a perduring
object located?
23A more severe problem, not mentioned by Gilmore, is that the rest frame of a spatially extended
object is not, in general, well defined in special relativity. (See the related point about proper time
at fn.8 of §5.2.1.)
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3. The Top Down Principle. This assumes a privileged temporal foliation of space-
time. Objects exactly occupy only those maximal regions of their worldtubes
that are also subregions of the leaves of this foliation (2006:222–224). Gilmore
complains that whether an object exactly occupies a region thus becomes extrin-
sic to facts about that region. If the privileged foliation depends, for example,
on distant mass-energy distributions, then whether an object exactly occupies
a particular region also depends on such facts. In addition, Gilmore points out
that certain spacetimes are simply not foliable.
4. The Bottom Up Principle. In rough terms, this imagines tiny timers attached
to the pointlike parts of an object. These measure the proper time along the
trajectories of the parts in question. Initially the timers are set to zero. The
object then exactly occupies regions of the worldtube at which the timers on
the pointlike parts all read the same (2006:224–226). One can anticipate the
impending objection. The phenomenon at the heart of the so-called ‘Twin
Paradox’ will lead to the timers of relatively accelerated parts of the object
falling out of step, with the result that surfaces of constant timer reading cease
to be spacelike.
I agree with Gilmore that (2)–(4) are untenable for the reasons he gives. Turning,
then, to the Every Slice Principle (ESP), this holds that an object exactly occupies
each and every “achronal” (i.e. spacelike) slice through its worldtube (2006:209–
219).24 How is “slice” to be interpreted? Flat hyperplanes arguably have no special
metaphysical significance and in any case are not available in a curved spacetime such
as our own. Gilmore therefore takes “achronal slice” to mean any hypersurface that
is everywhere spacelike; the (spatial) geometry of such surfaces will be generally be
curved. One further qualification is also required: the region in question must be
24Gilmore’s official characterization is that R is achronal iff “R is a region, and for any distinct
points p and q in R, neither p nor q is absolutely earlier than the other” (2006:204).
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maximal, where a region is a maximal achronal slice through an object’s worldtube
iff it is not a subregion of any other achronal regions within the worldtube.25 A
summary of ESP is therefore that enduring objects exactly occupy every maximal
achronal region within their worldtube.
5.4.2 Immanent Causation
Gilmore raises three apparent problems for ESP, which I address in this and the next
two sections. In fact I will discuss his objections in reverse order, beginning with
his observation that, for the identification of an object exactly occupying one region
with an object exactly occupying another, “an appropriate sort of causal relation
(often called ‘immanent causation’)” must hold between these ‘objects’ (2006:214).
This very general principle he calls MURIC (MUlti-location Requires Immanent
Causation). I am minded to accept it.
Gilmore believes that ESP is incompatible with MURIC. In particular, ESP per-
mits the very same object to exactly occupy both of the overlapping regions Ra and
Rb in Fig.5.5. But according to Gilmore, MURIC does not permit this, since the
object at Ra cannot be the (immanent) cause of the object at Rb, nor vice versa
(2006:215). If we are wedded to MURIC, it seems that ESP will have to go.
Let us take a step back. Anyone initially attracted to ESP will surely regard Ra
and Rb as containing objects and, indeed, objects of the same type; the remaining
question is whether they contain the very same object. Let the object at Ra be Oa
and that at Rb be Ob. In line with MURIC, we should indeed decide whether Oa and
Ob are one and the same based, in part, on whether they are causally related in an
appropriately intimate way. But they are so related. In particular, every part of Oa
is either (i) an immanent cause of the state of a particular part of Ob (viz. itself), (ii)
in a state that is immanently caused by a part of Ob, or (iii) must be reckoned a part
25Gilmore adds this qualification in response to an objection to be considered in §5.4.4.
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Figure 5.5
of Ob because it is exactly located in a region where Ra and Rb overlap. (The same
holds mutatis mutandis for every part of Ob.) Granted: the state of Oa as a whole is
not causally grounded in the state of Ob, or indeed vice versa; but the satisfaction of
(i) to (iii) surely constitutes excellent grounds to nonetheless identify Oa and Ob.
This observation should save ESP from Gilmore’s MURIC objection, but consid-
eration of the remainder of Gilmore’s discussion will be instructive. In response to
his alleged difficulty with MURIC, Gilmore offers the defender of ESP an amended
version. Gilmore calls this MURIC* :
Necessarily, for any material object O and distinct spacetime regions R1
and R2, if O exactly occupies both R1 and R2, then there is some region
R such that:
(i) R1 and R2 are achronal slices of R,
(ii) there is a set S of achronal slices of R such that every point in R
belongs to at least one member of S, and for any two members, x
and y, of S, the contents of x bear the appropriate sort of immanent
causal relation to the contents of y, or vice versa.
(2006:216)
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Figure 5.6
After noting two points in favour of MURIC*, Gilmore objects to it as follows. Con-
sider an entity composed of several molecules bound together. In the rest frame
of that entity, the molecules are all replaced, successively but extremely rapidly, by
intrinsic duplicates to which they are causally unrelated. With diagrammatic gaps
representing non-causal replacement (but not spatiotemporal gaps) we thus have the
situation depicted in Fig.5.6.
The objects exactly located at the regions labelled R1 and R2 are surely distinct,
since they are on opposite sides of a causal discontinuity. But MURIC* apparently
lets us down, in that it fails to rule out their identity.26 This is because, at least
according to Gilmore, there is a set S satisfying requirement (ii) of MURIC*: e.g.
the set of parallel slices running from Resti to Restf (2006:218–219).
26MURIC and MURIC* only place necessary conditions on when the occupiers of two regions
may be regarded as one and the same, so should not putative counterexamples involve cases where
we want to say two such occupiers are the same despite MURIC(*) vetoing this? The case under
discussion involves exactly the reverse. Gilmore is right to see it as problematic, however, for the
lack of appropriate casual connection between them is the only thing preventing our regarding the
occupiers of R1 and R2 as the same. Hence it is down to MURIC(*) to rule out their identity.
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Since MURIC and ESP are not obviously incompatible (for the reasons given
above), there is perhaps no pressing need to defend MURIC*. Nonetheless, it is be-
ing saddled with another’s guilt. Is it true that every two members of the set of
rest slices bear the “appropriate sort of immanent causal relation” to each other?
Surely (the contents of)27 Resti and Restf are not immanent-causally related, since
they lie on opposite sides of a causal discontinuity! Gilmore thinks that Resti and
Restf are so related because he explicitly assumes that “the relevant immanent causal
relation is transitive” (2006:218); and because, roughly speaking, Restn is very plau-
sibly immanent-causally related to Restn+1 for all n (even within the region of causal
discontinuity).28
It is the transitivity assumption, and not MURIC*, that is to blame here. Indeed
this assumption even troubles MURIC itself. On the basis of transitivity Gilmore
explicitly conceded that any two rest-frame slices are immanent-causally related to
each other. Resti and Restf are therefore immanent-causally related; and so even
according to MURIC, their contents may be identified. This appears to be a reductio
of the transitivity claim.
Transitivity also causes difficulties for the less liberal forms of relativistic en-
durance that Gilmore considers after rejecting ESP (see §5.4.1). Any causal disconti-
nuity not parallel to the permitted object-containing slices of a worldtube gives rise
to the very same problem.
Indeed, the combination of transitivity and near-instantaneous ‘immaculate re-
placement’ raises the same issues even in the non-relativistic case. Suppose that hor-
izontal lines in Fig.5.6 represent planes of absolute simultaneity. Any two successive
simultaneity slices through the worldtube in question would be immanent-causally
27N.b. this qualification will occasionally be omitted.
28Within this region, only a single particle is ever non-causally replaced from one rest slice to the
next. Since, as Gilmore points out, we do allow that objects can persist through the gain and loss of
parts, such slices “are as intimately causally related as any two slices through a spatially extended,
persisting thing ever are” (2006:218).
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related. By transitivity then, Resti and Restf are again immanent-casually related,
and no MURIC-like principle will prevent us from identifying them.29
The most obvious moral here is that the relevant immanent causal relation is not
transitive. Recognizing this is the only way to uphold what should be an uncontrover-
sial truth: that objects causally isolated from each other are not immanent-causally
related. Admittedly, the endurantist has a problem if they think that immanent
causal relations are sufficient for identity. If this were the case then the fact that
immanent causal relations hold between any two successive rest slices would make
each such slice identical to the next. By the transitivity of identity, we could then
conclude that all such rest slices—including Resti and Restf—are identical.
The endurantist must therefore deny that being immanent-causally related is suf-
ficient for identity.30 Somewhere along the chain of (pairwise) immanent-causally
related slices, identity is lost: there are (at least) two such successive slices that do
not contain the very same object. This will be because, to put it in rough terms, ‘too
much’ of the object has by this stage been replaced ‘too quickly’. True: in a different
context these two slices might contain the very same object. But that is just to say
that identity can fail to hold as a result of accumulated changes. I think this quite
plausible. In any case though, the more immediately relevant point is that, however
the endurantist deals with non-instantaneous causal discontinuities, they are not a
specifically relativistic problem.
5.4.3 Time Travel
Gilmore’s second criticism of ESP concerns time-travelling impenetrable extended
simples (2006:213–214). Having already rejected the possibility of extended simples
29I reconsider non-relativistic cases of immaculate replacement in §7.3.3. (In fact I will take a
somewhat sceptical stance.)
30If it is analytic that immanent causal relations hold only between states of the same object then
I rephrase in terms of quasi -immanent causal relations: relations that are intrinsically identical to
bona fide immanent causal relations except that they need not be accompanied by identity. The
example in the main text illustrates how this might arise.
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(§3.2), it seems I have an obvious response to this criticism. However, I abjure this
obvious response since (a) not everyone rejects the possibility in question, and (b)
Gilmore’s criticism can be developed so that it does not, I think, require extended
simples after all.
So consider again the worldtube of Fig.5.5, interpreted now as that of an impen-
etrable extended simple. According to ESP, the object in question is located in very
many overlapping subregions of that worldtube, e.g. Ra and Rb. But in that case
these objects do interpenetrate after all!
Gilmore’s immediate riposte in defence of ESP is that Ra and Rb contain the same
object. Allowing such self -penetration is consistent with denying that any two distinct
objects can interpenetrate. This response need not have a hint of ‘magic physics’
about it (how does the object ‘know’ that it may only penetrate itself?) because, at
least for extended objects that are not simples, ‘self-penetration’ is really overlap,
not interpenetration. ESP in no way suggests that any region of the worldtube of an
object is occupied by matter twice over. The occupants of Ra and Rb (for example)
share a part, and so do not interpenetrate, in just the way that the central third of
a desk shares a part with (but does not penetrate) the left-hand half of the desk.
Then again, Gilmore’s objects are simples; they have no parts to share. But must
the defender of ESP therefore allow that self-penetration occurs? Are regions of
the worldtube of an extended simple persisting as per ESP multiply occupied by
matter? And if not, might we still maintain that here we have just overlap and not
interpenetration?
However one deals with the initial set-up, it is the next cycle of Gilmore’s objection
that he takes to spell trouble for ESP. Suppose that our simple’s path extends around
a closed timelike loop so that, in some region of spacetime, the object is on a collision
course with its earlier self. The intuitive expectation is that the simple would not
self-penetrate. But how can we uphold this given the earlier concession that our
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simple can self-penetrate?
There need be no difficulty here. If a world contains extended simples that do not
interpenetrate, then (assuming the world is law-governed) it will, for example, be the
existence of certain powerful short-range forces that grounds such non-penetration.
The law will ensure that if two occupied disjoint subregions of some global spacelike
surface S are within some minimum distance from one another, then the pairs of
occupied subregions of spacelike hypersurfaces to the immediate future of S will be
more distant from one another. The law will be oblivious to whether it is the same
object occupying such pairs of regions or not, and it is entirely consistent with the
kind of intra-worldtube overlap required by ESP, which only ever involves occupation
by the same object of two regions that do not both lie on some spacelike hypersurface.
On the other hand, if the world is not law-governed, then the pattern of multi-location
exemplified by our simples is simply as it is. But there is no reason why this pattern
should not be both consistent with ESP and involve no worldlines that intersect
themselves.
I therefore reject Gilmore’s second objection to ESP. But a helping hand is on
offer.31 Suppose that our time-travelling object can penetrate other objects of its
type (including itself).32 Fig.5.7 depicts the situation we have in mind; the diagonal
worldtube is the time-travelled continuation of the vertical one.
In this case ESP is in a pickle. Consider EF and GH. Intuitively, the time-
travelling object does not exactly occupy the fusion of EF and GH, but ESP threatens
to yield the opposite result since this fusion is a maximal achronal slice through the
object’s worldtube.33 Even more intuitively, the object does exactly occupy EF and
(separately) GH. But since neither of these regions is a maximal achronal slice through
31The hand belongs to John Hawthorne.
32In this re-worked example the object, though still extended, need not be a simple.
33The mere fact that EF and GH are not contiguous does not prevent their exactly containing a
single object. Many ‘dispersed’ objects, such as suits and football teams, exactly occupy just such
regions. Indeed most objects are to some extent ‘dispersed’ due to inter-molecular separations.
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Figure 5.7
the object’s worldtube, ESP denies this.34
The alert reader will object that the fusion of EF and GH is not in fact achronal;
the existence of timelike loops means that EF is in the absolute future of GH (and
vice versa). Hence the intuitively desirable result is secured: the time-travelling
object exactly occupies both EF and GH, but not their fusion. Gilmore, however,
cannot offer this response, for he defines ESP in terms of a local sense of “achronal”
according to which the fusion of EF and GH is achronal.35 He rightly points out that
adopting the alternative, global, sense would only court other difficulties. Consider,
for instance, the region ABCD. Gilmore’s preferred formulation of ESP in terms of
local achronality (and maximality) gives precisely the wrong result: the object would
exactly occupy ABCD and neither of ABC and BCD. But on a global achronality
requirement, whilst the object would not exactly occupy ABCD, it would still not
exactly occupy either ABC or BCD: the timelike loop means that both of these regions
contain points timelike related to their neighbours. Hence neither is globally achronal.
34Gilmore notes (but does not solve) what is effectively a non-relativistic version of this problem
(2006:231 fn.29).
35See Gilmore (2006:229 fn.19, 231 fn.33) for details. As a rule of thumb, R is locally achronal
iff R would be achronal in the absence of timelike loops. The strict sense of “achronal” discussed
above (see fn.24) corresponds to global achronality.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.8
The moral is that ESP is in difficulty. Rather than offer yet another principle-
based answer to Gilmore’s Location Question, I will shortly attempt to undercut this
question itself. Such a move will also dissolve Gilmore’s final objection to ESP (i.e.
his first objection), and so I turn briefly to this.
5.4.4 Corner Slices
In fact it is this objection that leads to the requirement of maximality in ESP (see
§5.4.1). Consider the worldtube in Fig.5.8a, and in particular the (achronal) subre-
gion PQ. ESP without the maximality requirement would rule that the object whose
worldtube is depicted does exactly occupy PQ. But this answer becomes impossible
to credit when we consider similar regions that are closer still to the top left-hand
corner of the worldtube. In the most extreme case, such a region might contain only
a single particle. Surely the object does not exactly occupy such a region.36
Gilmore’s (2006:213) solution effectively notes that PQ, rather like ST, is not
a maximal achronal region within the worldtube; it is a subregion of many larger
achronal regions (such as PQR). This is not clearly erroneous, but it arguably goes
36Miller (2004:365–6) raises this problem in a similar context.
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too far. Consider the region UV in Fig.5.8b. Supposing the worldtube to be that
of a human, this region might contain all the usual parts of a person except for a
right hand. Does such a slice does not contain the person in question? If instead we
consider someone who loses a hand, ESP (subsequently) locates that person at just
such a slice.
5.4.5 Morals
The time-travel and corner-slice objections to ESP have proved problematic. But the
blame does not lie solely with ESP. I suspect that any answer to Gilmore’s Location
Question will fail if that answer is meant to apply to all types of object—especially if
it further restricts itself (a` la ESP) to characterizing the objects’ locations in purely
spatiotemporal terms.
A more promising account would have the endurantist proceed on a case-by-
case, region-by-region basis, so that whether an object exactly occupies a region
depends critically on the type of object being considered. The endurantist believes
that objects are three dimensional and exactly occupy multiple spacetime regions.
But the precise locations of such an object are not determined by the fact that some
spacetime region contains its worldtube and that certain subregions of this region
satisfy various geometric constraints. It is, of course, the other way around. Facts
about where the object is located determine which region is its worldtube. This is
as true for point particles as for composite objects; facts about where a particle is
located, together with the causal laws, determine the other point-sized regions in
which the particle is located.
For composite objects, bedrock is the pattern of (multiple) location of the fun-
damental entities that, at various spacetime regions, compose them. Some three-
dimensional achronal regions will contain the right sort of such entities, arranged in
the appropriate way, for these to compose a particular type of object at that region.
142
One thus arrives at three-dimensional objects. In general, whether a given three-
dimensional region contains an object of a given type will not just be a matter of the
intrinsic character of the contents of that region. It will also depend on regions to
its past and future having the right kind of content.37 And it will further depend on
regions that are spacelike related to it having the right kind of content (statue-shaped
regions within blocks of marble are not statues).38
This gives us variously located three-dimensional objects. But some of these
‘objects’ are the very same object. Such identity facts will be determined by a mixture
of spatiotemporal and causal considerations (see the discussion of Chapter Seven);
but, as with composition, the precise details may be expected to vary from kind to
kind and from object to object. In any case, it is only at this late stage that the
identifications that determine an enduring object’s worldtube enter the picture. One
obtains the path of an object of a certain type by first determining which three-
dimensional regions contain objects of that type, by then determining which regions
contain the same object, and by finally taking the fusion of the relevant set of such
regions. But if the path is arrived at in this way, which locations within it are occupied
by its object cannot be an interesting question that remains outstanding. The answer
is already before us.
5.5 Balashov On Explanatory Deficiency
In addition to the considerations of §5.2, Balashov has presented a further argu-
ment against endurance. His conclusion in its most general form is that, especially
in comparison with perdurance, endurance is an explanatorily inadequate theory of
persistence.39
37Cf. Sider (2001:187–8).
38It is this type of consideration that gives the maximality requirement in ESP whatever plausi-
bility it has, particularly in regard to the region ST in Fig.5.8a.
39Balashov proceeds to this conclusion in two separate papers from two rather different starting
points. In one he starts from a discussion of a two-dimensional spatial world (“Flatland”) that
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What are the data to be explained? Balashov contends that one and the same
persisting object exhibits a vast array of different three-dimensional shapes that all
fit together into a smooth four-dimensional volume. The shapes to which Balashov
refers are not simply those shapes that an object possesses over time. Rather, such
shapes are doubly indexed to both a frame and a time. For example, what is in
one frame a sphere that later becomes a cube might, in another frame, be an oblate
spheroid that later becomes a cuboid. In this way, objects exhibit a multitude of
doubly indexed shapes which, as Balashov observes, “arrange themselves into a ‘nice’
4D volume in space-time” (2000c:334). He claims that the perdurantist can easily
explain this fact (and we will see how in §5.6); but that the endurantist cannot. To
summarize then, the various
3D shapes taken together exhibit a remarkably unity: they can be lined
up neatly in spacetime to fill a nice 4D volume, without ‘corrugation’
and ‘dents’. How would the endurantist explain this unity among the 3D
shapes?
(2000c:334)40
How indeed? Begin with the non-relativistic case; there too the successive shapes of
an enduring object aggregate up into a smooth four-dimensional volume.41 But in
this case the explanation is clear: a causal story accounts for the shape of an object’s
worldtube. If I overeat, my worldtube soon thickens. If I diet, it all-too-gradually
narrows.
Miller makes this very point in response to Balashov:
Various causal facts about an enduring object O at time t, make it the
is embedded in a three-dimensional space containing spatially three-dimensional objects (1999).
Right-thinking Flatlanders reason abductively to the conclusion that their objects are spatially
three dimensional; Balashov thinks this parallels the (this worldly) argument for perdurance that
we are about to discuss. In a second paper he attempts to illustrate the same line of thought using
the traditional relativistic ‘problem’ of the Pole and the Barn (2000c).
40See also Balashov (1999:651–653).
41Although Miller (2004:367) makes the nice point that on mereological universalism most world-
tubes are anything but smooth or nice. Balashov’s claim is nonetheless broadly true for ‘everyday’
objects, although we should bear in mind that trees get pruned, watches disassembled, etc.
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case that O will exist at t∗. So there is no explanatory mystery here.
(2004:367)
Later on:
[W]e take as basic the three-dimensional objects and use the various ‘rules’
in the form of the laws of nature to predict what those objects will be like
in the future. So it can hardly come as a surprise when we discover that
those objects fill nice four-dimensional volumes: for that is precisely what
we predicted, given our theory.
(2004:368)
This causal strategy is essentially correct. However, whilst Miller’s remarks are en-
tirely appropriate to the non-relativistic case, she is inexplicit as to how to alter the
story—or even whether it needs altering—to deal with relativity. Interpreted rela-
tivistically, her causal story must be taken as frame relative (witness the unqualified
talk of times). Would such a causal story not privilege the frame in which it is told
in a manner inconsistent with relativity? One might reply that the causal story can
be given relative to any frame, and thus no frame is privileged. But suppose that, as
is natural to interpret Miller, the causal goings-on in frame A are used to generate
the successive shapes and properties of an object in that frame. What of the shapes
and properties of the object in frame B? Perhaps these are to be derived from the
successive shapes and properties in A, or (equivalently) from the object’s worldtube
as generated in A. But when, in the spirit of relativity, we also assert that the causal
goings-on in B could have grounded matters, we surely risk undermining our expla-
nation. How can the goings-on in A account for the shapes in B when the shapes
in A are themselves accounted for by the goings-on in B? Does this not mean that
neither frame tells the fundamental story?
I will therefore amend the causal account. Sider (2001:82–3) provides the basic
idea when he suggests in response to Balashov that the endurantist begin by focusing
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on the parts of an object—and in particular its constituent particles.42 He continues:
Provided the endurantist can make sense of the part-whole relation in a
relativistic context, then, she can account for the shapes of macroscopic
objects in various reference frames.
(2001:83)
Balashov was aware of Sider’s then-unpublished suggestion; his discussion includes a
pre-emptive riposte. The kernel of this is that “instead of offering a real explanans
[. . . ] the move, in effect, boils down to restating the explanandum” (1999:655). How
so?
Chemical explosions, the second law of thermodynamics, and superconductivity
are all adduced to articulate Balashov’s point; but the central claim is clear enough.
Why does an object, O, move from A to B? Answer: because its constituent particles
take that path. Balashov would rightly claim that this just restates the explanandum.
That O moves from A to B is tantamount to its particles doing the same. Of course
if we somehow explain the one fact then, given certain facts about composition, we
explain the other; but neither fact by itself explains the other. They are two sides of
the very same coin.
Yet Balashov’s response rests on a misunderstanding. The spacetime path of an
object does indeed involve little if anything more than the combined spacetime paths
of its constituent particles. Nonetheless, the point of re-stating the explanandum
at the particulate level (and, to clarify, I concede that it is a mere re-statement) is
that one can then give a genuine explanation of the re-stated facts. This genuine
explanation does not just amount to, as Balashov puts it, “putting [a] finger on the
worldlines of such particles to find out what space-time point is occupied by what
particle” (1999:654). It rather requires one to say why a particle at one spacetime
42To engage with Sider and (later) Balashov, I adopt the language of particles. This is merely for
convenience, and embodies no commitment to a fundamentally particulate ontology. (If the reader
prefers, they might understand such language in terms of ‘particle-like’ phenomena within Quantum
Field Theory.)
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point is also at this adjacent spacetime point rather than this one; and such a story
will be told in terms of physics. The various local fields around a particle determine
where it ‘next’ is; such fields again determine where it is ‘after’ that; and so on until
we have the complete worldline. The same considerations determine the worldlines of
all of an object’s particles, and thus they ultimately account for its four-dimensional
paths.
Of course in everyday contexts we rarely consider such particulate explanations.
But earlier we saw a disadvantage to more macroscopic causal accounts: in which
frame is the macroscopic story to be told? A distinct advantage of the particulate
explanation—and this is a point that Sider misses—is that the explanation of the
particle worldlines can easily be stated in terms of a frame-free physics, and thus we
can avoid even the appearance of a clash with relativity.
To repeat then, it is physical law that explains why a particle follows the worldline
it does; this depends on the fields local to it. Similar facts explain the worldlines of
nearby particles, leaving us with a fully grounded four-dimensional ‘sheaf’. If this
sheaf is ‘smooth’ or ‘nice’ then this is because the trajectories of particles within ma-
terial objects are constrained by physical law to remain in stable configurations. As
for the endurantist’s three-dimensional objects, these then enter the picture via facts
about composition. Once we have a story as to why the particles do what they do,
compositional considerations of the sort outlined at the end of §5.4 licence the en-
durantist to re-state these microscopic facts in macroscopic, three-dimensional terms.
Small wonder, then, that the three-dimensional object-shapes thus derived coalesce
into a smooth four-dimensional whole. They are each composed of constituent parti-
cles at different points along their worldlines; and considerations from physics ensure
that, in the case of familiar objects, these worldlines are closely associated into a
smooth volume.
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5.6 Perdurance And Relativity
During §5.2 I repeatedly doubted Balashov’s claimed asymmetries between endurance
and perdurance. Whenever an enduring object at a particular region (arguably) stood
in problematic coexistence relations to other objects, it seemed that exactly the same
would hold of an instantaneous temporal part located in the same region. I now
suggest that the other arguments of this chapter, to the extent that they trouble the
endurantist at all, can be put in parallel form against the perdurantist.
To begin in most recent territory, recall that even four-dimensional objects have a
multitude of three-dimensional shapes ‘associated’ with them. Such shapes aggregate
into smooth four-dimensional world-volumes, but according to Balashov,
the four-dimensionalist has a ready and natural explanation of the this
fact: different 3D shapes are cross-sections of a single 4D entity [. . . ]
(1999:653)
Similarly:
The explanation is that one is dealing with a 4D object presenting its
various 3D parts [. . . ]
(1999:653; my italics)
It is true that if objects perdure then the three-dimensional shapes are cross-sections
through those four-dimensional objects. The question, though, is whether Balashov
is entitled to simply assume the existence and shape of four-dimensional objects, only
for this to then ground facts about three-dimensional parts. Balashov thinks this right
and proper, claiming that “such parts are ‘carved out’ from a pre-existing ontological
entity” (2000c:333). Yet there is no obvious sense in which the four-dimensional entity
‘pre-exists’.43
One might also take issue with Balashov’s comment that the
43Balashov uses the same terminology elsewhere (1999:654–6).
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facts about the occupation of 4D volumes by perduring objects are fun-
damental and irreducible to the facts about the mereological relations
between four-dimensional wholes and their three-dimensional parts.
(2000c:323)
It is misguided to think perduring objects are simply given. In fact this is no more true
of perduring objects than of enduring ones, and the reason is the same in both cases.
Perduring objects have their four-dimensional shapes in virtue of their constituent
matter. Still assuming a particulate ontology, the perdurantist regards such parti-
cles as extremely thin, tube-shaped, four-dimensional entities; but what determines
the twists and turns of these tubes is local physics (which can be given a frame-
free formulation). The locations of successive temporal parts of the perduring con-
stituents are thus grounded; and within material objects, constituent worldtubes tend
to coalesce. Hence the ‘smooth’ four-dimensional volume, with its three-dimensional
cross-sections, can again be explained. As with endurance though, it is facts at the
microscopic level that provide the ultimate grounding for these shapes.
Little of clarity emerged from Hales and Johnson’s anti-endurantist argument
(§5.3), but I nonetheless suspect that if the spatial parts of an enduring object as
at different locations coexist in some problematic way, then the spatial parts of a
perduring object’s (distinct) temporal parts will coexist in the same problematic way.
As for Gilmore, his starting question was: which regions within its path does an
object exactly occupy (2006:208)? He rightly observed that this question is simple
for the perdurantist: the object exactly occupies its entire path. There is a question
in the vicinity, however, that Gilmore does not ask. Where within its path are we to
locate a perduring object’s temporal parts?
One might well think that there are four plausible answers. An object might have
temporal parts at and only at: (i) regions of its worldtube all the parts of which are
simultaneous in the rest frame of that object; (ii) regions of its worldtube all the parts
of which are simultaneous with respect to a privileged, universal, temporal foliation;
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or (iii) regions of its worldtube that are simultaneous according to tiny timers attached
to the pointlike parts of the object. Of course these three answers precisely parallel
the endurantist options investigated in §5.4.1; and there are parallel objections to
them. For example, on (ii) it becomes utterly extrinsic as to which regions of the
worldtube contain temporal parts. On (iii), so-called ‘temporal’ parts can run in
timelike directions if one part of the object is rapidly and regularly accelerated.
What of the fourth answer? It is of course an analogue of the Every Slice Principle,
and states that a perduring object has temporal parts at every maximal achronal
region of its worldtube.44 But certain collections of temporal parts are naturally
united into ‘everyday’ objects, and causal considerations play a major part in this
unification. Any causal discontinuities would make it hard to articulate precisely
when certain temporal parts should and should not be ‘genidentified’ in this way, and
so we could motivate a MURIC-like objection to ESP for temporal parts. Similarly,
on such a principle it seems that temporal parts can interpenetrate. Does this not
lead to a problem with a non-interpenetrating but time-travelling object on a collision
course with its former self? And finally, what of (achronal) corner slices through an
object’s worldtube? Do these too count as temporal parts?
Of course the perdurantist may offer parallel replies to those given in §5.4 on
behalf of the endurantist. My present point is rather that we have seen no arguments
against endurance that are not equally problematic for anyone concerned to locate
temporal parts within the relativistic domain. In that respect the authors examined
in this chapter fail in their mission.
I make two final observations. This section has contended that any relativistic
argument focussing on the particular locations of an enduring object, or on its coex-
istence relations as at those regions, can be put in parallel form against a perduring
object’s temporal parts. This motivates a closer scrutiny of endurance and perdu-
44See also Le Poidevin (1991:66–67.)
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rance; perhaps these theories are more closely related than one might initially think.
The next two chapters address this very issue.
Last of all though, a recommendation. Rea, Sider, Hawley, Balashov and Sattig
all seem convinced that temporal parts should make the transition to the relativistic
world.45 They attempt to achieve this by relativizing such parts to a frame, but I sug-
gest instead that they simply let go: temporal parts can just be abandoned in the face
of relativistic difficulties. The perdurantist could continue to maintain that objects
exactly occupy single, spatiotemporally extended regions. To this (I believe) they
should add that such objects have parts at each and every spatiotemporal subregion.
But there is no obvious need for these parts to be classified as spatial, temporal, or
something in between.46 The perdurantist can still talk of overlapping spatiotemporal
worms, the sharing of parts, the relativization of properties to parts, etc. What would
be lost? And yet there are clear gains: the perdurantist finesses awkward questions
as to how to reconcile temporal parts with relativity.
45See §6.1 and in particular fn.2.
46Cf. Gibson and Pooley (2006:162–163).
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Chapter 6
Are Endurance And Perdurance
Equivalent?
6.1 Introduction
Despite the apparently clear differences between endurance and perdurance, a minor-
ity of writers contend that there is no genuine debate here. This is a view to which I
am attracted, and one that I shall develop and consider over the next two chapters.
How might there fail to be a genuine dispute between two theories that appar-
ently make very different claims? First, an answer that doubtless raises many more
questions: there might be no fact of the matter as to which theory is correct. Second,
an answer that undercuts the original question: the ‘two’ theories might be one and
the same.
More must be said of each of these answers. What would it mean for there to be no
fact of the matter about persistence? In what sense could endurance and perdurance
be “one and the same”? This chapter attempts to answer such questions. In §6.2 I
say a little more about the idea that there might be no fact of the matter to settle the
endurantist-perdurantist debate (this is a topic to which I shall return in §7.5.1). In
§§6.3 and §6.4 I consider at rather more length whether we might regard endurance
and perdurance as but verbal variations on a theme.
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6.2 No Fact Of The Matter
Hirsch believes that “the world can be described, with equal completeness and cor-
rectness, in more ways than one” (1982:150). He thinks this particularly applies to
persistence:
The question is sometimes put: Do bodies have temporal parts? But it
seems to me that the question, so put, is verbal : the philosopher who
says that there are temporal parts is using language differently from the
philosopher who denies that there are such things.
(1982:189)
Rea seems to agree, recalling the idea that
the debate between nominalists and realists about universals [is] moot;
the world could be described equally well in the language of either. I am
inclined to think that the same is true of the debate between endurantists
and perdurantists.
(1998:258)
Finally, Sidelle considers a raft of theories: endurance (with coincidence between
objects), mereological essentialism, sortal dominance, nihilism, unrestricted composi-
tion, perdurance and more. His suggestion is that
among these packages—and perhaps others—there can be no fact of the
matter as to which truly describes the material ontology and persistence
of things in the world. They can only be understood as different ways
of articulating, extending and making coherent the combination of our
ordinary judgments and theoretical ideas.
(2002:134)
These authors apparently agree that there could be (and in fact are) different but
equally correct ways of describing persistence.
It is important that these sentiments amount to more than the trivial observation
that we could have used different words—e.g. “shmobject” instead of “object”—to
talk of persistence. Nor do these authors intend that English and French, for example,
provide “different but equally correct ways of describing persistence”. Whilst it is
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notoriously difficult to affirm the equal validity of different world-descriptions without
falling into traps such as these, I do find myself sympathetic to the attempt. Perhaps
we could talk of a lack of metaphysical ‘joints’ to reality; of distinct but equally
valid frameworks and conceptual schemes ; or of existential relativity and internal
realism.1 But these are topics into which I would prefer not to venture. The relevant
literature is unwieldy and, I think, has a tendency towards obscurity (sometimes
because the ‘relativist’ struggles to differentiate their thesis from the more trivial
linguistic claims such as those considered above). For now then, I will confine myself
to a modest suggestion: that even after all the relevant words have been chosen and
their meanings fixed, there might still be nothing to decide between endurance and
perdurance.
Here we might consider the ‘away goals’ rule employed in certain two-legged Eu-
ropean football matches. In the event of the aggregate scores being level at the end
of normal time in the second leg, any away goals ‘count double’. Thus a team that
has won 1-0 at home but lost 2-1 away would win the tie in virtue of their away goal.2
However, the end result would in all situations be precisely the same were away goals
to count treble, quadruple, or indeed if they counted for 1.000001 ‘of a goal’. None
of this implies a laxity in the meaning of “away goal”, “double”, “treble”, etc. It is
rather that the world does not decide between the standard (or perhaps conventional)
way of talking, and an inconsistent but equally ‘correct’ alternative.3
I want to say something similar about persistence. Consider Lewis’ Humean Su-
pervenience:
the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local mat-
1Carnap (1950) endorses the idea of different frameworks, whilst Davidson (1974) rejects the
possibility of alternative conceptual schemes. For discussions of existential relativity and internal
realism, see Sosa (1993, 1999) and Putnam (1981, 1983, 1987) (respectively).
2Note that the final aggregate score remains 2-2 though; an away goal does not literally count
twice.
3For another example, consider the electron. We could have adopted the convention that electrons
are positively charged. Obviously this would have brought consequences for the charges of other
particles, but the resultant world-description would not have been less correct.
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ters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another. [. . . ] We
have geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distance
between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits
of matter or aether or fields, maybe both. And at those points we have
local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing
bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an
arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference without
difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes on that.
(1986b:ix–x)
I find this a very persuasive picture, and in particular I am drawn to the thought that
Lewis’ mosaic is all that we are given; the rest is up to us. When we experience those
parts of the Humean tapestry local to us we find that many temporally unextended
spacetime regions contain very similar patterns. Often, it is natural and useful for us
to (sub-consciously) regard the tiny ‘bits and pieces’ within such a region as composing
something larger that exactly occupies it. Let us suppose that this composed entity
is rather cat-like.4 Suppose there is a similarly cat-like entity in a subsequent and
temporally contiguous spacetime region (and likewise for a succession of such regions).
It is then up to us whether we choose to identify these cat-like entities and regard the
cat as multi-located, or whether we think rather that whilst each cat-like entity exists
at only one temporally unextended region, it is nonetheless associated with adjacent
cat-like entities so as to form something temporally extended. The mosaic imposes
no particular practice on us here. We merely face a choice of how to (conveniently)
talk of these ‘two’ entities and the continuities that run between them.5
4Recall from Chapter Three fn.19 that I use “entity” in a broad sense that is neutral between
endurance and perdurance.
5Although the issue is not entirely clear, Lewis seems to have originally thought that Humean
Supervenience entailed perdurance (1986b:x, xiii). I side with Haslanger (1994) in thinking it does
not (and I note that Lewis later (1994:474–475) gave ground to Haslanger here). Haslanger’s con-
clusion is that in order to move from the Humean basis to either endurance or perdurance, one
requires “background ontological principles that interpret the facts of instantiation, and license the
introduction of entities” (1994:358). Such principles are necessary because, according to Haslanger,
the very same spatiotemporal spread of qualities can be instantiated either by enduring pointlike
entities or by instantaneous “stages” instead. However, whilst she in fact prefers endurantist “back-
ground principles”, I note that talk of interpretation and licensing is strongly suggestive of decisions
rather than discoveries here. If one additionally thought that there were no good reason to adopt
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Of course this would be rejected out of hand by one who thinks there are nature-
given facts about diachronic identity (or non-identity). Such an objector will deny
that any decision is required as to whether an entity within a certain temporally
unextended region is identical to an entity within another such region. I do not share
this view (and I even reject it as applied to basic particulars). I admit that there
are ‘nature-given’ continuities holding between (some) spatiotemporal regions; but I
think it is very much our decision as to what consequences to grant these. However,
these topics will be more naturally dealt with after a fuller discussion of the nature
of identity and genidentity. That is the topic of Chapter Seven, and hence we shall
return to the ‘no fact of the matter’ view in §7.5.1. In the remainder of this chapter
I investigate a different line of thought: whether the endurantist-perdurantist debate
might turn out to be insubstantial for different reasons. Could these theories be
somehow one and the same?
6.3 Translation Schemes
Dwain thinks he is standing on a sidewalk, whereas Archibald maintains it to be a
pavement. These two furrow their brows and fret endlessly as to whether that beneath
their feet is really a sidewalk or really a pavement; they adduce all sorts of recondite
arguments for their position; and perhaps they are even moved to publish. But
anyone familiar with American and British English sees their dispute as ridiculous.
Dwain and Archibald merely use different ‘labels’ for the very same object. Their
disagreement (if one even wants to call it this) is purely verbal.
Might it be that endurance and perdurance in fact acknowledge the very same
entities, but merely label these differently? This seems not too distant from the
(early) view of Smart (1955):
one set of “background principles” rather than another, it would seem extremely natural to adopt a
“no fact of the matter” view towards the endurantist-perdurantist debate.
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What we express in our ordinary language representation [i.e. endurance]
by saying that the spherical cricket ball becomes ellipsoidal we express in
our four-dimensional representation [i.e. perdurance] by saying that the
three-dimensional cross-section for t = t1 is ellipsoidal. [. . . ] In our four-
dimensional representation we talk about the same facts as in our ordinary
language representation, but the form of representation is different.
(1955:240; my italics)6
At the start of this excerpt Smart provides the barest bones of a translation scheme be-
tween endurance and perdurance (albeit under different descriptions). Such a scheme
would surely be welcome to those who think endurance and perdurance in some sense
equivalent, for it would suggest that everything affirmed by the endurantist is like-
wise affirmed by the perdurantist (and vice versa). To that end I consider in §6.3.1 a
recent (and more detailed) translation scheme proposed by Miller (2005a), and then
in §6.3.2 a proposal put forward by McCall and Lowe (2003, 2006). Still, the Holy
Grail for one who thinks endurance and perdurance equivalent would be to show that
the ‘dispute’ resembles that between Dwain and Archibald, i.e. to show that there is
a one-one correspondence between the elements of the two ontologies. The discussion
of McCall and Lowe will suggest a foundation for just such a correspondence; we will
develop this suggestion in §6.4.
6.3.1 Miller
Miller (2005a) has recently proposed a translation scheme between endurance and
perdurance that she thinks reveals their equivalence. In theory I should welcome
Miller as an ally, but in practice I have certain reservations.
Central to her enterprise is an ambiguity that Miller claims to find in the notion
6Smart goes on to say that “[f]or many purposes the four-dimensional logic is better” (1955:240),
but he does not suggest this representation to be any more correct, as opposed to (sometimes) more
useful, than the other. All this despite the fact that Smart later produced the first real arguments
from relativity against endurance. He still thought that “sentences ostensibly about [enduring]
objects could be mapped onto sentences ostensibly about [perduring] objects”, but by that stage
was nonetheless “inclined [. . . ] to deny the existence of the [enduring] objects” (1972:5).
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of “having a part”. One way in which a part can be had is the “metaphysically basic”
sense. This sense she introduces by considering an object O that
is at t1 composed of A and B, and at t2 composed of A and C. At t1 O
has part[s] A and B t1ly, and has part C t2ly. So there is some technical
sense—having a partmb—in which O has part C at t1.
(2005a:95)7
By contrast there is a more standard sense of “having a part” according to which the
only parts that O has at t1 are A and B. We will use an “s” subscript to indicate the
possession of a part in this standard sense.8 Miller tells us that the notion of having
a parts “is captured by having some partmb P at t in a tly manner” (2005a:95), in
which case it follows that P is tnly a partmb of O at tm iff P is a parts of O at tn.
9
Miller then uses the alleged ambiguity to explain why perdurance and endurance
do not conflict. Her idea is that when the endurantist says that all the parts of an
object are wholly present at a time, they are talking about partss. By contrast, when
the perdurantist says that an object has parts at times other than the present, they
mean partsmb.
However, it is not just that endurance and perdurance are therefore consistent.
According to Miller, they even make the same central claim. To see this we must
consider her definitions of these doctrines. An object is said to endure iff it is wholly
present at all times, where
O is wholly present at t1 just if every t1ly partmb is present at t1. And a
four dimensional object O has a temporal part O-at-t1 just if every t1ly
partmb of O is present at t1. So an object O has all of its parts at a
7Miller also talks of being a partmb of an object, and I shall adopt this manner of speaking. P is
a partmb of O (at tm in a tnly manner) iff O has partmb P (at tm in a tnly manner).
8And likewise for the corresponding notion of being a part.
9The “at tm” in this formulation is redundant, but I follow Miller in including it. Similarly when
talking of properties she remarks that “at t1 [. . . ] O has the property of being red t1ly, and [. . . ] of
being red t2ly and blue t3ly” (2005a:94; my italics). As observed above, if P is tnly a partmb of O
at tm, this is because P is a parts of O at tn. It follows that P is tnly a partmb of O at all times;
having a partmb would be better understood as temporally insensitive. Having a parts still varies
with time though: if P is tmly a partmb of O but not tnly a partmb of O then it will be a parts of
O at tm but not tn.
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time t1 in the endurantist sense, iff O has a temporal part present at t1
in the perdurantist sense. Hence we can interdefine “O is wholly present
at t” with “O has a temporal part present at t”. Then it follows that
“O is wholly present at every time at which it exists” translates into “O
has a temporal part present at every time at which it exists.” Thus we
translate “O is wholly present at every time at which it exists” to “O is
the mereological fusion of temporal parts.”
(2005a:101)
Since this latter phrase is Miller’s definition of perdurance, she concludes that en-
durance and perdurance are but verbal variations on a theme.
The problem here is that Miller not only makes endurance and perdurance equiv-
alent; she also renders them trivially true. To see this, we must ask whether it could
fail to be the case that “every t1ly partmb is present at t1”. This requires a little
interpretation, since the phrase “every t1ly partmb” is strictly speaking ill formed.
But a candidate meaning is obvious: a “t1ly partmb” of O is presumably an entity
that is t1ly a partmb of O.
10 And what is it to be t1ly a partmb of O? Recall that C
is t2ly a partmb of O (at t1: see fns.9 and 10) simply in virtue of O’s being composed
of (A and) C at t2.
11 In slightly more generality this suggests that if P (partly)
composes O at tn then P is tnly a partmb of O (at all times). However, this “if” can
be strengthened to an “iff”, since there is no obvious way in which P can be tnly a
partmb of O if it does not (partly) compose O at tn (and nor does Miller suggest that
this is possible). Thus we have (i): iff P (partly) composes O at tn is it the case that
P is tnly a partmb of O (at all times). To this we can add the seemingly indisputable
(ii): if P (partly) composes O at tn then P must at least be present at tn. Together
(i) and (ii) entail that if P is tnly a partmb of O (or is a ‘tnly partmb’ of O) then P is
present at tn.
The point of this rather dense exposition is that the definition of partsmb, together
with a seemingly indisputable fact about composition, guarantees that, for any ob-
10“. . . at some time”? In the shift to the ill-formed phrase, the redundant temporal qualification
has been lost.
11Cf. Miller’s earlier claim that “an object that is red at t1 is red in a t1ly manner” (2005a:94).
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ject, “every t1ly partmb is present at t1”. Given Miller’s (above) characterizations of
“wholly present” and “has a temporal part” it further follows that every (composite)
object is always both wholly present and possessed of temporal parts. Whilst this
conclusion might generally be good news for an equivalence view, on this occasion it
has been reached far too easily. The truth of endurance and perdurance should not
follow trivially from the definitions of a partmb, a temporal part, and what it is to be
wholly present. The debate is supposed to be much more substantive.
Nor is Miller deliberately proposing a controversial thesis to the effect that en-
durance and perdurance are trivially true; she seems unaware that her definitions
have this consequence. In fact we should take her argument, not as establishing the
equivalence (and trivial truth) of perdurance and endurance, but rather as exhibiting
the inappropriateness of her definitions. But if one jettisons these definitions, one also
loses the suggested path linking “wholly present at a time” to “has a temporal part
at a time”. This undercuts Miller’s central aim of providing a translation between
endurance and perdurance.
6.3.2 McCall And Lowe
A still more recent translation scheme has been proposed by McCall and Lowe (2003,
2006).12 The proposal at the heart of this scheme will form the basis of the ontological
equivalence thesis to be examined in §6.4.
McCall and Lowe contend that the
objects of the physical world can be described using either 3-dimensional
or 4-dimensional language, and that the descriptions are equivalent in the
sense of intertranslatable.
(2003:118)13
12McCall has long held the view that endurance and perdurance are in some sense “equivalent”
(1994:209). By contrast, Lowe had until recently argued for endurance against perdurance: see Lowe
(1987, 1988a, 1988b).
13For similar expressions see McCall and Lowe (2003:114; 2006:570).
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They start their exposition by observing that, for the perdurantist, temporal parts
are “the basic ontological elements of the world” (2006:570). For the endurantist,
however, “the world is made up ultimately of subatomic particles which have no
temporal parts” (2006:570). As we shall see, this is a slightly unfortunate start.
McCall and Lowe then go on to equate the instantaneous temporal part of a per-
during object with the “momentary sum” of the particles that then compose the
enduring object (2006:573–574). They apparently take this sum to be three dimen-
sional, for they soon conclude that
the intertranslatability of [endurantist] and [perdurantist] description rests
ultimately upon entities which can be described indifferently as “instan-
taneous [. . . ] temporal parts”, or “3D objects which exist at one time
only”.
(2006:574)14
I will adopt and examine at length the suggestion that what the perdurantist thinks
of as an instantaneous temporal part, the endurantist regards—roughly speaking—as
a three-dimensional object existing “at one time only”. But I regard McCall and
Lowe’s talk of particles as both distracting and a little inaccurate. The inaccuracy
lies in the idea, fostered by McCall and Lowe in their very first paragraph, that
particles lie firmly in endurantist territory, whereas it is temporal parts that the
perdurantist must regard as “primitive and basic” (2006:574). This is simply not
so. The perdurantist can also espouse a particulate ontology; it is just that they
will regard such particles as temporally extended, and with temporal parts for every
sub-division of their duration.15 Indeed, whatever reasons the endurantist may have
14My “endurantist” and “perdurantist” interpolations replace “3D” and “4D” (respectively), al-
though McCall and Lowe also use these terms to indicate three- and four-dimensionality. On which
note, the interpolated ellipsis replaces “4D”: it is a further curiosity that McCall and Lowe repeat-
edly commit to the apparent oxymoron that is an “instantaneous 4D temporal part”. They tell us
that, “[p]roperly speaking, an instantaneous temporal part is a 4D object with zero extension along
the time axis” (2006:572). Consequently they find themselves in a muddle when trying to equate
this to a three-dimensional sum of particles. I do not understand why they could not have said at
the outset that instantaneous temporal parts are (by definition) temporally unextended, and thus
three dimensional.
15Are temporal parts not “primitive and basic” after all then—provided we understand this in
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for embracing a particulate ontology will likely induce the perdurantist to make a
similar move. Particles are no less a part of either doctrine.
This means that a more natural perdurantist equivalent of the endurantist’s “mo-
mentary sum” of particles is a sum of the instantaneous temporal parts of (what
we might loosely regard as) ‘those very particles’; if the language of particles is ap-
propriate, it is appropriate on either side. But there is an alternative (and I think
preferable) way of talking about these sums; for they are not just sums of particles
(or temporal parts thereof). In fact, the sum of the relevant particulate temporal
parts is no more and no less than a temporal part of (what the perdurantist regards
as) a composite four-dimensional object.16
What of the endurantist’s “momentary sum” of particles? How do we conceive
of this more macroscopically? The question is difficult to answer insofar as McCall
and Lowe rather oscillate between talk of a “set” or “collection” of the relevant
particles, and talk of the “sum” of those particles. I think the idea is that (certain)
sets or collections of particles possess a sum, this being whatever entity (if any)
those particles jointly compose. My suggestion, then, is that a “momentary sum”
of enduring particles is simply an enduring object as at a particular time.17 So,
whilst the perdurantist thinks that a given region of spacetime is exactly occupied
by a sum of particulate temporal parts, or equivalently by the temporal part of a
composite object, the endurantist thinks the very same region is exactly occupied
by a “momentary sum” of particles, or equivalently by one of the many ‘instances’
of a multi-located object. Setting the distracting talk of particles to one side, we
terms of the temporal parts of perduring particles? Such temporal parts may well be bedrock for
the perdurantist. However, there is no suggestion that McCall and Lowe are discussing particulate
temporal parts; and in fact they appear to regard the temporal parts of even a composite object as
“primitive and basic” (2006:573–574). This is precisely what I object to.
16This temporal part is what McCall and Lowe seemed to think was “primitive and basic”.
17Here I have a retrospective confession: my prior (though tentative) approval of locutions such
as “O as at R1” was motivated in part by what follows in this chapter. That is not to say that I
have grave misgivings about such locutions. But I do intend to give theories of equivalence a ‘decent
run’, and so am inclined to charity here.
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arrive at the proposal that will form the basis of an alleged ontological equivalence
between endurance and perdurance. In terms of our now-familiar terminology, an
enduring object is multi-located, with each of its many ‘instances’ exactly occupying
a three-dimensional spacetime region. A perduring object, by contrast, has multiple
(instantaneous) temporal parts, each of which exactly occupies a three-dimensional
subregion of its path. The suggestion is that these are but different labels for the very
same entity. An instantaneous temporal part of a perduring object just is one of an
enduring object’s many ‘instances’, i.e. the object as at that particular location.
6.4 Ontological Equivalence
6.4.1 Introduction
Note that McCall and Lowe do not merely translate between momentary sums of
particles (which I have interpreted as objects as at a time) and temporal parts; they
seek to identify these.18 This, as they put it, is “the foundation of the 3D/4D transla-
tion scheme” (2006:574), and they do indeed sketch how a wider-ranging translation
between endurance and perdurance might flow through these putatively identical en-
tities. Roughly speaking they intend to “reduce” talk of an enduring object to talk
of its momentary sums (each of which I take to be the object as at a time), and
then to translate this via talk of the corresponding temporal parts into talk of four-
dimensional perduring objects. Of course one could run the translation in the other
direction also.
It seems to me that, even if successful, the most this provides is a way to express
the endurantist’s claims in “perdurantese”, and similarly the perdurantist’s claims
in “endurantese”. This is not enough—it is not nearly enough—to demonstrate an
equivalence though. The vital element that McCall and Lowe have overlooked is
18They talk of “entities that can be described indifferently” either way (2006:574).
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that the perdurantist must also assent to the endurantist’s claims (once parsed in
perdurantist terms); and likewise the endurantist must assent to (the translations of)
the typical perdurantist claims. McCall and Lowe seem not even to consider whether
this holds (let alone do they argue that it does).19
This is no idle worry. Whilst an identification of the three-dimensional entities
countenanced by the two ontologies is in some ways plausible (as I shall argue below),
there are reasons to suspect that in other ways the ontologies might align less well.
In fact, even with respect to three-dimensional entities, the endurantist believes that
an object as at one location is identical with ‘an object’—they would say the same
object—as at another. But then the perdurantist absolutely denies that an instan-
taneous temporal part at one time is identical to an instantaneous temporal part at
another. Consider also perduring objects : these are both concrete and four dimen-
sional. Does the endurantist countenance anything that corresponds to these? And
what of extended temporal parts? Or the fact that the perdurantist typically coun-
tenances all sorts of disparate and gerrymandered entities—whereas the endurantist
seemingly does not?
The remainder of this chapter attempts to answer such questions.20 But rather
than focussing on translation per se, I shall instead consider a thesis of Ontological
Equivalence (OE) between endurance and perdurance. OE holds that endurantist
and perdurantist countenance the very same entities, but merely differ over how to
label these.21 Whilst we may not ultimately accept OE, I take it to be of interest to
19Indeed, McCall and Lowe go on to present endurantist and perdurantist accounts of identity
through change that would be clearly distinct according to their translation scheme (2006:575–576).
That is, replacing talk of temporal parts within their perdurantist account does not yield anything
like their endurantist account of change (and nor is there an obvious path in the other direction). To
summarize the criticism one might say that although McCall and Lowe have produced a translation
scheme, they have neglected to show that the theories are inter -translatable, i.e. that they are
translations of one another.
20The exception is the issue about the identity (or lack thereof) between the three-dimensional
entities countenanced by the two theories. Chapter Seven deals with this issue in depth.
21I take it that the truth of OE would not only portray the endurantist-perdurantist debate
as somewhat shallow, but would also go some way towards showing the doctrines to be inter-
translatable. I am less sure what consequences inter-translatability in itself would have (and hence
164
discover just where and why it fails; and indeed we may learn more about endurance
and perdurance whilst trying to support it.
Why think that OE is even vaguely plausible though? We have seen it start
to emerge from McCall and Lowe’s translation scheme, but still: what motivates
it? Most of the impetus comes from consideration of the three-dimensional entities
countenanced by the two theories. For two reasons it is tempting to try to identify
these. First, this would mesh particularly well with the observation in §5.6 that “any
relativistic argument focussing on the particular locations of an enduring object, or
on its coexistence relations as at those regions, can be put in parallel form against
a perduring object’s temporal parts”. The arguments would be the same, because
the subject matter is the same: enduring objects as at various locations just are
the perdurantist’s temporal parts. No wonder that objections to the former furnish
parallel objections to the latter.22
But it also seems to me that the following considerations should carry significant
weight. Suppose the situation is such that, as we would ordinarily describe it, there
is an apple in Jim’s hand. Both endurantist and perdurantist grant the truth of the
everyday statement “There is an apple in Jim’s hand”. But what grounds the truth
of this statement? For the endurantist, it is the fact that a certain three-dimensional
region contains something round and green, with pips and a stalk etc. This entity is
multiply located, but one of its locations is in the relevant region. For the perdurantist,
the claim is again made true by something round and green with pips and a stalk
etc.; and indeed this something is exactly located in the very same spatiotemporal
region.
my focus on OE instead). For example, consider the claims that (1) all grass is green, and (2) all
grass is grue and observed before t or bleen and not observed before t (where “grue” and “bleen”
are defined in the standard way a` la Goodman (1954:73–80)). (1) and (2) are truth-functionally
equivalent; (1) is true just if (2) is. In some sense then, these are inter-translatable. But does (2)
not impute a different (and perhaps more complex) structure ‘to the world’?
22Recall also from §4.4.4 the proposed semantics for “O-at-t is p”. I suggested that “O-at-t” might
refer to a temporal part of (perduring) O, or to (enduring) O as at a particular location. This is
very much consonant with (my reading of) McCall and Lowe’s proposal.
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Moreover, both endurantist and perdurantist think there is only one thing that
exactly occupies this region, viz. the green, rounded entity with pips and a stalk etc.
It is this very thing that the endurantist regards as an instance of a multi-located
apple; and it is this very thing that the perdurantist takes to be a temporal part of
an apple. When considered in this manner, it is hard not to sympathize with the idea
that, at least when it comes to the exact occupants of instantaneous spatiotemporal
regions, endurance and perdurance are offering different labels for the very same
entity. Within this context OE does not appear too implausible a thesis.
Can OE survive in other contexts though? I proceed by asking what might corre-
spond to the other elements of the perdurantist ontology. In §6.4.2 I consider how OE
might be extended to include perduring, four-dimensional objects; and in §6.4.3 I con-
sider extended temporal parts. I then conclude with some mereological considerations
in §6.4.4.
6.4.2 Perduring Worms
Although endurance and perdurance both acknowledge three-dimensional entities,
the perdurantist additionally countenances temporally extended, four -dimensional
entities. Indeed they believe everyday objects to be just such ‘worms’. If the en-
durantist ontology is a mere re-labelling of the perdurantist one, then endurantists
should likewise countenance four-dimensional entities. But what could these be?
The most natural answer is suggested by McCall:
Does a four-dimensional object have temporal parts? Yes. In three-
dimensional language we would say that the ‘life’ or ‘history’ of the object
(as distinct from the object itself) is divisible into as many periods as
there are spatial intervals on the real line.
(1994:213)23
Similarly Sidelle writes that the perdurantist
23See also McCall (1994:211).
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sees time as a fourth dimension along which material objects extend, and
along which an object may be arbitrarily divided into parts. Many people
claim to find this intuitive, while opponents think all that is intuitive is
that the career of an object is so extended and divisible.
(2002:125–126)
Maxwell similarly portrays the endurantist as holding that
it is not objects, but rather the history [sic] of objects, that can be con-
ceived as being spread out in time: and histories exist only insofar as
objects persist and change.
(1985:29)
For a final espousal of lives though, we should return to Barker and Dowe:
Take again a multi-located entity O, be it enduring entity or universal. Say
that O is multi-located throughout a 4D space-time region R. Intimately
connected with O and R, there is, we submit, a 4D entity which we call
the life of O, or L(O). [. . . ] Lives are part of common sense ontology; we
speak of entities—be they people, animate entities or inanimate—having
long, interesting, varied, good, etc. lives. Lives are 4D things; they have
beginnings, middles, and ends. L(O) is just like an event occurring at a
region R; it is located at R with proper parts located at each subregion r
in R.
(2003:110)24
The emergent idea is that for every object the endurantist countenances an associ-
ated career, life or history. These are temporally extended, and can seemingly be
partitioned just as the perdurantist’s four-dimensional worms are. In fact, these are
not the only temporally extended entities that endurantists countenance. There are
many who think that whilst objects endure, concerts, avalanches and football matches
are temporally extended entities with stages or phases.25 And just as we talk of the
24Barker and Dowe later claim that “lives are instances of a broader ontology of events, whose
existence cannot be denied since they are the relata of causation” (2003:111). An important caveat,
however, is that they think lives paradoxical on endurance (2003:110). Their reasoning assumes that
if (i) p is part of E1, an entity exactly located at and only R1, and (ii) p is part of E2, an entity
exactly located at and only at R2, then (iii) E1 is partly located at R2. This principle seems correct
when R1 and R2 overlap, but Barker and Dowe apply it to successive, non-overlapping regions. Thus
interpreted, the principle is somewhat strange.
25See e.g. Mellor (1998:85–86). I shall refer to such entities as “processes”. Whilst I have no wish
to be stipulative here, I suspect that few would say that processes persist.
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early or later stages of a game, concert, etc., so too do we talk of the early or later
stages of Jim’s life, history or career. We speak of his troubled childhood, his difficult
teenage years, his life on the run, and his time in Dartmoor.
Now there may be a tendency to regard one’s history as a kind of abstract ‘story’.
The believer in OE can acknowledge the possibility of such stories (pointing out that
they are relevant to both enduring and perduring objects). What they must main-
tain, however, is that there is nonetheless something four dimensional and concrete
that endurantists do countenance. They can mount quite a reasonable case. Let us
set aside the term “histories” for any putative abstracta; we will deal with “lives” or
“careers” (which arguably sound more concrete already). First, and for what it is
worth, we may observe that the other temporally extended entities that endurantists
acknowledge, such as football matches and avalanches, clearly are concrete. Second,
certain events and processes are apparently part of one’s life: birth and death, break-
ing one’s leg, robbing a bank, etc. Such events and processes are concrete, and it is
hard to see how something could have concrete parts without itself being concrete.
Third, lives appear to have spatiotemporal locations, which is at least good evidence
for their being concrete. One could argue for this spatiotemporality directly: talk
of “my life in Prague” apparently attributes a location to (part of) my life. Or one
could observe that the events and processes that make up my life are not just con-
crete, but also spatiotemporally located; this suggests that lives are too. And finally,
lives are temporally extended. How could something be temporally extended without
even being in (space)time?
It seems, then, that some endurantists (or perhaps some commentators on en-
durance) think that there are indeed four-dimensional entities associated with each
and every (enduring) object. These are apparently concrete, and can be partitioned
in just the way that a perduring worm is. To recap then: from McCall and Lowe
we extracted the idea that what the endurantist regards as a particular instance of
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a multi-located object, the perdurantist re-labels as a temporal part (of an extended
object). The current proposal is to extend the thesis of OE so as to incorporate
four-dimensional entities also. The idea is that the perdurantist’s four-dimensional
objects are none other than what the endurantist labels as “lives” or “careers”.
If this is the case then we should expect the endurantist’s lives or careers to be
located just where the perduring worms are. The (limited) literature on this topic
suggests that the expectation is met. Recall Barker and Dowe’s talk of lives being
“[i]ntimately connected with” and “located at” the spacetime region through which
an enduring object is multi-located. Carter and Hestevold similarly suggest that, for
the endurantist, “world-lines represent the life or history of an individual and not the
individual herself” (1994:279). They quote Lockwood, who writes of the “world-line
that is intended to represent the life of a human being” (1989:261). Gilmore employs
a terminological variant—an object’s “path”—but informally characterizes this as the
region which “exactly encompasses O’s complete ‘career’ or ‘life-history’ ” (2006:204).
Finally, Balashov writes that
enduring objects pursue their careers in space, as well as time. Such
careers or histories can be suitably represented by worldlines (or rather
‘worldworms’) in the four-dimensional space-time.
(2000a:129)
There is a clear consensus then: the life or career of an enduring object exactly
occupies the object’s worldtube (i.e. the four-dimensional sum of the regions the
object exactly occupies). And it is in precisely such regions that the perdurantist
locates their four-dimensional objects.
Nonetheless, a worry remains. Are not the events that are part of someone’s life
typically somewhat larger than that person then is? The event of dancing the Bolero
at the 1984 Olympics is an important part of Christopher Dean’s life, but it is implau-
sible to think that event was entirely contained within the regions he exactly occupied
during the performance. For one thing, Jayne Torvill also contributed significantly
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to the event in question. Indeed this last point suggests a related objection. Certain
events are part of many people’s lives. Given that their worldtubes have no part in
common—for they do not overlap—how can lives be identified with worldtubes?
One who seeks to confine an object’s life to its path has a reply of sorts: when it
is said that certain events are “part of my life”, what is meant is that I was involved
in these events, and that they had a profound effect on me. Such a reply is fine
(and even rather plausible) in itself, but if all talk of my life can be paraphrased into
talk about me and the events in which I have participated, it will become doubtful
whether the endurantist is committed to a distinct ‘life’ after all. I return to this
issue in 6.4.4.
6.4.3 Extended Temporal Parts
In addition to instantaneous temporal parts and (four-dimensional) objects, the per-
durantist countenances extended temporal parts intermediate between the two. Does
the endurantist countenance anything similar?
In fact there is little here to trouble OE. Provided that a perduring (i.e. four-
dimensional) object should be identified with the life or career of a ‘corresponding’
enduring object, then sections of the four-dimensional, perduring object—i.e. ex-
tended temporal parts—should be identified with sections of the enduring object’s
career. Thus what the perdurantist takes to be Jim’s Oxford-located extended tem-
poral part, the endurantist regards instead as a part of his life (viz., his student
years).
In fact this suggested parallel is relevant to more than just OE. Consider Van
Inwagen’s (1990:252–254) criticism of perdurance. His ultimate aim is to show that
the perdurantist must espouse a counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality.26 Van
26Is this a criticism? Sider’s (2001:219) view, with which I agree, is that Van Inwagen thinks he
is forcing the perdurantist into an uncomfortable corner here: he believes counterpart theory to be
unattractive.
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Inwagen hopes to reach this conclusion from the initial observation that temporal
parts are “modally inductile”, i.e. that they could not have been longer than they
actually are.27 And there is some sense to the claim that temporal parts are modally
inductile: (perduring) Jim’s 1989 temporal part is obviously just a year long. How
could it have been longer? The same is true for all of his year-long temporal parts.
Van Inwagen next observes that if Jim perdures then he himself “is one of his
temporal parts—the largest one, the sum of all of them” (1990:253); and as already
stated, temporal parts are modally inductile.28 But surely Jim could have lived for
longer than he actually does. Suppose he lives for fifty years. Could he not have lived
for seventy-five?
Sider (2001:218–220) makes the right noises in response, for example that we
do not fret about the spatial analogue of this ‘difficulty’. But what interests me
more is that there is an endurantist analogue of Van Inwagen’s argument. Enduring
Jim’s career lasts for fifty years (we have supposed). Each year-long section of this
career could hardly have lasted for eighteen months (say); such sections are modally
inductile. And since Jim’s career is made up of these inductile sections, it would
follow that his career itself is modally inductile. This we would very much want to
deny.
This endurantist version of the objection suggests a further response. The sections
of Jim’s career that we typically discuss are not the 1989 section, or the 2001 section,
etc. Rather, we talk of his adolescence, his time in Dartmoor, and so on. It is far
from obvious that these sections are modally inductile. Without his remission for
good behaviour, Jim would still be in prison.29
Of course there is the worry here that the Dartmoor section of Jim’s career is the
27Temporal parts are likewise said to be “modally incompressible”: they could not have been
shorter than they actually are. Apparently the perdurantist “will want to say that temporal parts
[. . . ] have their temporal extents essentially” (1990:253).
28In Chapter Three fn.9 I agreed that a perduring object counts as its own extended temporal
part.
29Sider makes the equivalent point in the perdurantist context.
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section of his career that runs from, say, 23rd May 1998 to 1st March 2004. Conceived
of in the former manner it seems that this could have been longer or shorter; but in the
latter vein its temporal length appears immutable. This is the familiar phenomenon
whereby the modal properties of an object seemingly depend upon how we refer to it.30
But whilst this is doubtless an interesting topic, the important points for our purposes
are that Van Inwagen’s objection ‘against perdurance’ is equally an objection against
endurance; that there are prima facie promising ways to respond on behalf of either
doctrine; and that both the objections and the responses are exact parallels. This
would be very much expected on OE. But even if one does not ultimately endorse that
thesis, it seems to me that there is enough of a parallel between extended temporal
parts and the sections of an enduring object’s life to make Van Inwagen’s objection
seem less of a purely perdurantist worry.
6.4.4 Mereological Relations
I now consider two objections to OE based on composition. The first concerns the
sheer number of composite entities that endurance and perdurance countenance. The
second (and I think more serious) complaint centres on how the theories regard the
compositional relationship between their three- and four-dimensional entities.
Compositional Restriction
Perhaps endurance and perdurance countenance entities that exactly occupy three-
dimensional regions, and similarly for four-dimensional regions; and perhaps there is
some sort of correspondence between these. But do perdurantists not countenance
rather more such entities?
As Sider (2001:7–8) observes, most perdurantists embrace unrestricted composi-
tion. And it is certainly true that most endurantists do not. This need not entail a
30Lewis (1986a:249–263) understands this phenomenon in terms of a context-dependent modal
counterpart relation; as remarked in fn.26, Van Inwagen seems opposed to such an analysis.
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dispute about what natural objects there are (or those we talk about). But it seems
there may be a serious disagreement as to whether there are (very many) composite
entities beyond the natural objects (or those we regularly discuss).
Such a disagreement is in fact orthogonal to the endurantist-perdurantist dis-
pute.31 The kernel of perdurance—that objects are temporally extended with parts
for every subdivision of their duration—is consonant with the claim that (a) not every
set of simultaneous temporal parts composes a temporal part of a (four-dimensional)
object; and also with (b) not every succession of temporal parts composes a (four-
dimensional) object.32
As to endurance, it seem consistent to claim that objects exactly occupy multiple
spacetime regions, and yet that (a′) every set of simultaneous simples composes some
object as at that time (no matter how strange); and that (b′) every succession of
objects-as-at-times corresponds to the development of some object (no matter how
strange).33 Of course I should not understate how bizarre such entities might be. In
fact I think unrestricted endurance a crazy doctrine. But I think it no more crazy
(and indeed no less crazy) than the corresponding perdurantist thesis.
Three- And Four-Dimensional Entities
A more serious problem for OE is the following. Perduring worms are fusions of the
instantaneous temporal parts that it is suggested we should identify with enduring
objects as at particular times. If this mereological relationship is to be replicated by
the endurantist then an enduring object’s life or career must have as parts the various
‘instances’ of that very object.
31As Sider admits: “One could believe four-dimensionalism without accepting unrestricted com-
position (and vice versa)” (2001:7).
32McCall (1990:210–211) similarly expresses reservations about the combination of perdurance
and unrestricted composition.
33For more on unrestricted endurance, see Haslanger’s “Indiscriminate Endurance” (1994:354–
356), Sidelle’s “Persistence Universalism” (2002:129), and no less than three similar doctrines con-
sidered by Miller (2006). (Haslanger and Sidelle do not endorse the ‘endurances’ they consider;
Miller endorses one of her three.)
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Endurantists do not usually espouse any such claim.34 But then many endurantists
make no mention of lives or careers; so perhaps there is room for manoeuvre here.
In addition, the believer in equivalence between endurance and perdurance need not
(and probably does not) hold this equivalence to be especially salient. They are more
likely to take the endurantist to be unknowingly committed to certain principles that
they may then exploit. Of course the more that must be foisted onto the endurantist,
the less plausible the claims of equivalence will become. But still there is room for
the proponent of OE to step back and ask, in the current context, just what the
relationship between an enduring object and its life or career might be.
I think OE is nonetheless in trouble here. The best I can offer its proponents is
the discussion of §4.3. In response to Barker and Dowe’s criticisms of endurance I
highlighted certain difficulties in the notion of an (endurantist) ‘auto-fusion’; I wrote
that “when I contemplate Jim as at R1 and Jim as at R2 I am less certain that these
fuse to yield Jim simpliciter”. What were the reasons for this? I observed that: (a)
the fusion has an inconsistent mix of properties that we might wish to understand in
terms of temporal parts; (b) the fusion weighs rather more than Jim ever does; (c)
the fusion at least occupies (and perhaps exactly occupies) a sum of instantaneous
regions; and (d) the fusion is not obviously a person.35 From this I concluded that (e)
the fusion is not obviously Jim. I did not and do not claim that these observations
represent the only way of construing Jim’s auto-fusion. Nonetheless, I advise the
defender of OE to strongly back these observations, and moreover to propose that
the fusion of an enduring object as at its multiple locations is none other than its life
or career.
The supporter of OE might then suggest that most of (a)–(e) lend support to their
34Although Barker and Dowe come extremely close when they write, of an object O and its life
L(O), that they think “O is a part of L(O)” (2003:110). However, they then clarify that “L(O)
is somehow constituted out of O and possibly other entities” (2003:110; my italics). The italicized
qualification, though only mooted as a possibility, is not a part of the view under consideration.
35And I now confess one extra reason for not wishing to identify the fusion of Jim as at various
regions with just plain old Jim: even in §4.3 I had an eye on what is about to emerge.
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position. Regarding (a): they would hold that an enduring object’s life or career ‘has
temporal parts’, insofar as this is how the perdurantist labels the various ‘instances’ of
Jim that, on the present suggestion, are indeed parts of Jim’s life or career. Regarding
(c): the fusion of all of Jim’s ‘instances’ would occupy (so would it exactly occupy?) a
temporally extended region. As to (d) and (e), Jim’s life or career is neither a person
nor Jim himself.36
If the fusion of Jim as at various locations were simply his life, then we could also
explain the exceedingly close connection between the two. The connection is partly
spatial: Jim can never go where his life does not. But it is also temporal: Jim’s life
begins when he does, and cannot outlast him. Were his life the fusion of Jim as at
his multiple locations, we could explain these spatiotemporal facts.
The close connection between Jim and his life is not just spatiotemporal though.
Whenever Jim performs some act, it becomes a part of his life; and conversely, every
part of his life charts an action performed by Jim. Indeed, all of these relations
apparently hold of necessity. Were we to regard Jim and his life as entirely distinct,
we would face some awkward Humean questions as to how distinct entities can be
necessarily related. But if Jim is part of his life then it is obvious how the connections
arise.
Of course the view under consideration does not answer the objection that surfaced
at the end of §6.4.2. Certain events and processes are spoken of as “part of my life”,
yet they seem rather larger than any region I exactly occupy. There is some mileage
in replying that we are currently considering a more technical sense of “life”; but the
further the departure from ordinary usage, the less likely we are to countenance lives
in this technical sense. The alternative reply is that, on the view that my auto-fusion
is my life, whilst the events and processes in question are not strictly a part of that
36(b) is more problematic. Is one’s life really so heavy? I think the best option for the supporter
of OE here is to contend that a perduring worm is extremely heavy also, since it is composed of the
matter that composes each of its temporal parts.
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life, the latter will typically overlap the former (since both contain me as a part). The
believer in OE can point out in mitigation that our intuitions about lives and careers
are admittedly somewhat vague; and at least their position goes some way towards
precisifying these thoughts.
Still, my own view is that OE falls down at this point. I find it highly plausible
when focussed on three-dimensional entities, but less so when it comes to talk of
lives or careers (that putatively correspond to four-dimensional objects). Recent
discussion notwithstanding, I remain troubled by the mereological relations (or lack
thereof) between particular ‘instances’ of an enduring object and its life or career; I
do not think these replicate the relations between a perduring object and its temporal
parts. But I stand by the claim that one’s views on composition are independent of
one’s view on persistence; and also by the claim that Van Inwagen’s argument from
modal inductility troubles the endurantist no less (and no more) than it troubles the
perdurantist. To my mind, OE has not vindicated the idea that the endurantist-
perdurantist debate is less than genuine. Perhaps this idea can be captured in a
different way though.
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Chapter 7
Rotating Discs, Identity, And
Genidentity
7.1 Introduction
Chapter Six considered a thesis of Ontological Equivalence (OE) which held endurance
and perdurance to differ only as to how they label the world’s contents. OE has
already run into heavy weather. But a further problem was postponed until now: the
endurantist’s temporally unextended entities are (held to be) multi-located, whereas
those countenanced by the perdurantist are not. How, then, could these be the very
same entities?
An alternative idea was floated more briefly in §6.2: perhaps endurance and per-
durance are genuinely distinct, but there is no fact of the matter as to which is correct.
Multi-location again seems central here. If there are no multi-located entities in the
world then endurance is clearly false. On the other hand, if there are temporally
unextended entities that exactly occupy multiple spacetime regions, we will be led to
reject perdurance instead.
Talk of multi-location amounts to talk of identity. If something exactly occupies
both R1 and R2 then it trivially follows that the exact occupant of R1 is identical to
the exact occupant of R2.
1 It seems, then, that if one believes in OE or one believes
1Or, more cautiously, that an exact occupant of R1 is identical to an exact occupant of R2.
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that there may be no fact of the matter with regard to persistence, one’s views on
identity will be crucial.
In addition and quite independently of this, it seems to me that genidentity pro-
vides an intriguing model for identity. The former is usually held to reduce to certain
underlying continuities. Can the same be said of the latter?
I approach these topics via the Rotating Discs Argument (§7.2). That will lead
us to consider and reject Hawley’s (1999, 2001) suggestion that genidentity is un-
derpinned by certain primitive relations. This will usher in a parallel discussion of
diachronic identity (§7.3). Again I will reject primitivism, adopting a reductionist
approach instead (§7.4). Having defended this approach and examined certain con-
sequences, I return to the ‘no fact of the matter’ view in §7.5, where I also discuss
certain traditional puzzles of identity over time.
7.2 The Rotating Discs Argument
7.2.1 Formulation
The Rotating Discs Argument (RDA) is usually taken to threaten perdurance but
not endurance, and it therefore presents a prima facie challenge to any thesis of
equivalence between the two. It aims to show that perdurance cannot capture an
elementary distinction: that between a rotating and a stationary disc.2
Consider, to begin, successive microscopic ‘snapshots’ of a this-worldly disc. Even
if the disc rotates, the vacua between its atoms allow us to ‘join the dots’ over time:
in one snapshot there is an atomic temporal part in one place; in the next snapshot
an atomic temporal part just nearby; and so on.3 The perdurantist uses these facts
2The RDA traces its ancestry at least back to Broad (1925:36–37). Recent discussion stems from
Armstrong (1980) and unpublished but roughly contemporaneous lectures by Kripke.
3Even this is problematic if there is no standard of ‘same place’ over time. I set aside this
complication; see Butterfield (2004:24–26).
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of spatiotemporal continuity to trace out a binding relation that unites the atomic
temporal parts into a four-dimensional atomic whole; this relation they call “geniden-
tity”. Within a rotating disc, genidentical (but distinct) temporal parts trace out a
helical worldline. Straight worldlines, on the other hand, indicate a stationary disc
(or at least a non-rotating one).
Now consider an other-worldly disc composed of homogeneous, continuous matter.
Surely such a disc could rotate or fail to do so. This time, however, ‘snapshots’ of the
disc would not determine the worldlines for portions of the disc’s matter: whether or
not the disc rotates, each snapshot is of a homogeneous, continuous, lump. What, in
this case, determines the genidentity relations between successive parts of the disc—
and thus whether it rotates?
7.2.2 Three Types Of Solution
Three types of solution are suggested in response to the RDA. I provide a brief
overview before going on to consider in more detail Hawley’s (1999, 2001) variant on
the third type.
Causes And Effects
Rotation has certain characteristic causes and effects. If these are present then it
would seem simple to determine whether (even) a homogeneous disc rotates. For
example, if a coin placed on a disc moves outwards from the centre, the disc is surely
rotating.
Proponents of the RDA respond by ‘imagining away’ such effects. More than one
initially appreciates must be imagined away though: e.g. any deformation of the disc,
stress energies within it, dust particles in its vicinity, and the frame-dragging effect of
rotating bodies in General Relativity.4 And if all of the standard causes and effects
4As Butterfield (2004:67–68) observes, rigid rotation alone takes us far from familiar physics.
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of rotation are absent, we might start to doubt whether there is a fact of the matter
as to the disc’s rotation.5
I share these doubts, and I will ultimately (in §7.4.4) endorse a response by Sider
(2001:230–236) that accommodates them. It will be seen that Sider treads a careful
line between letting those causes and effects that are present determine whether or
not a homogeneous disc rotates, and denying that there is any fact of the matter
when such causes and effects are absent.
Vectorial Qualities
The second type of response to the RDA focusses on vectorial qualities. The rough
idea is that each portion of matter within a homogeneous disc has an associated
vector that determines where ‘it’ will be immediately afterwards. Smoothing out
some of this roughness: of course the perdurantist takes the vector to determine the
subsequent location, not of the portion of matter itself, but rather of its genidentical
successor.
What are these vectors though? Perhaps they are just velocity vectors; certainly
the velocity of a matter-portion seems apt to determine its (successor’s) subsequent
position. But how is velocity understood here? On the standard Russellian analysis,
(instantaneous) velocity is a quotient limit: distance travelled divided by time taken.
But “distance travelled” surely indicates the distance between an entity at one time
and that same entity, or at least its genidentical successor, at another. As a reply
to the RDA then, this proposal seems unworkable. Russellian velocities presuppose
genidentity; they cannot also be used to ground it.
Enter Tooley’s (1988) heterodox account of velocity: instantaneous velocity is a
temporally intrinsic property that can be picked out by its role in physical theory.
It is that property, whatever it may be, which relates to momentum, energy, change
5See Callender (2001).
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of position, etc. in just the manner described by the standard laws of physics. Such
an account allows velocity to not merely encode, but rather to explain and govern an
object’s trajectory.6
Tooley did not intend his instantaneous velocities as a solution to the RDA. Nor
is it obvious that they are even applicable. As Zimmerman (1998b:282–284) notes,
the laws of physics that specify Tooleyan velocities themselves presuppose the notion
of a persistent entity, threatening circularity once more: Tooleyan velocities are used
to define persistence, yet persistent entities must be antecedently supplied in order
to define Tooleyan velocity.
As a result, Lewis (1999) endorses a related proposal by Robinson (1989) which
seeks to define vectorial ‘quasi -qualities’, not by their theoretical role, but rather in
terms of that which governs the propagation of matter. Thus Lewis puts the idea
as being that “if there is matter at a spacetime point, and if the vector associated
with that matter points in a certain direction, then at the next moment matter will
appear at the place toward which that vector was pointing” (1999:211). Note that
Lewis does not talk of the same matter, or even genidentical matter, appearing in the
relevant place. Since the vector field is to be used to genidentify persisting matter,
facts about persisting matter cannot be used to define the field. Note also that the
proposal must be hedged: Robinson (1989:406) observes that propagation only occurs
in the absence of any relevant “destructive forces”.
The problems with this proposal are twofold.7 First one may simply doubt the
existence of anything like the vector field that Robinson and Lewis postulate. Second,
one might object to the vectorial nature of this field. It is introduced by Robinson
and Lewis as a ‘fix’ for Humean Supervenience, which doctrine had previously sought
6Or at least it does in our world, where Tooleyan velocities are nomologically correlated with
Russellian (quotient) velocities. In nomologically distinct worlds, the property that our laws single
out as playing ‘the velocity role’ may simply not exist, or it may exist in those worlds yet be
uncorrelated with an object’s trajectory. A further issue is whether it even makes sense to talk of
intrinsic velocity within a spacetime with respect to which absolute velocity is not well defined.
7Although Zimmerman (1999) discusses a recherche´ third objection.
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to found causation, persistence, etc. solely on intrinsic qualities. Perhaps there are
independent reasons for relaxing this requirement, and perhaps Robinson’s quasi -
qualities are only ‘hypothetically extrinsic’ (insofar as they only tell us where matter
will be located if there is a ‘next time’). Nonetheless, the Humean project seems to
lose some of its lustre once vectorial quantities are admitted to the basis.8
Non-Supervenient Causation
The final type of solution utilizes relations of immanent causation.9 Might the matter
within my table be instantaneously replaced by qualitatively identical matter? Some
writers believe such ‘immaculate replacement’ to be possible (in some sense), and
moreover that my table would not survive this process.10 What would apparently be
missing are (the right kind of) causal connections between my table and its replace-
ment. One moral is that spatiotemporal and qualitative continuity are insufficient
for causal continuity. Another is that causal connection is necessary for identity (or
genidentity).
The RDA might be held only to reinforce these morals. Spatiotemporal-cum-
qualitative relations clearly cannot bind successive temporal parts of the discs. Per-
haps causation does so instead. To re-iterate though, the Humean basis is the same
for both rotating and stationary (homogeneous) discs. In that case the postulated
causal relations must be taken as non-supervenient.
8For further discussion, see Robinson (1989:407–409), Lewis (1999:209) and Butterfield (2004:51–
53).
9See Armstrong (1980) and Zimmerman (1998b).
10See Shoemaker (1979:326–327) and Armstrong (1980:79). I return to immaculate replacement
in §7.3.3.
182
7.2.3 Hawley’s Non-Supervenient Relations
The Proposal
Hawley (1999, 2001) also proposes to answer the RDA with non-supervenient relations
(NSRs), but her relations are not themselves causal. Instead, they are sui generis
relations between temporal parts or stages, the holding of which
is not entirely determined by the intrinsic properties of those [. . . ] stages,
nor even by those intrinsic properties plus spatio-temporal relations be-
tween the stages.
(2001:71)
Although Hawley is adamant that her NSRs are not themselves causal (2001:86–88),
they are nonetheless
the relations, whatever they are, which underpin the relation of “imma-
nent causation” which holds between stages of the same object [. . . ]
(2001:85–86)
Thus it is these non-supervenient, non-spatiotemporal relations that ultimately weld
temporal parts into four-dimensional objects.11 In the context of RDA, such relations
hold between a segment of the disc at one time, and a segment of the disc at another
time. If the segments thus related are co-located then the disc is stationary; if not, it
rotates.12
The proposed relations perform other tasks also. In addition to underpinning im-
manent causation, Hawley’s NSRs single out from amidst the innumerable gerryman-
dered sequences of temporal parts those sequences that are “natural” (2001:90–94).
This facilitates an explanation of how we pick out suitable referents for our terms
(2001:96–98) and also helps to
ground the distinction between genuine change and mere difference over
time between different objects.
(2001:95)
11Hawley is in fact a stage theorist (see Chapter Three fn.22), but she takes her solution to apply
to perdurance also (2001:69–71).
12Assuming the disc has not undergone a translation.
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Against NSRs I: Macroscopic Entities
As I read her, Hawley believes that NSRs hold directly between the various temporal
parts of macroscopic perduring entities.13 I am about to argue against this idea. In
the next section I shall argue against a related proposal: that NSRs hold primarily
at the microscopic level.
Hawley’s NSRs would clearly be of great help in dealing with homogeneous rotat-
ing discs. In actuality they are less help than hinderance though. Even in our world it
is (alleged to be) NSRs that subvene genidentity and thereby pick out natural objects
to act as the referents of our talk and the subjects of genuine change (2001:90–98).
The central difficulty is then the following: how do we square these NSRs with the
apparently distinct facts on which genidentity also seems to rest?
To start with, Hawley’s NSRs are supposed to hold between the temporal parts
of very many types of object. But this is implausible for the simple reason that, as
Hawley had earlier observed,
[w]hat relations underpin the persistence of a single object may depend
upon what kind of object is in question.
(2001:70)
Hawley does not mean to invoke a whole set of NSRs that underpin the persistence of
different types of object. Rather, her preceding discussion reveals her to be alluding to
the ‘usual suspects’ here: qualitative similarity, spatiotemporal continuity, psycholog-
ical continuity (for persons), etc. A combination of these relations is usually thought
to underpin persistence, with the precise details depending on “what kind of object
is in question”. But how do we reconcile these relations with the non-supervenient
ones that Hawley has posited?
One would think, for example, that the temporal parts of my chair are united,
not by NSRs, but rather because they are qualitatively similar and spatiotemporally
13Though recall fn.11.
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continuous.14 But relations of qualitative similarity and spatiotemporal continuity
supervene, respectively, on the qualities instantiated by, and the spatiotemporal lo-
cations of, those successive temporal parts. Such relations must therefore be distinct
from Hawley’s non-supervenient relations. We have a choice then: does genidentity
follow Hawley’s relations, or rather those that appear to bind the chair’s temporal
parts together?
Perhaps we should ask whether these relations can separate. Suppose that NSRs
can diverge from what is usually thought to subvene genidentity. After all, with
Hawley’s relations being non-supervenient, it is hard to see what could constrain them
to parallel the more traditional relations of spatiotemporal continuity, qualitative
similarity, etc. But then if they can diverge, who is to say they do not diverge?
Hawley’s NSRs might hold between (what we would ordinarily describe as) my chair
at t1 and (what we would describe as) my table at t2. Might Blair be genidentical with
Hitler?15 The NSRs that Hawley countenances are in no way observable. Connect
them every which way and we would be none the wiser.
We might also worry whether, in the event of a divergence, we should take NSRs to
ground genidentity. Suppose that, in intuitive terms, such relations link ‘my chair’ at
t1 and ‘my table’ at t2 (and that I somehow came to know this). I would still describe
this situation as I just did: a non-supervenient relation would hold between one
object (my chair) and another (my table). I might think this an odd state of affairs.
But I would not conclude that my chair at t1 and my table at t2 (partly) compose a
‘natural’ object, whilst my chair and my table—which entities are spatiotemporally
continuous and qualitatively stable—are somehow gerrymandered and inferior.
On the other hand, suppose that Hawley’s relations cannot cleave apart from the
14Doubtless there is a causal requirement as well, but I assume for now that this reduces to
qualitative and spatiotemporal facts. More on this in §7.3.3.
15Better: might some or all of the temporal parts of what we think of a single, continuant Blair in
fact be genidentical with some or all of the temporal parts of what we think of as a single, continuant
Hitler?
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traditional basis for genidentity. Why can they not? The answer would be obvious
if her relations supervened on the more traditional ones; but since her relations are
explicitly non-supervenient, this cannot be so. Instead it seems that her relations are
not only basic, but that there are basic constraints upon them to parallel qualitative
similarity, spatiotemporal continuity, etc.16 The precise constraints vary from object
to object. NSRs follow: spatiotemporal continuity in the case of billiard balls; vital
continuity with regard to trees; continuity of parts when it comes to an oft-repaired
watch; and, at least arguably, psychological continuity for people. How does this
come about?
All in all it is unappealing to think that Hawley’s relations cannot cleave apart
from the traditional subveners of genidentity. We are being asked to believe in re-
lations that are utterly unobservable; that cannot but parallel the relations which
traditionally subvene genidentity (even though there is no explanation for this paral-
lelism); and that are neither identical with nor supervene upon those more traditional
relations. On the other hand if these relations can cleave apart then, as discussed
above, we are faced with bizarre diachronic concatenations of (what we regard as)
ordinary objects as at particular times. To further endarken matters, it seems myste-
rious how we could ever know whether the two sets of relations do or do not diverge.
Against NSRs II: Microscopic Entities
I therefore reject Hawley’s proposal as it stands. There is a variation on her theme
though: NSRs govern genidentity only for simples. The genidentity of the various
temporal parts of a macroscopic object might then arise, not due to NSRs between
those temporal parts themselves, but rather due to NSRs that underpin the geniden-
16This assumes that it even makes sense for there to be constraints on a supposedly primitive
relation.
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tity of the object’s microscopic parts.17,18
If there are no simples, i.e. if everything has parts that have parts that have parts
etc., then this view would clearly need re-thinking. It may be hostage to empirical
fortune in other ways also. What might initially appear to be simples are perhaps
just fluctuations in the quantum ‘soup’. Would this allow for persistent microscopic
entities at all, let alone ones with temporal parts linked together by NSRs?
But the main difficulty is just as before. Supposing for convenience a ‘billiard
ball’ understanding of atoms, we naturally believe that genidentity for such entities
follows spatiotemporal and qualitative continuity. Can the NSRs that hold at the
microscopic level part company with these continuities? Suppose that they cannot.
Why not? There seems to be a brute constraint here no less mysterious than that pre-
viously considered at the macroscopic level. Alternatively, suppose that the NSRs and
the spatiotemporal-cum-qualitative constraints can cleave apart. We might imagine
two atoms in a box. How do we know they are not constantly ‘switching genidenti-
ties’? Or, speaking more strictly now, how do we know we are not dealing with two
atoms that are repeatedly exchanging position with correspondingly oscillating qual-
ities? Indeed, might not the continuous trajectories and apparent smooth variation
in qualities conceal a succession of very many atoms ‘jumping in and out of’ these
trajectories? And might something similar be true, not of atoms in a box, but rather
of ‘my’ atoms and ‘yours’?
To these recent questions there is an answer of sorts: we should prefer the simpler
17At least this is part of the story. For many objects (e.g. animals, plants and artifacts) continuity
of form or purpose contributes alongside mereological continuity. Even then though, continuity of
parts still matters: a tree may survive the replacement of all of its cells, but not if they are all
replaced simultaneously.
18Might the ‘variation’ about to be considered be what Hawley intended all along? (Thus: “the
suitable relations which underpin the persistence of ordinary things are non-supervenient” (2001:71;
my italics).) I think not: (i) she usually writes that NSRs hold between temporal parts of an
object (with no suggestion that these relations hold only in virtue of more microscopic ones); (ii) her
examples discuss NSRs between temporal parts that are clearly macroscopic (those of the segments
of a disc (2001:88–89) or indeed herself (2001:89)); and (iii) in fact the idea that NSRs hold at the
microscopic level, let alone that they only hold at the microscopic level, is never even mentioned.
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story. Yes, there could be two spatiotemporally and qualitatively discontinuous atoms
within the box. But it is far simpler to assume that the atoms are better behaved.
This is indeed the simpler assumption, but are we entitled to make it? Whatever
the heuristic merits of simplicity when judging between theories, if the pathological
worlds are entirely possible and observationally indistinguishable from our own, why
assume we inhabit a well mannered world? Setting this aside though, there is some-
thing rather ridiculous about appealing to simplicity as an arbiter here. On what is
really the simplest account, these two possibilities never arise. Genidentity for our
billiard-ball particles simply consists in, and is no more than, spatiotemporal-cum-
qualitative continuity. That is why it cannot diverge from these factors. That is why
more bizarre possibilities need not even be considered.
7.2.4 Endurance And The RDA
As remarked in §7.2.1, any endurantist-perdurantist equivalence is threatened if the
RDA troubles only one of these theories. Sometimes one has to read between the
lines to find the accusation that perdurance is threatened but endurance is not. Thus
Lewis makes no mention of endurance but does state that a possible response to the
RDA is: “so much the worse for the metaphysic of temporal parts” (1999:209). Sim-
ilarly, Zimmerman puts the RDA against a combination of perdurance and Humean
Supervenience (1998b). Are we to conclude that endurance is immune?
Other writers are more explicit. Having briefly explained the difficulties that
spinning and non-spinning homogeneous spheres would present for the perdurantist,
Scala writes that the
same difficulties do not attend the view according to which objects endure
through time, however, since the differences between the spheres [. . . ] can
be cashed out in terms of diachronic identity and the movement or non-
movement of parts.
(2002:393)
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Similarly, Hawley thinks that endurance, with its attendant notion of identity, can
escape the RDA. She suggests that her proposal in terms of close-binding NSRs may
be reminiscent of
the closest connection of all, that of identity. Perhaps the segment persists
by enduring through time. This is certainly a possible response to the
homogeneous disc argument [. . . ]
(2001:89)19
Clearly there is a perceived disanalogy between perdurance and endurance. Whilst the
former requires a “suitable” genidentity relation to connect temporal parts, Hawley
thinks that endurantists
face no equivalent challenge. The transtemporal relation in question, ac-
cording to endurance theorists, is just the relation of identity. [. . . ] Noth-
ing else needs to be said, and in this respect endurance theory is simpler
than either stage or perdurance theory.
(2001:69)
Finally, Sider thinks that the
three-dimensionalist has an easy answer. There are no temporal parts, and
so no genidentity relation, and so no need for an analysis of genidentity.
The enduring parts of the disk will be located at different places depending
on whether the disk rotates. Thus, the disks are distinguished by different
patterns of occupation of spacetime points by their enduring material
parts.
(2001:226)
But what exactly is it about identity that allows it to evade the difficulties associated
with genidentity and the RDA? According to Butterfield, we think there is a disparity
because we are tempted to say that
the endurantist can take the distinction between the correct and incorrect
worldlines (straight vs. helical) as “bedrock”: no more can be said, and
besides, no more needs to be said.
(2004:26)
19See also Hawley (1999:16).
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This is wrapped up in
the idea that—at least for the spatial parts of a piece of homogeneous
matter—diachronic criteria of identity are unnecessary, or even unintelli-
gible: i.e. the idea that the identity over time of such parts is just “good
old identity”, and is both unanalysable, and in no need of analysis—it is
as clear as crystal!
(2004:26)
I agree with Butterfield when he goes on to suggest that in fact “the endurantist also
has work to do” here (2004:26). But I also agree with his diagnosis: Scala, Hawley
and Sider (doubtless along with others) regard endurance as immune from the RDA
because they think that, for the endurantist, diachronic identity is just primitive (at
least at some level). In other words they think that, for the endurantist, it is simply a
brute fact that a particular segment of the disc at t1 is identical to a particular segment
at t2. The successive locations of thus-identified segments determine whether or not
the disc rotates. But it is to just such primitivism that I am about to object.
7.3 Against Primitivism
I regard Hawley’s belief in NSRs as tantamount to a belief in primitive genidentity.
We shall now discover that the arguments against her view are equally hostile to
a primitivism about identity. Again I consider the macroscopic case before then
considering the microscopic one.
7.3.1 Against Primitivism I: Macroscopic Entities
A theory of primitive identity for macroscopic objects threatens to conflict with the
idea that identity depends critically on a combination of qualitative, spatiotemporal,
mereological, and causal continuities (the precise details of the combination varying
with the type of object in question). Thus the identity of a watch seems to depend
upon the identity of its component parts, and the rate at which those parts are
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replaced. With organisms, whilst mereological issues are again important, continuity
of vital processes also plays a part. When it comes to persons, the standard accounts
involve either bodily or psychological continuity.
How do we reconcile all this with primitive identity? I do not think we can. Prima
facie the relevant continuities might come apart from the primitive facts of identity.
But the latter are not observable, in which case for all we know Blair might be
identical with Hitler.20 Perhaps (what I think of as) my chair and my table are not
natural objects, despite their spatiotemporal and qualitative continuities. Instead,
‘my chair’ yesterday might be identical with ‘my table’ today.
But perhaps these far-fetched scenarios are impossible. Suppose (that it is co-
herent that) there are constraints on primitive identity—and constraints such that
identity cannot hold unmediated across spatiotemporal intervals or radical qualita-
tive changes (at least not for the kinds of object discussed above). Indeed, identity
might be constrained to exactly parallel those continuities that we expect it to follow.
That would prevent the epistemological chaos which would result if these could cleave
apart.
Nonetheless, we stumble from one epistemological hurdle to the next. We have
no real idea how the mooted constraints might work; perhaps they too are brute.
Worse still, it seems that the precise constraints on primitive identity must vary
with the type of object. And how, given the unobservability of identity, have we
discovered that primitive identity is constrained to follow: continuity of function in
the case of ships; continuity of vital processes in the case of a tree; and—at least
arguably—psychological continuity when it comes to persons? Might it not be that,
unbeknownst to us, ‘tree identity’ cannot survive the loss of a single leaf? Perhaps a
watch can survive being dismantled with its parts ground up and spread across the
universe. On the primitivist view, how could we come to know otherwise?
20Granted: the Hitler-Blair object would be temporally discontinuous. But if facts of identity are
just primitive, what is there to prevent them from holding across such discontinuities?
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7.3.2 Against Primitivism II: Microscopic Entities
Primitive identity therefore seems unattractive at the macroscopic level. But I suspect
it has more adherents at the microscopic level. Such an adherent might well hold that
identity for composite objects depends upon the kind of continuities discussed above,
and in particular on the continuity of an object’s parts. Perhaps the identity of
these parts depends on similar continuities, including facts about various sub-parts.
Ultimately though, one arrives at entities that plausibly do not possess parts; and
hence it might be held that the diachronic identity of these entities must be simply
primitive.
To some extent I need not disagree with this picture. I will argue later that the
identity of an enduring object does not just depend upon, but in fact consists of
the holding of the various continuities already mentioned. The same is true of the
genidentity relation between instantaneous temporal parts. I thus claim there to be
parity between identity and genidentity; but so long as this parity is maintained at
the microscopic level, it would be no disaster should microscopic identity/genidentity
turn out to be primitive. And in much of what follows I shall be concerned primarily
with identity and genidentity for macroscopic entities.
Nonetheless, on occasion I do consider microscopic entities, taking their identity to
be non-primitive.21 And if the perdurantist can get by without primitive genidentity
(or NSRs) at the microscopic level, then why can the endurantist not cope without
primitive identity? Of course if they do dispense with primitive identity then the
endurantist may join the perdurantist in being threatened by the RDA.22 But still, I
think the positives will more than outweigh the negatives here.
For one thing, we should surely prefer a (plausible) theory that holds a particular
relation to be supervenient rather than primitive. There is perhaps a hint of ontolog-
21See §§7.4.4 and 7.5.1.
22See §7.4.4.
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ical parsimony about this preference: a primitive relation is surely distinct from any
continuities seemingly connected to it, whereas a relation that supervenes on these is
less obviously distinct.23 But I believe we should be particularly loath to countenance
relations that are not just primitive but also unobservable (both in themselves and in
their consequences). Primitive identity would be just such a relation.
Identity seems to follows spatiotemporal, qualitative and causal continuities even
at the microscopic level. Suppose we were granted omniscience with regard to such
facts (and further suppose a particulate ontology). We might then know that there
is a path of continuous matter-occupation between a particle at R1 and a particle at
R2; that there is no such path between the particle at R1 and any other particle at
R2; that the particles at R1 and R2 are qualitatively identical (and indeed that their
qualities are manifested all along the path between them); and finally that there is an
unbroken chain of (appropriate) causal links running between the ‘two’ particles.24
In such a situation, do we really want to say that the identity of that at R1 and
R2 is a primitive fact? Does their identity not hold in virtue of the aforementioned
continuities?
Indeed, the situation is similar to that at the macroscopic level (save for the ab-
sence of mereological continuities). Can primitive identity part from the spatiotem-
poral, qualitative and causal continuities outlined above? In which case how do we
know that it does not do so all of the time? We might revisit our earlier atoms in a
box (this time from the perspective of endurance). I quote from §7.2.3:
How do we know they are not constantly ‘switching [identities]’? Or,
speaking more strictly now, how do we know we are not dealing with
two atoms that are repeatedly exchanging position with correspondingly
oscillating qualities? Indeed, might not the continuous trajectories and
apparent smooth variation in qualities conceal a succession of very many
atoms ‘jumping in and out of’ these trajectories? And might something
23I return the question of distinctness in §7.4.
24Note that I do not say “immanent-causal links”, lest this commit us to the identity of the
particles. See Chapter Five fn.30 for a similar point.
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similar be true, not of atoms in a box, but rather of ‘my’ atoms and
‘yours’?
Of course an alternative is that primitive identity might somehow be bound to the
continuities in question. Again we might ask whether this even makes sense; and
again we might ask just what binds it. Are the constraints also just brute? And
how, indeed, have we found out about the relevant constraints—especially given the
unobservability of identity itself?
A further alternative: the endurantist might adopt primitive identity with their
fingers crossed. In other words, they might deny any formal constraint on primitive
identity but nonetheless hope that, in actuality, it is well behaved enough to follow
whatever continuities are salient at the microscopic level. We might grant that such a
world would be simpler than a world where primitive identity cleaves apart from the
relevant continuities. Moreover, I suppose there could be an argument to the effect
that if we live in a well-behaved world then we know that microscopic entities are
not ‘constantly swapping identities’.25 However, I see no reason (save for blinkered
optimism) to think that we do live in a simple world (vis-a`-vis identity) when there
are so many other, relatively pathological worlds observationally indistinguishable
from our own. And really it would provide no substantial assurance to know that,
somewhere out amidst the possibilia, there are those who know themselves to be
living in a well-behaved world (with respect to identity), when all the while there are
countless others—quite possibly including ourselves—ignorant of the fact that they
are not.
All in all then, I fail to see why the endurantist should take a different stance
towards the diachronic identity of microscopic objects than they take towards identity
at the macroscopic level. In either case they should deny the primitiveness of identity,
taking it to depend on the relevant continuities instead. Apart from allowing the
25The idea is inspired by those externalists about knowledge who propose analogous conditionals
in response to brain-in-a-vat scepticism. See DeRose (1999:10–13) for the rough idea.
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endurantist to recognize the great importance of these continuities, a rejection of
primitivism dispels certain sceptical ‘possibilities’. The tethering of identity to its
apparent criteria allows us to assert with confidence that our world is not one in which,
unbeknownst to us, identity connects indiscriminately across the salient continuities.
7.3.3 Immaculate Replacement
Before moving on to more positive remarks about the nature of identity, I must revisit
the possibility of immaculate replacement ; for this could be thought to support the
primitivism I am trying to deny. Might all of Jim’s matter be instantaneously anni-
hilated and immediately replaced by qualitatively identical matter? We are supposed
to grant, firstly, that this is in some sense possible; and secondly that Jim (or perhaps
his matter) would not survive this process.
Cases of immaculate replacement certainly trouble what I shall call a super-
endurantist : one who believes both that causation supervenes on spatiotemporal-
cum-qualitative continuities, and that identity supervenes on a combination of spa-
tiotemporal, qualitative and causal facts.26 Because the replacement matter in the
example is qualitatively identical to and appears in the same place as that which
it displaces, the super-endurantist might seem compelled to admit that the standard
causal relations do obtain, and hence that Jim does survive. This is a counter-intuitive
conclusion.
How will the super-endurantist respond? The primitivist must hope that they
retain their belief in the supervenience of causation. In that case all of the continu-
ities that are supposedly essential to identity—i.e. spatiotemporal, qualitative and
causal ones—will be present. When this is coupled with the belief that Jim does not
survive the replacement process, it seems that the super-endurantist will be forced to
backtrack when it comes to the supervenience of identity.
26Note, however, that immaculate replacement would also trouble a super-perdurantist.
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This would be a strange way for the super-endurantist to proceed though. In-
stead of retaining the supervenience of causation but abandoning the supervenience
of identity, a more sensible option would be to abandon the former but retain the
latter. Prima facie it seems that whilst the spatiotemporal and qualitative conti-
nuities are undisturbed, the very act of replacement guarantees that the standard
causal relations do not obtain. Hence one customary moral drawn from immaculate
replacement: it is the lack of causal connection that accounts for the lack of identity.
Note that this moral suggests identity not to be primitive, but rather to be dependent
on causal considerations.
Alternatively though, the super-endurantist might retain the supervenience of
causation and identity, but deny the possibility of immaculate replacement.27 They
can nonetheless grant the possibility of parts of the story, and indeed of certain
related stories. Most obviously, I see no reason why they cannot allow the possibility
of instantaneous annihilation of matter, and similarly its creation ex nihilo.
They can also allow the following possibility. Merlin has been known to generate
matter ex nihilo on several occasions. When he does so, such matter instantaneously
obliterates whatever was present in the region where it appears. Merlin can control
precisely what matter he generates, where he generates it, and what properties it
has. In other words Merlin could indeed generate qualitatively identical matter just
where Jim’s matter currently is. Should he do so, there may yet be good reason, even
for the super-endurantist, to judge that despite the spatiotemporal and qualitative
continuities local to Jim, the essential causal continuities do not hold across the region
of immaculate replacement. This is because Merlin’s exploits at other times and
in other places provide excellent grounds—excellent spatiotemporal and qualitative
grounds—to regard him as the cause of the replacement matter in our example.
So the super-endurantist can continue to uphold the supervenience of causation on
27Perhaps this is the best option for the super-perdurantist also.
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the broader spatiotemporal spread of qualities; and they may also hold that despite
the local spatiotemporal and qualitative continuities, Jim does not survive Merlin’s
malevolent act.
What the super-endurantist cannot allow is that there could be two worlds that
are spatiotemporally and qualitatively identical throughout, yet which differ over
the patterns of diachronic identity within those worlds. If the believer in (primitive
identity and) immaculate replacement really wishes to posit some powerful outside
influence that nonetheless might ‘reach into’ one of the worlds to ‘tweak’ the facts
of identity—and only these facts—then so be it: the super-endurantist must deny
this possibility. They do this with no sense of embarrassment or shame, but rather
with great gladness. It allows them to discount what would otherwise be a virulent
sceptical problem. For how would we know that we are not being immaculately
replaced, again and again, all of the time?
7.4 Identity Reduced
I have argued at length that (diachronic) identity is not primitive—neither at the
macroscopic nor the microscopic level. Instead it critically depends on the holding of
certain continuities: continuities that vary with the kind of object in question, but
are broadly speaking spatiotemporal, qualitative, and-or causal. I now develop this
account by claiming, in §7.4.1, that identity reduces to such continuities; and then in
§7.4.2 that we play a significant part in deciding which continuities are relevant. In
§7.4.3 I consider three objections to such views, and then in §7.4.4 I briefly revisit
the Problem of Change and the RDA in the light of recent developments.
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7.4.1 Reductionism About Identity
To begin then, consider the relation “is an uncle of”. This relation is not (both)
primitive and yet mysteriously constrained to parallel the relation “is a brother of
a parent of”.28 Instead, being an uncle surely depends upon these other familial
relations. Do we want to say, though, that “is an uncle of” is a distinct relation to
“is a brother of a parent of”? Which is to say: are there two relations here, one of
which supervenes on the other? I would have thought instead that only one relation
is present, albeit one we may describe in different ways. The ‘uncle-ness’ relation
reduces to or just is the relation “is a brother of a parent of”. Being an uncle consists
in being the brother of a parent.
The continuity-based relations on which identity apparently depends are doubtless
more complex than those on which unclehood rests. Nonetheless, I suggest that
identity similarly reduces to the relevant continuities. Put another way: the holding
of identity simply consists in the holding of those continuities. It is not distinct from
these, and involves nothing extra. In particular it is not an additional relation that
somehow ‘sits on top of’ the continuities in question. If it were, how could we have
come to know of it? How would we have discovered its supervenient nature? Given
the unobservability of identity itself, were it distinct from the relevant continuities
then these questions would be utterly unanswerable.
In espousing a reductionist theory of identity I take myself to be adopting at least
a semi-popular view. I cite two examples: Parfit since is he is so very explicit on
this topic, and Locke as a plausible originator of the view. The latter remarks on at
least four occasions that identity “consists” in the holding of certain continuities (for
both persons and for men—Locke views these as distinct).29 As to the former, Parfit
28I assume that a parent’s sister’s husband is not strictly speaking an uncle, but rather an uncle-
in-law.
29See Locke (1975 [1689]:328–348). Lowe (1989:2) explicitly endorses Locke’s views, and also uses
“consists” (with regard to identity) elsewhere (1988a:76).
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writes (on the topic of personal identity) that once the details of any psychological
and physical continuities have been given, this
is a full description of the facts. There is no further fact about which we
are ignorant.
(1984:242)
In other words: there is no “further fact” about identity. The
fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding of certain
more particular facts.
(1984:210)30
7.4.2 Decisions Or Discoveries?
Suppose, then, that identity reduces to its apparent criteria. We might then think
that personal identity consists merely in psychological continuity (say); that ‘tree
identity’ amounts to no more than vital continuity; and that the identity of a watch
reduces to facts about its component parts.31 Were these reductions simply ordained
‘on high’ though? And if they were, how did we ever discover them?
The answer is that these were decisions and not discoveries. Not conscious deci-
sions, nor particularly sudden ones. But nonetheless we have established over time a
practice of identifying ‘trees’ that are vitally continuous, ‘watches’ that are mereolog-
ically continuous, and so on. The fact that our practice is what matters explains how
we have any grasp on the relevant criteria of identity for a particular object. Had we
played no part in the ‘decision’ that trees can survive the loss of their foliage, or that
cars may have their parts replaced, how could we have come to know these facts?32
30Parfit is similarly reductionist about other forms of identity. Thus both personal identity and
the identity of nations are said to “consist in nothing more than the holding over time of various
connections, some of which are matters of degree” (1984:316). And whilst he stops short of fully
endorsing the view, he seems fairly comfortable with the idea that identity for a physical object
“necessarily involves or consists in [. . . ] spatio-temporal physical continuity” (1984:203).
31It is reductionism, rather than the complete adequacy of the suggested analyses, that primarily
concerns me here.
32As to why identity reduces to different criteria for different types of object, to some extent this
is obvious: rocks, rivers and roadblocks can hardly be psychologically continuous over time. More
subtle differences might be anthropocentric and pragmatic, being a product of what we are likely to
want the concepts “person”, “penknife”, “pumpkin”, etc. to track.
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Three further considerations support the view that facts about identity emerge
from our practices. First: puzzle cases. A philosopher puts forward a particularly
unlikely scenario involving a φ. We judge that the φ would (not) survive this scenario,
which intuition the philosopher attempts to capture via a set of proposed criteria for
φ-identity. How are we to understand this process apart from as revealing recherche´
elements within our practice with regard to (the identity of) φs?
Second: personal identity. Does this consist in bodily or psychological continuity?
Because these rarely if ever part, there has no been no pressure on us (or our prac-
tices) to ‘decide’ which continuity identity follows. No wonder these issues remain
unresolved; there are simply no determinate answers here.33
Third: vagueness. Arguments against vague identity notwithstanding (e.g. Evans
(1978)), I doubt that for every possible vicissitude that may befall an object there is a
fact of the matter as to whether it survives. This is brought home particularly well by
Parfit’s (1984:231–243) examples involving degrees of physical and-or psychological
change. If one thinks that facts about identity are somehow ‘out there’, independently
of our practice, then it will be hard to make room for this vagueness.34 On the other
hand, if identity emerges from our practices, then it is obvious how vague identity
arises: it simply requires our practices to be vague—as they surely are.
7.4.3 Three Objections
I now consider three objections. The first is that an extreme reductionism about
identity is essentially no better than a denial. If there is no “further fact” about
identity beyond the holding of the now-familiar continuities, then is this not to say
that, strictly speaking, there is no identity?
If the complaint is really that on the reductionist view there is nothing resembling
33Nonetheless, for expository reasons I shall continue to adopt one criterion (generally the psy-
chological one) rather than the other.
34Unless, that is, one thinks it indeterminate what we refer to by names such as “Jim”, “Kofi
Annan”, etc. I find this hard to believe.
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identity as the objector conceives of it, then I can happily allow this (especially if the
objector is a primitivist). But if the objection is genuinely that a reductionist view
does not allow for identity, then it is simply misguided. “Being an uncle of” reduces to
other relations, yet there remain uncles nonetheless. Dogs may be ultimately reducible
to quantum fluctuations; but still there are dogs. And most relevantly of all, Sider
is correct to claim that “[i]t is natural to seek a reductive analysis of genidentity”
(2001:225; my italics).35 That hardly means that the perdurantist denies genidentity!
A second objection concerns the apparent importance of identity with regard to
persons, animals, and those objects to which we are sentimentally attached. If identity
amounts to no more than certain continuities, why does it seem to matter so much?
I will not answer this question (and thus, to some extent, this objection). But I
confess, firstly, that with regard to persons, I am attracted to Parfit’s view that
“[p]ersonal identity is not what matters” (1984:217; my italics). Secondly I note that
the primitivist is certainly no better placed to ground the importance of identity. At
least the reductionist can begin to tell a story about why psychological continuity
might matter to us. But why should we care about the holding of some (rather
obscure) brute relation?36
The third objection arises insofar as several authors reject, or at least regard as
misleading, a mode of expression that I have already come close to adopting (and will
certainly adopt in what follows). They regard talk of personal identity, rock identity,
ship identity, etc. as to some extent improper. Talk about φ-identity should rather
be understood as talk about what it is to be a φ. In this manner Quine contends that
the apparent criteria of bodily identity “are not conditions on the notion of identity;
they are conditions on the notion of body” (1976:860). And Noonan similarly thinks
that we should
35See also Lewis (1976:20–24).
36Indeed, if we consider a case in which we somehow knew that (primitive) personal identity had
separated from, say, psychological and physical continuity, is it clear that our sentimental attachment
would follow the alleged ‘identity’ rather than the continuities instead?
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deny that the genuine problems which philosophers are concerned with
when they debate topics under the title of ‘problems of (synchronic and
diachronic) identity’ are problems about identity at all. Rather, they are
problems about kind-membership.
(1989:107)37
By contrast, I am far more receptive to talk of personal identity, rock identity, etc. I
certainly see nothing wrong with saying, of Jim at t1 and Mr. Smith at t2, that iff they
are psychologically continuous (say), then they are in fact the same person. Modulo
the precise criterion, I think this is exactly what we should say. On the other hand
perhaps we could talk more generally of persons being psychologically continuous,
rather than personal identity reducing to such continuity.38 But is the former a great
improvement on the latter?39
Perhaps it would be better to discuss kind-membership if talk of kind-identity
were liable to be confused with talk of some ‘purer’ identity. Lewis seems to hint at
this ‘pure’ conception:
Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is identical to
itself; nothing is ever identical to anything else except itself. There is never
any problem about what makes something identical to itself; nothing can
ever fail to be. And there is never any problem about what makes two
things identical; two things never can be identical.
(1986a:192–193)
I can agree with much of this. But there is at least a suggestion here that identity is
just basic: whilst Lewis does not quite say that there is nothing that “makes some-
thing identical to itself”, he comes close (and he does say that identity is “simple”).
Recall our standard endurantist framework though, and in particular the discussion
of §5.4.5. We start with a panoply of simples and qualities spread throughout space-
time. Compositional considerations furnish the endurantist with objects of a certain
37See also Lewis (1986a:192–193), Sider (2001:149) and Hawthorne (2003:99).
38The claim that persons are psychologically continuous re-expresses the claim that psychological
continuity is necessary for personal identity. What of the claim that it is sufficient though? Should
we say that persons ‘inevitably follow’ psychological continuity? Or that personhood does? The
expression in terms of identity arguably seems more natural.
39Especially given the ‘hiccup’ of the last footnote.
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type that exactly occupy various three-dimensional regions. Some of these ‘objects’
are in fact the very same object though; they are multi -located. The identity of the
φ that occupies R1 with the φ that occupies R2 is not some brute fact though: that
would return us to the dark doctrines of primitivism. Rather, these locations contain
the very same φ because certain continuities run between them (the precise details of
which depend on the φ in question).
I will therefore give little ground to Noonan, Lewis, et al. If they feel the need
to re-interpret my talk of φ-identity in terms of ‘what it is to be a φ’, then so be it.
But really I see no shame in talk of the criteria for φ-identity. That seems an entirely
appropriate name for those criteria that determine certain φ-containing regions to be
exact locations of the very same φ.
7.4.4 Familiar Territory
It is worth revisiting two earlier topics in the light of reductionism about identity.
The first visit will be brief: in §4.4 I expressed a good deal of scepticism about the
Problem of Change. The view of identity I have now endorsed only reinforces this
scepticism. According to the reductionist, identity just is or consists in the holding
of those relations on which it apparently supervenes. The particular relations that
count depend on the type of object in question; but it is by now familiar that paths of
continuous matter-occupation, vital processes, functional continuity, etc. are amongst
the relevant factors. Once it is accepted that the holding of identity amounts to no
more than the holding of these continuities, it is obvious that there is no conflict
between diachronic identity and qualitative diversity. Why should there be? Nothing
subtle about the continuity of vital processes requires a tree to be qualitatively identi-
cal over time. Similarly for Lewis himself: his diachronic identity (arguably) consists
in and is no more than the holding of certain psychological relations between (the
mental states of) his earlier and later ‘selves’. But “being psychologically continuous
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with” and “being the same shape as” are obviously unrelated. To think that the
former might in any way imply the latter is just bizarre.
The consequences of reductionism about identity are less welcome when it comes to
the RDA. To recap: in §7.2 I described the apparent perdurantist difficulty (§7.2.1);
discussed three types of solution (§7.2.2); introduced and criticized Hawley’s non-
supervenient relations (§7.2.3); and finally suggested that the endurantist escapes
RDA only if their identity relation is, as Butterfield (2004:26) puts it, “unanalysable,
and in no need of analysis” (§7.2.4). I have since denied that identity is “un-
analysable”, and am therefore committed to the view that endurance does not es-
cape the RDA. Diachronic identity is no less dependent on various continuities than
genidentity is, in which case the lack of any such salient continuities within homoge-
neous, rotating discs troubles either doctrine equally.
Of course this apparent parity is good news for one who takes endurance and
perdurance to be in some way equivalent. But it seems still more important to
address the RDA now that it threatens endurance and perdurance alike. There will
be no fireworks here though. My preferred solution is essentially that given by Sider
(2001:230–236). This was advertised early in §7.2.2, but more recent developments
mean I wish to interpret his account as applicable also to endurance.
The essential idea is that in many worlds there will be sufficient causes and effects
associated with what is obviously rotation (or obviously not rotation) to determine,
in less clear-cut cases, both the physical laws and the paths that continuant matter
pursues.40 Thus: in a particular world we observe that by regarding certain spa-
tiotemporal regions as the paths of persistent objects, and by postulating particular
laws that these persistent objects obey, we can achieve an optimal balance between
subsuming as much empirical data as possible and doing so with the minimum num-
ber of lawlike principles. It may be, for example, that the ‘best system’ of laws
40Of course with regard to the RDA what we need to know is what paths the parts of the disc
pursue; but Sider’s proposal provides this too.
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and continuant paths respects the conservation of momentum. In that case there
will be some homogeneous discs whose parts are assigned helical paths on the basis
that, for example, the disc used to have a (stationary) gap on its edge which then
received a moving part exactly filling it (thus rendering the disc both homogeneous
and rotating). Sider mentions other examples where the laws and continuant paths
determine the rotation of a homogeneous disc, e.g. when the disc has been physically
spun. One need not say that disc’s current rotation is directly caused by this past
event.41 The point is rather that, immediately after the disc has been spun, the lines
of identity/genidentity for its parts will be helical. Assuming that the physical laws
in this world roughly resemble our own, these parts will continue to trace out helical
paths provided no further forces act upon the disc.42
Two wrinkles remain with this solution (and Sider is aware of both). The first
is that in sparser worlds there may not be enough data for the joint assignment of
continuant paths and laws. In such worlds it is simply indeterminate as to whether
a homogeneous disc rotates. For the perdurantist this means there is no fact of the
matter as to which part of the (temporal part of the) disc at one time is genidentical
with which part of the (temporal part of the) disc immediately afterwards. In terms
of identity it would be similarly indeterminate what paths diachronic identity follows
over time. Such conclusions are unusual, but they are less surprising given the situa-
tion that generates them. In a world containing homogeneous discs entirely isolated
from all of the usual causes and effects of rotation, it seems far from unreasonable to
deny a fact of the matter as to whether such discs rotate.43
The second wrinkle is the extrinsicality within Sider’s proposal: the paths of
persistent matter will in some cases be partly determined by what occurs in distant
41Robinson protests that this would involve a kind of “action at a (temporal) distance” (1989:406).
42Future developments are presumably just as significant. If, at some future time, a coin is placed
on a rotating disc only for it to immediately slide outwards, then providing that developments
elsewhere have established the relevant physics, the disc will be regarded as (having been) rotating.
43See Callender (2001).
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regions of spacetime.44 There is no escaping this, even if we would want to. The
account on offer is extrinsic insofar as nomological considerations determine the paths
of persistent matter in those regions where such paths are not initially obvious; and
the laws are indeed determined by more straightforward cases of persistence elsewhere.
Extrinsicality that creeps in via the laws of nature I do not find particularly troubling
though. And I note in addition that in worlds that are anything like ours (or at least
how we take ours to be), extrinsic determinants of persistence are not necessary.
Purely local continuities can determine the facts of genidentity, just as they can the
facts of identity.
7.5 Identity and Genidentity
If identity were brute and genidentity supervenient then these two relations would
surely differ markedly. However, I have argued that identity is in fact reducible to
its criteria; and the same is true of genidentity. In §7.5.1 I consider the consequences
of this for the view that the endurantist-perdurantist dispute might be somehow
less than genuine. Then in §7.5.2 I consider the application of perdurance and-or
genidentity to some traditional metaphysical puzzles involving persistence. I contend
that endurance and-or identity can to a large degree mimic the perdurantist solutions.
7.5.1 No Fact Of The Matter (Again)
I have argued that identity, like genidentity, reduces to its apparent criteria. In other
words the holding of identity, like the holding of genidentity, amounts to no more
than the holding of certain continuities (the relevant continuities varying with the
type of object).
Moreover, the continuities to which these relations reduce are for the most part the
44This criticism could equally be put against the super-endurantist’s analysis of the Merlin example
in §7.3.3.
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same. Recalling the thesis of Ontological Equivalence from Chapter Six, consider a
three-dimensional spacetime region R1 that is exactly occupied by what endurantists
regard as a person, and by what perdurantists regard as an instantaneous temporal
part of a person. Consider also spacetime region R2, of which the same can be
said. There are in addition certain continuities that hold between the two regions,
their occupants, and the states of those occupants. In particular: there is a path
connecting R1 and R2 that consists of successive instantaneous regions each of which
is occupied by persons, or temporal parts thereof, varying only gradually in their
physical characteristics; and there is an unbroken chain of psychological continuity
between the (mental states of the) R1- and R2-located entities.
45 All this is no more
and no less than what is required for the contents of R1 and R2 to be identified by
the endurantist and genidentified by the perdurantist. And if each relation reduces
to precisely the same criteria, are they not but verbal variations on a theme?
The believer in Ontological Equivalence clearly hopes that we should answer “yes”.
But there are two reasons to resist. First, identity and genidentity do not reduce to
the same criteria; in some situations the exact occupants of two three-dimensional
regions would be regarded as genidentical by the perdurantist but distinct by the
endurantist.46
Set this to one side though: suppose that (with respect to the exact occupants of
three-dimensional regions) the endurantist regards identity as holding when and only
when the perdurantist regards genidentity as holding. Still it might be thought that
the endurantist and perdurantist are not merely using different vocabulary when the
same underlying continuities are present; for attributions of identity carry with them
substantially more than attributions of genidentity. In particular, if we identify the
exact occupiers of two three-dimensional regions then we are committed to their being
45Further stipulations: (i) there are no branching chains of physical or psychological continuity
in the vicinity; (ii) the situation is ‘causally standard’, i.e. we have no immaculate replacement or
similar disruptions.
46Cases of symmetric fission will furnish an example in §7.5.2.
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just one (multi-located) entity in these regions. By contrast, if the exact occupiers are
genidentical, they are clearly two. How can this not amount to a genuine difference
between endurance and perdurance?
It seems that if one regards the endurantist-perdurantist debate as less than sub-
stantive, one ultimately has to deny that there are facts of the matter about identity
(and similarly about ‘one-ness’). Perhaps one adopts a thesis of Ontological Equiva-
lence, believing endurance and perdurance to countenance essentially the same types
of entity but to label these differently. Or one might think that these theories are gen-
uinely distinct, but that there is nonetheless no fact of the matter to arbitrate between
them (recall §6.2). Either way though, there is multi-location on endurance, whereas
there is not on perdurance. Multi-location arises when the same entity exactly occu-
pies distinct regions. If it is a nature-given fact that this never occurs, clearly there
would be a fact of the matter with regard to persistence: endurance would be false.
If, on the other hand, there simply are multi-located three-dimensional entities then
it seems that the perdurantist is mistaken.
How might it be argued, then, that facts about identity are not ‘nature given’?
We could observe that at the macroscopic level our practices could have evolved
differently. Thus we might have come to regard a butterfly as an associated successor,
or perhaps the progeny, of a caterpillar; the pupal stage would involve, not radical
mutation, but rather death and subsequent birth. We might have said that, after a
particularly extensive renovation of my laptop, what I have is in fact a new laptop.
We might even have evolved a practice according to which persons do not survive
sleep, but rather ‘give birth to’ a closely related descendent. Whilst to operate in
these heterodox ways might be to some degree impractical, I am not convinced it
would involve any substantial mistake.
These thoughts are based on a conception of individuation that not everyone will
share though. For those who accept Quine’s (1969:23) slogan of “no entity without
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identity”, there may be very little scope for talk of the same type of entity having
different identity-conditions. Relatedly, an unrestricted mereologist might re-describe
my ‘possibilities’ in terms of our choosing to talk of different entities. Thus it would
not be that the identity conditions for persons (say) might have differed; it is rather
that we could have spoken of things other than persons.
I will therefore approach the idea that there are no nature-given facts of identity
from a different angle. I begin with the Lewisian framework to which I am attracted:
the idea that “all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular
fact”, or equivalently “an arrangement of qualities” (1986b:ix–x). Those qualities
and their arrangement determine (inter alia) the paths of the persistent entities. This
will be in virtue of: paths of continuous matter-occupation; qualitative similarities
between successive regions; and patterns within the Humean mosaic which mean that
the matter in one region is intimately causally related to the matter in another.
What I do not see is how these paths, similarities and patterns could determine
whether a world contains enduring or perduring entities. Provided these two doctrines
are coherent and distinct, it seems that the very same spread of qualities would permit
either possibility. Consider two three-dimensional regions each of which contains
something ‘person-like’. Suppose that all of the necessary continuities are also present;
we think this is a case of persistence. But how do those continuities settle whether the
two regions contain genidentical (but distinct) temporal parts of a four-dimensional
person, or rather different ‘instances’ of a multiply located enduring object? To
repeat: I fail to see how they could. The very same Humean tapestry would allow
for both endurance and perdurance.
At this point an objector arrives. Although I have spoken in passing of “matter”,
I have said little about what underlies the Humean arrangement of qualities. The
objector might urge that such qualities must be instantiated, and that whether a
world features endurance or perdurance is determined by whether the instantiating
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entities endure or perdure. To this objection there are a number of replies.
First, it is clearly correct that if there are microscopic enduring entities then our
world “features endurance” at least to some extent (and mutatis mutandis for per-
durance). But it is unclear whether the endurance or perdurance of the fundamental
constituents of reality would determine the nature of persistence at the macroscopic
level. Many endurantists regard processes as temporally extended; yet they further
regard these as dependent upon enduring entities (whether microscopic or macro-
scopic). Thus an avalanche is grounded in the behaviour of (putatively enduring)
rocks, lumps of snow, and their constituent matter. Might it be that even though
the fundamental constituents of reality endure, persons and physical objects are more
like processes than we ordinarily imagine?
The converse of this—that there may be perdurance at the microscopic level but
that everyday objects endure—perhaps seems strange. But it is not so far-fetched
to think that endurance might be some sort of emergent, purely macroscopic phe-
nomenon. Might I not be an enduring entity, exactly occupying multiple regions,
even though my persistence ultimately depends on perduring particles?
The second point in response to the objector is that the microscopic world might
feature neither endurance nor perdurance—because it does not feature persistence!
If the sub-atomic world is just a hodge-podge of fields, flux and flow, then we may
find no room in it for persistent entities. (I further take it that on some quantum
theories this is quite a plausible picture.)
Thirdly, and perhaps relatedly, we might ask whether an “arrangement of qual-
ities” needs to be underpinned. Could there not just be collections of qualities at
various spacetime points? Indeed, might we not espouse a particulate ontology (say),
except with particles interpreted not as bearers of qualities, but rather just bundles
of them?47
47Note that Lewis is appropriately non-committal here. In addition to the “vast mosaic of local
matters of particular fact”, he suggests that we have geometry and then “[m]aybe points of spacetime
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All in all one need not be persuaded that the facts of macroscopic persistence are
fixed by how things persist at the microscopic level. But for the sake of argument, let
the objector have their way: grant that endurance at the microscopic level entails en-
durance at the macroscopic level (and similarly for perdurance). Let us further assist
the objector by supposing that there are indeed point-sized entities that instantiate
the qualities spread throughout the Humean tapestry. What then determines whether
these point-sized entities endure or perdure?
I think the objector will want to say that here our spade is turned: if there are
point-sized multi-located entities, this is simply a brute fact. Admittedly, this is
not quite the primitivism that I considered in §7.3. It is not that identity is being
asserted as primitive (and in fact this may even be denied). The claim is rather
that it is simply given whether the now-familiar continuities underpin identity, or
genidentity instead. Still, I am not greatly enamoured with this primitivism either.
The sheer unobservability of identity per se would conceal from us whether there is
indeed multi-location, or whether there is not. Everything would appear exactly the
same on either alternative.48
Moreover, if these matters are thought to be just basic then I do not see how
to rule out the possibility that some point-sized entities are multi-located—but only
some. One persisting table might be composed of enduring point-sized entities. A
qualitatively indistinguishable table might be composed of (successions of) instan-
taneous point-sized entities. A third table might initially be composed of enduring
point-sized entities, but later composed of (successions of) instantaneous ones. A
fourth table might have enduring legs but a perduring table-top.
I would like to collapse these unwelcome possibilities. The way to do so is to
hold that, whilst it may be given that there is matter exhibiting certain qualities
itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether or fields, maybe both” (1986b:x).
48Note that this is not a point about the microscopic world being unobservable. Even it were
observable, we could still not witness facts about identity.
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at one spacetime region, and matter exhibiting similar qualities at an adjacent and
immediately subsequent region, it is not given whether we are dealing here with the
same matter multi-located, or distinct matter that is nonetheless closely associated.
We must choose how to talk about the world and its continuities, and whether we opt
to do so in terms of multi-located point-sized entities, or a succession of distinct such
entities, on neither alternative do we make a mistake. Of course this is still on the
supposition that there are point-sized entities, and I certainly do not commit to the
truth of this supposition. But I do hold that facts about identity and genidentity—
whether of microscopic or macroscopic entities—are not just given to us. They depend
instead on how we choose to describe the Humean spread of qualities.
7.5.2 Logical Shape And Puzzle Cases
In §7.5.1 I suggested that where the endurantist sees identity, the perdurantist sees
just genidentical association. But there are certain formal discrepancies between
identity and genidentity which indicate that in fact these cannot be the same relation
differently labelled. In particular, genidentity can hold between a three-dimensional
temporal part at one time and more than one such part at another time; and geniden-
tity is also non-transitive.
Indeed, there is more than a suggestion that these formal discrepancies are what
gives perdurance an edge over endurance with regard to certain ‘coincidence cases’.49
My discussion will concentrate on three cases in particular: the Ship of Theseus,
the Statue and the Clay, and symmetric fission. Even if one thinks endurance and
perdurance entirely distinct, the guiding idea behind my discussion will be that by
considering the various perdurantist solutions, we might come to appreciate what
kind of replies could be given (perhaps even should be given) by an endurantist who
49See Sider (2001:140) for the claim that (it is widely thought that) perdurance yields superior
solutions to endurance. (Sider thinks his own stage theory is even better placed to deal with these
cases though.)
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espouses reductionism about identity.
The Ship Of Theseus
Theseus’ Ship (TS ) is very gradually renovated until none of the original parts remain.
Call the resultant ship “Newie”. Is Newie identical to TS? One is tempted to answer
affirmatively. Part-by-part replacement does not destroy identity.
But suppose that the original parts are then assembled to form a second ship. Call
this ship “Oldie”. Is Oldie not TS? She has exactly the same parts as TS originally
did, and to this we might add an unrealistic supposition: that when the parts were
removed, they had in no way deteriorated from when TS first set sail. Oldie would
then be both mereologically and qualitatively identical to TS.
My intuitions are confused only if I focus on the end of the story. Prior to this, the
situation seems clear: there is only one ship present, and that ship is surely both TS
and Newie. Moreover, ships do not change position radically and discontinuously. If
Newie were TS only until Oldie is assembled, this impossibility would have to occur.
Hence there can be no such ‘transition’; Newie is TS.50
I will seek to supplement this endurantist treatment by comparison with the per-
durantist analysis. They claim the narrative to involve two four-dimensional entities,
the temporal parts of which are initially shared but gradually overlap less and less
(until ultimately they overlap not at all). As Sider puts it:
The only remaining question is the merely conceptual one of which of
these spacetime worms counts as a ship.
(2001:9–10)51
50All that remains (if anything does) is to justify the claim that only one ship is present prior to
Oldie’s construction. That which is at sea is clearly one ship, but might Oldie in fact be (distinct
from this ship and) present throughout the story—albeit with some parts ashore and others partly
composing the seaborne vessel? I think we should deny this. It is arguably not possible for a ship
to have her parts spread too widely, and certainly not possible for some of those parts to also be
permanent fixtures on a distinct ship. (See Lowe (1983).)
51Pedantic correction: the remaining question is as to which worm, if either, is Theseus’ Ship (or
perhaps whether “Theseus’ Ship” is a proper description). Maybe both worms are ships; maybe
only one worm is a ship but neither worm is TS.
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I think the perdurantist should answer that TS is the worm whose (spatial) parts
are always contiguous, and which has entirely seaborne temporal parts even midway
through the story. (Thus the solution is ‘all plain sailing’.)
What of the other worm? In fact this is not all that worm-like. During the period
of gradual replacement, this worm is repeatedly bifurcating as more and more parts
are replaced in different harbours and shipyards. The ‘worm’ is more like a river that
splits into very many roughly parallel streams, only to later unite into a river once
more (when Oldie is constructed). It does not correspond to a ship (especially given
the considerations of fn.50), but rather a collection of ship-parts.
Now can the endurantist take a cue from this? A believer in Ontological Equiva-
lence would take the analogous endurantist account to hold that there are two careers
present: that of a ship, and that of a collection of ship-parts. (And indeed one might
well believe this even if one rejects OE.) The difficulty though is that these careers,
just like the analogous worms, are initially overlapping. Must the endurantist there-
fore admit that there are two co-located entities then present: a ship and a collection
of ship-parts? The perdurantist countenances only one three-dimensional entity at
the outset, and hence we have a problem for the believer in OE. But quite irrespective
of that, the endurantist may be reluctant to admit that, initially, there is both a ship
and a distinct, co-located collection of ship-parts.
I think this reluctance is admirable. In my opinion the endurantist should say that
at the start of the story only one entity is present—namely, TS. The collection of ship
parts just is TS, as is the corresponding mass of wood and metal, the collection of
particles that compose these, etc.52 In virtue of what later befalls it, the initial object
(i.e. TS) is the same ship as the subsequent, seaborne, entity (i.e. Newie); but it is
the same collection of parts as that which becomes dispersed between dockyards and
52Although there are apparent differences in historical and modal properties between these, we
do not want to proliferate entities here. I will return to apparent historical and modal differences
shortly when I address statue-clay cases.
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the open sea (before being reassembled to form Oldie). And this very much echoes
the perdurantist solution: their initial three-dimensional entity belongs to a sequence
of temporal parts united by a ship-genidentity relation, and a (distinct) sequence of
temporal parts united by a parts-genidentity relation.
If the endurantist goes along with this suggestion then they are embracing (one
form of) Relative Identity (RI). Suppose that φ and ψ are kinds of object. I take a
basic formulation of RI to hold that:
(1) The following situation is possible: x is the same φ as y but not the
same ψ as y.53
In order to deal with TS though, something stronger (though not necessarily more
objectionable) is required:
(2) The following situation is possible: x is the same φ as y but not the
same φ as z; and x is the same ψ as z but not the same ψ as y.
More must be said with regard to (1) and (2). A relatively minor issue concerns how
many of x, y and z are required to be φs and-or ψs.54 More importantly though, (1)
and (2) need to be motivated (especially because RI is generally quite unpopular).
I think they can be motivated. Indeed, I think they follow quite naturally from two
beliefs: (i) that a single entity might be both a φ and a ψ; and (ii) that the identity-
conditions for φs and ψs might reduce to distinct, potentially divergent, continuities.
With regard to (ii), if ship identity just is functional continuity (let us say), whereas
53Geach (1967, 1973, 1980), Zemach (1974), Griffin (1977) and Noonan (1980) all endorse some-
thing roughly akin to (1). Note that (1) neither entails nor is entailed by the claim that (D): all
identity is relativized to a kind. Whilst Geach and Zemach embrace both (1) and (D), Griffin en-
dorses (1) but not (D), and Stevenson (1972) accepts (D) but not (1). For further discussion of RI
see Dummett (1991), Noonan (1997) and Hawthorne (2003); but note that many of the criticisms
‘of RI’ in fact address (D) rather than (1).
54(1) clearly commits to both x and y being φs, but I shall understand (1) in such a manner that
either, both or neither of x and y may be ψs. (In the latter case (1) is just trivial.) With regard to
(2), x must be both a φ and a ψ. y is obviously a φ and z obviously a ψ, but again I shall understand
(2) such that it may hold whether or not y is also a ψ and whether or not z is also a φ.
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the identity of a collection of ship parts requires mereological constancy, these con-
tinuities can clearly diverge. With regard to (i), it seems not unreasonable to think
that something can be both a ship and a collection of ship parts. If this “something”
is mereologically continuous with one (later) entity, yet functionally continuous with
a distinct (later) entity, then it will be ship-identical to the former and parts-identical
to the latter. All that is required is for the relevant continuities to part company—as
they do so graphically in the case of TS.55
Of course we must duly note (i), for if x cannot be both a φ and a ψ then it surely
cannot be the same φ as y yet the same ψ as z. But if (i) is granted (and I will soon
try to motivate it with respect to the statue and the clay) then RI seems to emerge
quite smoothly given (ii).
Perhaps it is worth pausing a moment to dispel any lingering hints of contradiction
though. Is identity not transitive? In which case if TS is identical to both Oldie and
Newie, does this not render Oldie and Newie identical—when clearly they are not?
The reply is that RI retains transitivity (and symmetry etc.), but restricts these to
a kind-relativized identity. What would follow by transitivity is that if x is the same
φ as y and the same φ as z, then y and z are the same φ; but if x is the same φ as y
yet only the same ψ as z, y and z need not be the same φ or ψ. And again this just
seems right on the view that identity reduces to its apparent criteria. Why should
continuity of form or function between x and y, together with mereological continuity
between x and z, entail any kind of continuity between y and z?
In summary then, I recommend RI for two reasons. Firstly, it emerges naturally
55Note my parenthetic additions of “later” in this paragraph. These are not intended to prohibit
non-diachronic applications of RI, but it would certainly be unusual to countenance multiple simul-
taneous locations of the very same φ. This means it is (a) hard to envisage synchronic criteria that
would lead one to φ-identify these ‘objects’; and (b) harder still to envisage how such criteria might
diverge from the criteria for being simultaneous locations of the very same ψ (say). By contrast,
the idea that the same φ may exist at different times is relatively familiar, and it is likewise easy
to understand how distinct criteria of identity might diverge over time. (I note in passing that if
an object time-travelled back so as to co-exist with its earlier self then the endurantist presumably
would identify these simultaneous ‘objects’. However, I suggest that this identification would be
based largely on the usual diachronic criteria of identity.)
216
from the view of identity that I have endorsed over the course of this chapter. Secondly
though, it allows us to explain any indecision as to whether it is Oldie or Newie that
is TS. For in a sense, both are: the initial entity is ship-identical to Newie, and
parts-identical to Oldie.
The Statue And The Clay
According to some, there is both a statue and a distinct but co-located lump of clay
on my mantelpiece. Simultaneous entities with different properties are not identical,
and whilst the statue is only an hour old (say), the clay has been around for rather
longer. There is also an apparent modal difference: the clay would survive remoulding
but the statue would not. Such considerations provide the rationale for taking the
statue and clay to be distinct. As to their co-location, it is obvious that where the
statue goes, the clay doth follow.
The contrasting and far more intuitive position is that the statue and clay are
identical. To all appearances, and from our usual practice of counting, there is only
one thing on the mantelpiece—or rather one maximal, statue-shaped thing. It is both
a statue and a statue-shaped lump of clay. Moreover, we can support this na¨ıve view
with four quick philosophical arguments (although I do not claim they are irrefutable):
(a) Co-location. Quite simply, it is unattractive to think that two seemingly im-
penetrable objects can overlap, let alone be completely co-located. If we can
avoid saying this, we should do.
(b) Weight. Prior to being formed into a statue, the lump of clay weighed 5kg.
Statues are not usually thought to be weightless. Why, then, does ‘the object’
on the mantelpiece weigh exactly 5kg if ‘it’ is really two objects: a 5kg lump of
clay and a distinct statue?56
56Lewis (1986a:202) makes essentially this point.
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(c) Composition. The lump of clay is composed of various molecules arranged in
such-and-such a fashion. But statues are not simples! They are also compos-
ite, and I cannot see what might compose them except the various molecules,
suitably arranged, that also compose the lump of clay. This allows Zimmerman
to cast doubt on the claim that the statue and clay have different modal prop-
erties (and thus on part of the argument for their distinctness): “Should not
two physical objects constructed in precisely the same way out of qualitatively
identical parts have the same capacities for survival under similar conditions?”
(1995:87). But in addition it is mysterious how the very same molecules could
even compose two distinct, co-located objects in the first place. If this can
occur, why stop at two? Perhaps there are ten objects on the mantelpiece, or
twenty, or even a million.
(d) Multiplicity. There is another line of thought that would overpopulate my
mantlepiece. If we think that the statue and the lump of clay are distinct
but co-located, should we not say the same of the collection of statue parts, the
sub-parts of the clay, and also the set of molecules that compose these? In other
words, if there is reason to think there are two entities on my mantlepiece, then
even apart from (c) above, we have reason to think there may be more than
two entities there.
What does the perdurantist say here? They take the statue and clay to be four-
dimensional entities, with the statue but an extended temporal part of the longer-
lived clay. This respects the intuition that there is only one three-dimensional entity
on the mantelpiece at any time, viz. an instantaneous temporal part that is shared
between the four-dimensional statue and clay. There is also the potential to explain
the difference in historical properties. More on these shortly.
With respect to modal properties though, perdurance is not enough. Our intuition
is that the clay would survive remoulding, but the statue would not. However, if the
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clay would survive remoulding, then surely an extended temporal part of the clay
would do likewise. According to perdurance the statue is an extended temporal part
of the clay; hence it both would and would not survive remoulding. Clearly there is
something wrong here.
In response the perdurantist could abandon their prior claims. That is, they could
(i) admit not only that the four-dimensional statue and clay are distinct, but that
the four-dimensional statue is in fact distinct from any temporal part of the lump
of clay. The statue would remain co-located with a temporal part of the clay, but it
would still be distinct. Alternatively they could retain their part-sharing account, but
(ii) interpret ‘clay talk’ in terms of the relevant matter, whilst understanding ‘statue
talk’ in terms of the form of that matter. In other words claims about the statue
being beautiful, or incapable of surviving certain changes, would be re-interpreted as
claims about the form of the clay. Finally, and probably most familiarly, the per-
durantist might (iii) follow Lewis (1986a:249–263) in adopting a modal counterpart
theory according to which the statue is indeed a temporal part of the clay, but dif-
ferent counterparts of this temporal part become salient depending on whether it is
conceived qua statue or qua (temporal part of a) lump of clay.57
Note that each of these strategies is also open to the endurantist. Nothing in the
notion of an object exactly occupying multiple three-dimensional regions prevents two
objects from being co-located. Nothing in this notion militates against a form-matter
distinction. And nothing in this notion constrains one’s modal theory.
As to the differing historical properties, the perdurantist explains these by observ-
ing that the extended temporal part of the clay that is the statue began after the
clay itself did. Shifting to endurance, we might ask whether the career of the statue
could be part of the career of the clay; and whether the career of the clay might have
begun before that part which pertains to the statue. Perhaps this would be an odd
57It may be that (ii) and (iii) are closely related though. Some of the counterparts mentioned in
(iii) might be thought to be matter -counterparts, whilst others would be form-counterparts.
219
way to talk, but re-expressed in terms of (enduring) objects rather than careers, it
corresponds to something very sensible. The idea is that the (enduring) clay is the
statue, but was not always.
If at this point it be objected that, on pain of contradiction, the clay cannot be
a statue at some times yet not others, then the objector must be referred back to
the discussion of §4.4. I think a better objection is that not enough has been said by
the endurantist to resolve the original difficulty with historical properties. We may
grant that it is only after remoulding, firing, etc. that the clay becomes a statue. This
doubtless explains, to some degree, why the clay has been around for longer than the
statue. But recall that, once it has been appropriately sculpted, fired etc., the clay
is supposed to be the statue. It seems reasonable to ask how long this entity—the
entity that is both the statue and the clay—has been around. Just an hour, or for
somewhat longer?
This question clearly concerns identity over time. If the entity in question is
identical with something four hours ago (and also with something at all times since),
it is (at least) four hours old. If it is identical only with entities located in the last few
minutes then it is far younger. Yet it seems that how ‘far back’ the relevant identity
reaches depends on whether we conceive the relevant entity qua statue or qua clay.
How can this be?
Relative Identity to the rescue! The entity in question—the entity that is both
the statue and the clay—is statue-identical to entities only within the last hour or
so, yet clay-identical to significantly earlier entities. No surprise here: the criteria of
identity for lumps of clay differ from, and are much more lax than, those for statues.
And note that this simply echoes the perdurantist answer. They regard a particular
three-dimensional temporal part as part of both statue and clay. Is it or is it not
genidentical to something that existed four hours ago? Answer: it is clay-genidentical
to something then; it is statue-genidentical to nothing then.
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Fission And Fusion
In fact we have already encountered what could be construed as a case of fission. In
the example of Theseus’ Ship, the single entity present at the start of the story later
‘became two’: the initial entity was ship-identical to Newie, but parts-identical to
(the distinct) Oldie.
The following case of fusion can be dealt with similarly. Tibbles is a cat sat on
a mat. Tib consists of all but a single hair of the feline matter that then composes
Tibbles. Slightly later though, we pluck out the hair in question. Assuming we do
not want to allow distinct but co-located objects, it seems we must say that, post-
plucking, there is just one thing sat on the mat. But is this thing Tib or Tibbles?
Whilst we feel inclined to say that it is both, we recall that these entities used to be
distinct. How can what was once distinct now be identical?
RI provides the answer. Post-plucking there is indeed just one thing on the mat.
It is both a cat and a lump of feline matter. But that thing then on the mat is cat-
identical with the entity previously known as “Tibbles”, and matter-identical with
the entity previously known as “Tib”. The former identity relation might plausibly
reduce (at least roughly) to continuity of vital processes, whereas the latter reduces
to mereological constancy.
These cases involve asymmetric fission or fusion though. It is when we come
to symmetric cases that the endurantist struggles to keep up with the perdurantist.
Because examples of symmetric fusion are hard to make plausible, I will focus on a
case of symmetric fission instead. It is close to one envisaged Parfit (1984:266–267).
Suppose that Jim enters a transporter, but a malfunction occurs and he is ‘twice’
transported to locations equidistant to his target destination. Put less tendentiously,
Jim disappears as normal at t1 when the transporter button is pressed, but then it
seems that two entities (K and L) appear momentarily later at t2. Each of these is
psychologically continuous with, and physically indistinguishable from, Jim as at t1.
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What conclusion will the endurantist draw here? It seems that there are four
exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities:
(1) Jim is identical to K;
(2) Jim is identical to L;
(3) Jim is identical to neither K nor L;
(4) Jim is identical to both K and L.
Of these, (1) and (2) are inconsistent with reductionism about identity, since the
underlying relations between Jim and K are just those between Jim and L. This is
not troubling; (1) and (2) are in any case the least intuitive responses. To be sure, a
primitivist about identity could claim that it is simply brute that Jim is identical to
one of K and L. But this is primitivism at its worst: we could never know which of
K or L is identical to Jim.
If personal identity requires spatiotemporal continuity then teleportation destroys
identity even in ‘straightforward’ (i.e. non-branching) cases. Hence the deviant tele-
portation in our example would certainly mean the end for Jim, thus vindicating (3).
Alternatively, one might hold that whilst ordinary teleportation can be survived, in
our case we must accept (3) because (1), (2) and (4) are so very untenable.58 This ob-
viously rests heavily on the arguments against (4), which arguments we will encounter
before long. But note that (3) is not entirely satisfactory. The continuities between
Jim and K, say, are just those that hold when a standard teleportation produces
K alone; and in such a case Jim and K plausibly would be identical (and the same
applies mutatis mutandis to L). It is disconcerting that something entirely extrinsic
to the relations between Jim and K—namely the existence of L, potentially very far
58At first Parfit refrains from choosing between (1)–(4) on the grounds that they are but different
descriptions of the very same scenario (1984:258–260). However, he writes shortly later that “[s]ince
I cannot be identical with two different people, and it would be arbitrary to call one of these people
me, we can best describe the case by saying neither of these people will be me” (1984:262).
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away—might render Jim and K non-identical.59
As to (4), if Jim were identical with both K and L then by the transitivity of
identity K and L would themselves be identical. Perhaps there is scope here for a
revisionary theory of endurance that allows an enduring object to exactly occupy
distinct simultaneous regions (even when no time travel is involved).60 And there
is certainly some motivation for the view that Jim is identical to K, insofar as the
Jim-K relations are again just what they are in a ‘standard’ teleportation case where
Jim plausibly would be identical to K (and we can say the same for L). Nonetheless
I suspect that most endurantists will deny that K and L are identical, and are thus
forced to deny that Jim is identical to both.
It seems, then, that the endurantist must accept (3). Now one might think this
absolutely right: Jim does not survive ‘double’ teleportation. But if one tends instead
to the contrary intuition, i.e. that Jim does (or could) survive double teleportation,
then the endurantist position is unsatisfying.
Here the perdurantist is in their element. According to Lewis (1976), fission of the
sort envisaged involves two four-dimensional persons sharing an initial set of temporal
parts. Spatiotemporally, each such person is radically discontinuous: the first consists
of the common set of temporal parts until t1, but then a certain spatiotemporally
distant set from t2; the second consists of the common set until t1, but then the other
spatiotemporally distant set from t2. It is indeterminate which (four-dimensional)
person “Jim” refers to, but of course this indeterminacy goes unnoticed until t1.
So can the endurantist somehow mimic this? A single three-dimensional entity
at t1 is, according to the perdurantist, genidentical to two three-dimensional entities
shortly later at t2 (and I do mean “two”: these entities are quite distinct). As before
59A different reading of (3) is possible: K and L are simultaneous parts of a composite entity
existing at t2; and it is this composite entity, rather than K or L themselves, that is identical to
Jim. I think this solution is simply too strange. Can Jim—a person—really be identical to something
two-headed, four-handed, eight-limbed, and with radically non-contiguous parts?
60See fn.55.
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though, if the endurantist claims that a single three-dimensional entity at t1 (i.e. Jim)
is identical with two three-dimensional entities at t2 (i.e. K and L), they cannot also
maintain both the distinctness of K and L and the transitivity of identity. When
they faced a similar problem in the context of Theseus’ Ship, the endurantist could
observe that TS was ship-identical to Newie but parts-identical to Oldie; the different
identity-relations offered them an escape route. Jim, K and L are all persons though;
they are the same type of object. Hence the solution in terms of RI is not available.
What is highlighted here (and in other symmetric cases) is that the relations I
have claimed to underpin identity need not be one-one or transitive. But identity is
one-one and transitive. It seems, then, that an additional, non-branching, condition
is necessary for identity. When it comes to persons, we identify x and y iff they are
non-branchingly psychologically continuous (say).
Might the endurantist try to deny the transitivity of identity? That would allow
Jim to survive double teleportation; he could be identical with both of K and L. I do
not think this a realistic option though. The transitivity of identity is too deeply and
too obviously ingrained in our practices to be gainsaid or revised away. And when
it comes to mathematical-cum-logical instances, qualitative identity, or the identity
that holds between Cicero and Tully (i.e. the same entity by different names), I doubt
that we can even comprehend the non-transitivity of identity.
Nonetheless the perdurantist account might inspire the endurantist to talk, not
of identity, but rather of a different relation. Let us envisage a quidentity relation
that, for the most part, reduces to the very criteria to which I have attempted to
reduce identity. Quidentity is both reflexive and symmetric, but parts company from
identity in two ways. First, there is no “non-branching” rider attached to the criteria
for quidentity. Second, quidentity is not entirely transitive. Only if x is temporally
between y and z does it follow that if x is quidentical to y and also to z then y is
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quidentical to z.61 This allows quidentity to be a formal parallel of genidentity. Each
is almost an equivalence relation, and almost always holds between a single entity
at one time and a single entity at another. Only in cases of fission and fusion do
exceptions to this arise.
The fact remains that Jim does not survive the malfunctioning teleporter. Post-
teleportation, no-one is identical to Jim. If this is counter-intuitive, then so be it:
endurance does not respect the relevant intuition. It can come close though, insofar
as Jim is quidentical to two people post-teleportation, and quidentity is a relation
that exactly coincides with identity in almost every other case. To conclude on a
Parfittian note, I believe that Jim should care little about being merely quidentical
to someone (in fact to two people) post-teleportation. It is the underlying continuities
that matter, rather than whether these licence talk of identity, genidentity or even
quidentity.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has covered much ground. Beginning with an apparent threat to per-
durance, namely the RDA (§7.2), I soon came to focus on a response that posited
non-supervenient relations as the grounds for genidentity (§7.2.3). I criticized this
response, both at the macroscopic and microscopic level, before going on to frame
parallel criticisms of what I took to be an analogous view: primitivism about identity
(§7.3). Such primitivism fails to accord sufficient respect to criteria of identity, and
moreover it renders our knowledge of identity quite obscure.
Instead I have proposed that identity reduces to its apparent criteria; the holding of
identity amounts to no more than the holding of these criteria (§7.4). I take this to be
true even at the microscopic level, in which case endurance joins perdurance in being
61More intuitively, this means that entities on different branches of a forked continuity may each
be quidentical to an entity at or below the branch point, but may not be quidentical to one another.
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potentially susceptible to the RDA (§7.2.4). Indeed, this parallelism is unsurprising;
for genidentity is standardly taken to reduce, in most cases, to those continuities that
(in my opinion) identity similarly reduces to. I then backed Sider’s response to the
RDA (§7.4.4).
Next I reconsidered an idea from Chapter Six: that the debate between endurantist
and perdurantist might be less than substantive. Revisiting §6.2, I considered in
§7.5.1 the Lewisian “arrangement of qualities”, together with the continuities that
this generates. I contended that the very same Humean tapestry could support either
endurance or perdurance. Each option seems possible, and neither would in any way
‘reveal itself’. But I then suggested that there might be genuine indeterminacy here;
that perhaps the facts of persistence are not woven into the tapestry, but depend
rather on how we choose to describe it.
Whether one agrees with this or not, it may yet be true that the endurantist
can learn from the perdurantist when it comes to certain diachronic puzzle cases.
In §7.5.2 I attempted to supply endurantist analogues of the standard perdurantist
solutions, guided to some extent by my earlier discussions of (potential) equivalence.
Relative Identity was a central (and undeniably controversial) feature of some of these
analogues. But my contention was not just that Relative Identity might assist the
endurantist here; I claimed in addition that it emerges naturally from (i) a desire to
avoid distinct but co-located objects, and (ii) a belief that identity for different kinds
of object reduces to different, and potentially divergent, criteria.
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